Day of Deceit
Encyclopedia
Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor is a book by Robert Stinnett
alleging that the Roosevelt administration deliberately provoked and allowed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
in order to bring the United States
into World War II
. Stinnett claimed to have found information showing that the attacking fleet was detected through radio and intelligence intercepts, but that the information was deliberately withheld from Admiral Kimmel
, the commander of the base.
First released in December 1999, it received a cautiously positive review in the New York Times and is frequently referenced by proponents of advance knowledge theories
. Historians of the period, however, in general reject its thesis, pointing to several key errors and reliance on doubtful sources.
) in October 1940, which was obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. McCollum, who was head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence at the time, discussed the strategic situation in the Pacific and ended with a list of eight actions directed at the Japanese threat. Stinnett characterizes the actions as "provocations" and states his belief McCollum's point F ("Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands") was intended to lure the Japanese into attacking it. He ignores the fact a war between the U.S. and Japan is contrary to President Roosevelt's desire to aid Britain, and Prime Minister Churchill's desire to avoid "another war". His belief is the overall intent was supposedly to provoke an act of war which would allow Roosevelt to enter into active conflict with Germany in support of the United Kingdom. This would be contrary to Britain's best interests, and Churchill and Roosevelt knew it; Hitler certainly did. In actuality, Stinnett attributes to McCollum a position McCollum expressly refuted. Furthermore, McCollum's own sworn testimony also refutes it.
Short
and Kimmel were ordered to remain in a defensive posture with respect to the Japanese. Stinnett claims, however, that intelligence intercepts were deliberately withheld from them in order to prevent them from mounting an adequate defense. He also claims radio traffic was intercepted from the fleet as it approached Hawaii, allowing it to be tracked, but that again this information was withheld so that the defenders would be unprepared. All of this, he alleges, was directed from the White House itself with Roosevelt's knowledge and at his behest.
Stinnett's claims of "intercepts" are contradicted by Japanese testimony, which unequivocally state there were none, and even transmitter keys were removed. (The claim of a need for "low-power radio" made by Stinnett ignores standard fleet practise under radio silence, use of flag or blinker. ) Morover, his "intercepts" do not amount to direction finding
bearings, contrary to his claims, while his document allegedly showing the plot of these nonexistent bearings contains nothing of the kind.
"If there was this vast and humongous conspiracy", its members had to number in the hundreds. Among them would have to be Lt. Kermit Tyler who, on the morning of 7 December, was contacted about a radar contact on an inbound flight, and told the operators to forget about it. One would also have to include the Navy duty officer, who was asleep when Ward
first tried to report a minsub contact, thereby losing over three hours' warning. It would also include the officer who ordered AAF fighters be parked in close proximity to avoid sabotage. Also included would be the senior antiaircraft officers, who ordered ammunition to be locked up far from the guns.
quotes CIA historian Donald Steury:
Certain points in Stennitt's argument were disputed by many reviewers. His characterization of the McCollum memorandum was not accepted by Conrad Crane, who wrote:
Philip Zelikow, writing in Foreign Affairs
, objected to Stennitt's claim that the Japanese naval code was being read at the time (the JN-25
code was changed shortly before the attack and was not decrypted again until May 1942), an objection also raised by Crane. A review posted on the U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association website addresses the intelligence issues in greater detail and disputes claims that the fleet was detected through direction finding; the author also criticizes Stinnett's use of testimony from Robert Ogg, originally identified as "Seaman Z" by Toland in his 1986 book. Indeed, Ogg expressly denies saying what Toland quotes him as saying. In their annotations on the 1995 Pentagon study of the attack, Frederic Borch
and Daniel Martinez, chief historian at the USS Arizona Memorial
, also dispute these claims and call his claims "totally false".
Furthermore, Stinnett makes numerous and contradictory claims of the number of messages originated by the Kido Butai, attributing to it messages from shore stations, Yamamoto's flagship (which was not accompanying the task force), deception measures, and traffic from before the task force even sailed. Moreover, he finds "not a single one" originating from the Kido Butai after it sortied 26 November.
Robert Stinnett
Robert B. Stinnett is a former American sailor who earned ten battle stars and a Presidential Unit Citation. He is the author of Day of Deceit, regarding U.S. government advance knowledge of the World War II Pearl Harbor attack.-Biography:...
alleging that the Roosevelt administration deliberately provoked and allowed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
Attack on Pearl Harbor
The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise military strike conducted by the Imperial Japanese Navy against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on the morning of December 7, 1941...
in order to bring the United States
United States
The United States of America is a federal constitutional republic comprising fifty states and a federal district...
into World War II
World War II
World War II, or the Second World War , was a global conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945, involving most of the world's nations—including all of the great powers—eventually forming two opposing military alliances: the Allies and the Axis...
. Stinnett claimed to have found information showing that the attacking fleet was detected through radio and intelligence intercepts, but that the information was deliberately withheld from Admiral Kimmel
Husband E. Kimmel
Husband Edward Kimmel was a four-star admiral in the United States Navy. He served as Commander-in-chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Because of the attack, he was removed from office and was reduced to his permanent two-star rank of rear admiral...
, the commander of the base.
First released in December 1999, it received a cautiously positive review in the New York Times and is frequently referenced by proponents of advance knowledge theories
Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate
The Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory is the idea that the American officials had advance knowledge of Japan's December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor...
. Historians of the period, however, in general reject its thesis, pointing to several key errors and reliance on doubtful sources.
Thesis
Stinnett's starting point is a memorandum written by Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum (the McCollum memoMcCollum memo
The McCollum memo, also known as the Eight Action Memo was a memorandum, dated October 7, 1940 The McCollum memo, also known as the Eight Action Memo was a memorandum, dated October 7, 1940 The McCollum memo, also known as the Eight Action Memo was a memorandum, dated October 7, 1940 (more than a...
) in October 1940, which was obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. McCollum, who was head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence at the time, discussed the strategic situation in the Pacific and ended with a list of eight actions directed at the Japanese threat. Stinnett characterizes the actions as "provocations" and states his belief McCollum's point F ("Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands") was intended to lure the Japanese into attacking it. He ignores the fact a war between the U.S. and Japan is contrary to President Roosevelt's desire to aid Britain, and Prime Minister Churchill's desire to avoid "another war". His belief is the overall intent was supposedly to provoke an act of war which would allow Roosevelt to enter into active conflict with Germany in support of the United Kingdom. This would be contrary to Britain's best interests, and Churchill and Roosevelt knew it; Hitler certainly did. In actuality, Stinnett attributes to McCollum a position McCollum expressly refuted. Furthermore, McCollum's own sworn testimony also refutes it.
Short
Walter Short
Walter Campbell Short was a Major General in the United States Army and the U.S. military Commander responsible for the defense of U.S. military installations in Hawaii at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.-Early life:He was born in 1880 in Fillmore, Illinois...
and Kimmel were ordered to remain in a defensive posture with respect to the Japanese. Stinnett claims, however, that intelligence intercepts were deliberately withheld from them in order to prevent them from mounting an adequate defense. He also claims radio traffic was intercepted from the fleet as it approached Hawaii, allowing it to be tracked, but that again this information was withheld so that the defenders would be unprepared. All of this, he alleges, was directed from the White House itself with Roosevelt's knowledge and at his behest.
Stinnett's claims of "intercepts" are contradicted by Japanese testimony, which unequivocally state there were none, and even transmitter keys were removed. (The claim of a need for "low-power radio" made by Stinnett ignores standard fleet practise under radio silence, use of flag or blinker. ) Morover, his "intercepts" do not amount to direction finding
Direction finding
Direction finding refers to the establishment of the direction from which a received signal was transmitted. This can refer to radio or other forms of wireless communication...
bearings, contrary to his claims, while his document allegedly showing the plot of these nonexistent bearings contains nothing of the kind.
"If there was this vast and humongous conspiracy", its members had to number in the hundreds. Among them would have to be Lt. Kermit Tyler who, on the morning of 7 December, was contacted about a radar contact on an inbound flight, and told the operators to forget about it. One would also have to include the Navy duty officer, who was asleep when Ward
USS Ward (DD-139)
USS Ward was a Wickes-class destroyer in the United States Navy during World War I, later APD-16 in World War II...
first tried to report a minsub contact, thereby losing over three hours' warning. It would also include the officer who ordered AAF fighters be parked in close proximity to avoid sabotage. Also included would be the senior antiaircraft officers, who ordered ammunition to be locked up far from the guns.
Reception
Historians of the period are dismissive of Stinnett's claims. An article in SalonSalon.com
Salon.com, part of Salon Media Group , often just called Salon, is an online liberal magazine, with content updated each weekday. Salon was founded by David Talbot and launched on November 20, 1995. It was the internet's first online-only commercial publication. The magazine focuses on U.S...
quotes CIA historian Donald Steury:
[Stinnett] concocted this theory pretty much from whole cloth. Those who have been able to check his alleged sources also are unanimous in their condemnation of his methodology. Basically, the author has made up his sources; when he does not make up the source, he lies about what the source says.
Certain points in Stennitt's argument were disputed by many reviewers. His characterization of the McCollum memorandum was not accepted by Conrad Crane, who wrote:
A close reading shows that its recommendations were supposed to deter and contain Japan, while better preparing the United States for a future conflict in the Pacific. There is an offhand remark that an overt Japanese act of war would make it easier to garner public support for actions against Japan, but the document's intent was not to ensure that event happened.
Philip Zelikow, writing in Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs is an American magazine and website on international relations and U.S. foreign policy published since 1922 by the Council on Foreign Relations six times annually...
, objected to Stennitt's claim that the Japanese naval code was being read at the time (the JN-25
JN-25
The vulnerability of Japanese naval codes and ciphers was crucial to the conduct of World War II, and had an important influence on foreign relations between Japan and the west in the years leading up to the war as well...
code was changed shortly before the attack and was not decrypted again until May 1942), an objection also raised by Crane. A review posted on the U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association website addresses the intelligence issues in greater detail and disputes claims that the fleet was detected through direction finding; the author also criticizes Stinnett's use of testimony from Robert Ogg, originally identified as "Seaman Z" by Toland in his 1986 book. Indeed, Ogg expressly denies saying what Toland quotes him as saying. In their annotations on the 1995 Pentagon study of the attack, Frederic Borch
Fred Borch
Colonel Frederic L. Borch is a former military attorney who served as Chief Prosecutor of the Guantanamo military commissions before he was replaced by Robert L. Swann after it was alleged that Borch was trying to corrupt the commissions.-Background:...
and Daniel Martinez, chief historian at the USS Arizona Memorial
USS Arizona Memorial
The USS Arizona Memorial, located at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii, marks the resting place of 1,102 of the 1,177 sailors killed on the USS Arizona during the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 by Japanese imperial forces and commemorates the events of that day...
, also dispute these claims and call his claims "totally false".
Furthermore, Stinnett makes numerous and contradictory claims of the number of messages originated by the Kido Butai, attributing to it messages from shore stations, Yamamoto's flagship (which was not accompanying the task force), deception measures, and traffic from before the task force even sailed. Moreover, he finds "not a single one" originating from the Kido Butai after it sortied 26 November.