Lockyer v. Andrade
Encyclopedia
Lockyer v. Andrade, , decided the same day as Ewing v. California
, held that there would be no relief by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
from a sentence imposed under California's three strikes law
as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. Relying on the reasoning of Ewing and Harmelin v. Michigan
, , the Court ruled that because no "clearly established" law held that a three-strikes sentence was cruel and unusual punishment, the 50-years-to-life sentence imposed in this case was not cruel and unusual punishment.
. Two weeks later, he stole four videotapes from a different K-Mart store in Montclair, California
. Andrade had been in and out of the state and federal prison systems since 1982. By the time of these two crimes in 1995, he had been convicted of petty theft, residential burglary, transportation of marijuana, and escape from prison. As a result of these prior convictions, the prosecution charged Andrade with two counts of petty theft with a prior conviction, which under California
law can either be a felony or a misdemeanor. Under California's three strikes law, any felony can serve as the third "strike" and thereby expose the defendant to a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life in prison.
The trial court denied Andrade's request to classify the two petty theft charges as misdemeanors, and Andrade was ultimately convicted of the two felony theft charges. As a result of his prior convictions, Andrade was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison. (The State conceded at oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court that the California Supreme Court had decided a case since Andrade's conviction that might allow him to petition the trial court to reduce his sentence to one 25-years-to-life term.) The California Court of Appeal
affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied discretionary review.
Andrade next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Central District of California
. Andrade argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment
ban on cruel and unusual punishment, but the district court rejected this claim. Andrade appealed, and the Ninth Circuit
, after reviewing the relevant Supreme Court decisions, concluded that the district court was wrong. The State of California asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit's decision, and it agreed to do so.
, , its procedural posture was different. Ewing was a case on direct review from the California state court system, meaning that the Supreme Court was deciding in the first instance whether a three-strikes sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. If the defendant in Ewing had prevailed in the Supreme Court, he would have received a new sentencing hearing. Andrade, by contrast, was an appeal from a federal habeas petition. If the Court was to reach the same result in Andrade as it did in Ewing, it had to travel a different path to arrive there.
Because of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Court could not grant relief unless the decision of the state courts to uphold Andrade's sentence was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States". This meant that the Court's first task was to identify what that "clearly established" law was. The Court examined its prior holdings, and found three that were relevant—Rummel v. Estelle
, ; Solem v. Helm
, ; and Harmelin v. Michigan
, . Although these precedents were not a "model of clarity", the Court concluded that a "gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years", but that the "precise contours" of this principle were unclear and applied only in the "exceedingly rare and extreme case". In Solem, the sentence did not allow for parole, and the Court had held it was cruel and unusual; in Rummel, the sentence did allow for parole, and the Court had held it was not cruel and unusual. In this case, like in Rummel, Andrade retained the opportunity for parole, even if that possibility was remote. Because the gross disproportionality principle applied in only an extreme case, the Court concluded that the California courts did not unreasonably apply it to Andrade's sentence.
protested that Andrade's criminal history and triggering offenses were less severe than those of the defendant in Ewing, yet Andrade received a harsher sentence. He argued that the sentence in this case was indistinguishable from that in Solem, and thus required the Court to grant relief. "Andrade, like the defendant in Solem, was a repeat offender who committed theft of trifling value, some $150, and their criminal records are comparable, including burglary (though Andrade's were residential), with no violent crimes or crimes against the person." Because Andrade was 37 at the time of the offenses in this case, the 50-years-to-life sentence was effectively life without parole. The only way Souter could distinguish the sentence in this case and the sentence in Solem was "to reject the practical equivalence of a life sentence without parole and one with parole eligibility at 87".
Moreover, the fact that California's three-strikes law embodied one penological theory — the theory of incapacitation
— facilitated judicial review of sentences imposed under it with reference to the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. The incapacitation theory could not, Souter argued, justify sentencing a person to 25 more years in prison for an identical, trifling crime committed two weeks after the first. "Since the defendant's condition has not changed between the two closely related thefts, the incapacitation penalty is not open to the simple arithmetic of multiplying the punishment by two, without resulting in gross disproportion even under the State's chosen benchmark". For Souter, the sentence in this case presented one of those rare cases that the Eighth Amendment allowed the Court to set it aside.
Ewing v. California
Ewing v. California, , is one of two cases upholding a sentence imposed under California's three strikes law against a challenge that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. As in its prior decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, , the Court could not agree on...
, held that there would be no relief by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
Habeas corpus
is a writ, or legal action, through which a prisoner can be released from unlawful detention. The remedy can be sought by the prisoner or by another person coming to his aid. Habeas corpus originated in the English legal system, but it is now available in many nations...
from a sentence imposed under California's three strikes law
Three strikes law
Three strikes laws)"are statutes enacted by state governments in the United States which require the state courts to hand down a mandatory and extended period of incarceration to persons who have been convicted of a serious criminal offense on three or more separate occasions. These statutes became...
as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution is the part of the United States Bill of Rights which prohibits the federal government from imposing excessive bail, excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishments. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that this amendment's Cruel and Unusual...
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. Relying on the reasoning of Ewing and Harmelin v. Michigan
Harmelin v. Michigan
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 , was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution...
, , the Court ruled that because no "clearly established" law held that a three-strikes sentence was cruel and unusual punishment, the 50-years-to-life sentence imposed in this case was not cruel and unusual punishment.
Facts
On November 4, 1995, Andrade stole five videotapes from a K-Mart store in Ontario, CaliforniaOntario, California
Ontario is a city located in San Bernardino County, California, United States, 35 miles east of downtown Los Angeles. Located in the western part of the Inland Empire region, it lies just east of the Los Angeles county line and is part of the Greater Los Angeles Area...
. Two weeks later, he stole four videotapes from a different K-Mart store in Montclair, California
Montclair, California
Montclair is a city in San Bernardino County, California, United States. The population was 36,664 at the 2010 United States Census.The current mayor is Paul M. Eaton.-Description:...
. Andrade had been in and out of the state and federal prison systems since 1982. By the time of these two crimes in 1995, he had been convicted of petty theft, residential burglary, transportation of marijuana, and escape from prison. As a result of these prior convictions, the prosecution charged Andrade with two counts of petty theft with a prior conviction, which under California
California
California is a state located on the West Coast of the United States. It is by far the most populous U.S. state, and the third-largest by land area...
law can either be a felony or a misdemeanor. Under California's three strikes law, any felony can serve as the third "strike" and thereby expose the defendant to a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life in prison.
The trial court denied Andrade's request to classify the two petty theft charges as misdemeanors, and Andrade was ultimately convicted of the two felony theft charges. As a result of his prior convictions, Andrade was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison. (The State conceded at oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court that the California Supreme Court had decided a case since Andrade's conviction that might allow him to petition the trial court to reduce his sentence to one 25-years-to-life term.) The California Court of Appeal
California Court of Appeal
The California Courts of Appeal are the state intermediate appellate courts in the U.S. state of California. The state is geographically divided into six appellate districts...
affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied discretionary review.
Andrade next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Central District of California
United States District Court for the Central District of California
The United States District Court for the Central District of California serves over 18 million people in southern and central California, making it the largest federal judicial district by population...
. Andrade argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution is the part of the United States Bill of Rights which prohibits the federal government from imposing excessive bail, excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishments. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that this amendment's Cruel and Unusual...
ban on cruel and unusual punishment, but the district court rejected this claim. Andrade appealed, and the Ninth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is a U.S. federal court with appellate jurisdiction over the district courts in the following districts:* District of Alaska* District of Arizona...
, after reviewing the relevant Supreme Court decisions, concluded that the district court was wrong. The State of California asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit's decision, and it agreed to do so.
Majority opinion
Although this case involved the same legal claim as Ewing v. CaliforniaEwing v. California
Ewing v. California, , is one of two cases upholding a sentence imposed under California's three strikes law against a challenge that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. As in its prior decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, , the Court could not agree on...
, , its procedural posture was different. Ewing was a case on direct review from the California state court system, meaning that the Supreme Court was deciding in the first instance whether a three-strikes sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. If the defendant in Ewing had prevailed in the Supreme Court, he would have received a new sentencing hearing. Andrade, by contrast, was an appeal from a federal habeas petition. If the Court was to reach the same result in Andrade as it did in Ewing, it had to travel a different path to arrive there.
Because of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Court could not grant relief unless the decision of the state courts to uphold Andrade's sentence was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States". This meant that the Court's first task was to identify what that "clearly established" law was. The Court examined its prior holdings, and found three that were relevant—Rummel v. Estelle
Rummel v. Estelle
Rummel v. Estelle 445 U.S. 263 is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a life sentence with the possibility of parole for William James Rummel for a felony fraud crime amounting to $120.75...
, ; Solem v. Helm
Solem v. Helm
Solem v. Helm, , was a United States Supreme Court case concerned with the scope of the Eighth Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment. Mr. Helm, who had written a check from a fictitious account and had reached his seventh nonviolent felony conviction since 1964, received a...
, ; and Harmelin v. Michigan
Harmelin v. Michigan
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 , was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution...
, . Although these precedents were not a "model of clarity", the Court concluded that a "gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years", but that the "precise contours" of this principle were unclear and applied only in the "exceedingly rare and extreme case". In Solem, the sentence did not allow for parole, and the Court had held it was cruel and unusual; in Rummel, the sentence did allow for parole, and the Court had held it was not cruel and unusual. In this case, like in Rummel, Andrade retained the opportunity for parole, even if that possibility was remote. Because the gross disproportionality principle applied in only an extreme case, the Court concluded that the California courts did not unreasonably apply it to Andrade's sentence.
Dissenting opinion
Justice David SouterDavid Souter
David Hackett Souter is a former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. He served from 1990 until his retirement on June 29, 2009. Appointed by President George H. W. Bush to fill the seat vacated by William J...
protested that Andrade's criminal history and triggering offenses were less severe than those of the defendant in Ewing, yet Andrade received a harsher sentence. He argued that the sentence in this case was indistinguishable from that in Solem, and thus required the Court to grant relief. "Andrade, like the defendant in Solem, was a repeat offender who committed theft of trifling value, some $150, and their criminal records are comparable, including burglary (though Andrade's were residential), with no violent crimes or crimes against the person." Because Andrade was 37 at the time of the offenses in this case, the 50-years-to-life sentence was effectively life without parole. The only way Souter could distinguish the sentence in this case and the sentence in Solem was "to reject the practical equivalence of a life sentence without parole and one with parole eligibility at 87".
Moreover, the fact that California's three-strikes law embodied one penological theory — the theory of incapacitation
Incapacitation (penology)
Incapacitation in the context of sentencing philosophy refers to the effect of a sentence in terms of positively preventing future offending....
— facilitated judicial review of sentences imposed under it with reference to the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. The incapacitation theory could not, Souter argued, justify sentencing a person to 25 more years in prison for an identical, trifling crime committed two weeks after the first. "Since the defendant's condition has not changed between the two closely related thefts, the incapacitation penalty is not open to the simple arithmetic of multiplying the punishment by two, without resulting in gross disproportion even under the State's chosen benchmark". For Souter, the sentence in this case presented one of those rare cases that the Eighth Amendment allowed the Court to set it aside.