Expressivism
Encyclopedia
Expressivism in meta-ethics
is a theory about the meaning of moral language
. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms–for example, “It is wrong to torture an innocent human being”–are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as “wrong,” “good,” or “just” do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth condition
s. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth
that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.
– as well as realist accounts – e.g. ethical intuitionism
.
Because expressivism claims that the function of moral language is not descriptive, it allows the irrealist to avoid an error theory: the view that ordinary moral thought and discourse is committed to deep and pervasive error, and that all moral statements make false ontological claims.
: the descriptivist view that utterances of the type “X is good/bad” mean “I approve/disapprove of X”. Subjectivism is a descriptivist theory, not an expressivist one, because it maintains that moral sentences are used to represent facts–namely, facts about the subject’s psychological states.
Historical development: from noncognitivism/emotivism
Some early versions of expressivism arose during the early twentieth century in association with logical positivism
. These early views are typically called “noncognitivist
”. A. J. Ayer’s emotivism
is a well-known example.
According to emotivism, the act of uttering a moral sentence of the type “X is good (bad)” is closely akin to the expression of a positive (or negative) emotional attitude toward X, and such an utterance can be paraphrased by “Hurrah for X!” or “Boo, X!”
C. L. Stevenson
also advanced an important version of emotivism.
At the beginning of the middle of the twentieth century, R. M. Hare
was an important advocate of expressivism / noncognitivism. Hare’s view is called prescriptivism
because he analyzed moral sentences as universal, overriding prescriptions or imperatives. A prescriptivist might paraphrase “X is good” as “Do X!”.
More recent versions of expressivism, such as Simon Blackburn’s
“quasi-realism
”, Allan Gibbard’s
“norm-expressivism”, and Mark Timmons’ and Terence Horgan’s “cognitivist expressivism” tend to distance themselves from the “noncognitivist” label applied to Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare. What distinguishes these “new wave” expressivists is that they resist reductive analyses
of moral sentences or their corresponding psychological states, moral judgments, and they allow for moral sentences/judgments to have truth value.
Horgan and Timmons’ label “cognitivist expressivism” in particular captures the philosophical commitment they share with Blackburn and Gibbard to regard moral judgments as cognitive psychological states, i.e. belief
s, and moral sentences as vehicles for genuine assertions or truth-claims. Much of the current expressivist project is occupied with defending a theory of the truth of moral sentences that is consistent with expressivism but can resist the Frege-Geach objection (see below). Expressivists tend to rely on a minimalist or deflationary theory of truth
to provide an irrealist account for the truth of moral sentences.
(originally articulated by intuitionist
and non-naturalist
G. E. Moore), for any proposed definition of a moral term, e.g. " 'good' = 'the object of desire' ", a competent speaker of English who understands the meaning of the terms involved in the statement of the definition could still hold that the question, "Is the object of desire good?" remains unanswered.
The upshot of this argument is that normative or moral terms cannot be analytically reduced to "natural" or non-moral terms. Expressivists argue that the best explanation of this irreducibility is that moral terms are not used to describe objects, but rather to evaluate them. Many philosophers regard expressivists or noncognitivists as "the real historical beneficiar[ies] of the [open question argument."
Some moral realists
maintain that a synthetic reduction of moral terms to natural terms is possible. Other realists (including Moore himself) have concluded that moral terms refer to non-natural, sui generis
properties or relations; but non-naturalism is vulnerable to the argument from queerness (see below).
, who developed it from the writings of Gottlob Frege
— claims that by subscribing to Expressivism one necessarily accepts that the meaning of "It is wrong to tell lies" is different from the meaning of the "it is wrong to tell lies" part of the conditional "If it is wrong to tell lies, then it is wrong to get your little brother to lie", and that therefore Expressivism is an inadequate explanation for moral language.
Frege–Geach contends that "It is wrong to get your little brother to tell lies" can be deduced from the two premises by modus ponens
as follows:
In the second statement the expressivist account appears to fail, in that the speaker asserting the hypothetical premise is expressing no moral position towards lying, condemnatory or otherwise. The expressivist thus cannot account for the meaning of moral language in this kind of unasserted context.
Proponents of expressivism are concerned to preserve the participants in ordinary moral thought and discourse from charges of deep error. But, Cuneo argues, there is evidence that many such participants do intend to represent a factual moral reality when they make moral judgments. Hence, if the expressivists are correct and moral language is not properly used to make factual, descriptive assertions, many participants in ordinary moral discourse are frustrated in their illocutionary act
intentions. On these grounds it is argued that we should give up expressivism, unless the expressivists are to give up on their claim that expressivism is not an essentially revisionist view of moral thought and discourse.
Meta-ethics
In philosophy, meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments. Meta-ethics is one of the three branches of ethics generally recognized by philosophers, the others being normative ethics and applied ethics. Ethical...
is a theory about the meaning of moral language
Morality
Morality is the differentiation among intentions, decisions, and actions between those that are good and bad . A moral code is a system of morality and a moral is any one practice or teaching within a moral code...
. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms–for example, “It is wrong to torture an innocent human being”–are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as “wrong,” “good,” or “just” do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth condition
Truth condition
In semantics, truth conditions are what obtain precisely when a sentence is true. For example, "It is snowing in Nebraska" is true precisely when it is snowing in Nebraska....
s. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth
Truth
Truth has a variety of meanings, such as the state of being in accord with fact or reality. It can also mean having fidelity to an original or to a standard or ideal. In a common usage, it also means constancy or sincerity in action or character...
that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.
Expressivism
Expressivism is a form of moral anti-realism or nonfactualism: the view that there are no moral facts that moral sentences describe or represent, and no moral properties or relations to which moral terms refer. Expressivists deny constructivist accounts of moral facts – e.g. KantianismKantianism
Kantianism is the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher born in Königsberg, Prussia . The term Kantianism or Kantian is sometimes also used to describe contemporary positions in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics.-Ethics:Kantian ethics are deontological, revolving entirely...
– as well as realist accounts – e.g. ethical intuitionism
Ethical intuitionism
Ethical intuitionism is usually understood as a meta-ethical theory that embraces the following theses:# Moral realism, the view that there are objective facts of morality,...
.
Because expressivism claims that the function of moral language is not descriptive, it allows the irrealist to avoid an error theory: the view that ordinary moral thought and discourse is committed to deep and pervasive error, and that all moral statements make false ontological claims.
Expressivism distinguished from descriptivist subjectivism
Expressivism does not hold that the function of moral sentences as used in ordinary discourse is to describe the speaker’s moral attitudes. Expressivists are united in rejecting ethical subjectivismEthical subjectivism
Ethical subjectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:# Ethical sentences express propositions.# Some such propositions are true.# Those propositions are about the attitudes of people.This makes ethical subjectivism a form of cognitivism...
: the descriptivist view that utterances of the type “X is good/bad” mean “I approve/disapprove of X”. Subjectivism is a descriptivist theory, not an expressivist one, because it maintains that moral sentences are used to represent facts–namely, facts about the subject’s psychological states.
Historical development: from noncognitivism/emotivismEmotivismEmotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. Influenced by the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positivism in the 20th century, the theory was stated vividly by A. J. Ayer in his 1936 book Language, Truth and...
to cognitivist expressivism
| Some expressivist philosophers | a representative work: | |
|---|---|---|
| A. J. Ayer | Language, Truth, and Logic | 1936 |
| C. L. Stevenson | The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms | 1937 |
| R. M. Hare R. M. Hare Richard Mervyn Hare was an English moral philosopher who held the post of White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 1966 until 1983. He subsequently taught for a number of years at the University of Florida... |
The Language of Morals | 1952 |
| Simon Blackburn Simon Blackburn Simon Blackburn is a British academic philosopher known for his work in quasi-realism and his efforts to popularise philosophy. He recently retired as professor of philosophy at the University of Cambridge, but remains a distinguished research professor of philosophy at the University of North... |
Essays in Quasi-Realism Quasi-realism Quasi-realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:# Ethical sentences do not express propositions.# Instead, ethical sentences project emotional attitudes as though they were real properties.... |
1993 |
| Allan Gibbard Allan Gibbard Allan Gibbard is the Richard B. Brandt Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Allan Gibbard has made several contributions to contemporary ethical theory, in particular metaethics... |
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings | 1990 |
| Mark Timmons | Morality without Foundations | 1999 |
| Terence Horgan (with Mark Timmons) | Cognitivist Expressivism | 2006 |
Some early versions of expressivism arose during the early twentieth century in association with logical positivism
Logical positivism
Logical positivism is a philosophy that combines empiricism—the idea that observational evidence is indispensable for knowledge—with a version of rationalism incorporating mathematical and logico-linguistic constructs and deductions of epistemology.It may be considered as a type of analytic...
. These early views are typically called “noncognitivist
Non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions and thus cannot be true or false...
”. A. J. Ayer’s emotivism
Emotivism
Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. Influenced by the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positivism in the 20th century, the theory was stated vividly by A. J. Ayer in his 1936 book Language, Truth and...
is a well-known example.
According to emotivism, the act of uttering a moral sentence of the type “X is good (bad)” is closely akin to the expression of a positive (or negative) emotional attitude toward X, and such an utterance can be paraphrased by “Hurrah for X!” or “Boo, X!”
C. L. Stevenson
Charles Stevenson
Charles Leslie Stevenson was an American analytic philosopher best known for his work in ethics and aesthetics....
also advanced an important version of emotivism.
At the beginning of the middle of the twentieth century, R. M. Hare
R. M. Hare
Richard Mervyn Hare was an English moral philosopher who held the post of White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 1966 until 1983. He subsequently taught for a number of years at the University of Florida...
was an important advocate of expressivism / noncognitivism. Hare’s view is called prescriptivism
Universal prescriptivism
Universal prescriptivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that, rather than expressing propositions, ethical sentences function similarly to imperatives which are universalizable — whoever makes a moral judgment is committed to the same judgment in any situation where the same relevant facts...
because he analyzed moral sentences as universal, overriding prescriptions or imperatives. A prescriptivist might paraphrase “X is good” as “Do X!”.
More recent versions of expressivism, such as Simon Blackburn’s
Simon Blackburn
Simon Blackburn is a British academic philosopher known for his work in quasi-realism and his efforts to popularise philosophy. He recently retired as professor of philosophy at the University of Cambridge, but remains a distinguished research professor of philosophy at the University of North...
“quasi-realism
Quasi-realism
Quasi-realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:# Ethical sentences do not express propositions.# Instead, ethical sentences project emotional attitudes as though they were real properties....
”, Allan Gibbard’s
Allan Gibbard
Allan Gibbard is the Richard B. Brandt Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Allan Gibbard has made several contributions to contemporary ethical theory, in particular metaethics...
“norm-expressivism”, and Mark Timmons’ and Terence Horgan’s “cognitivist expressivism” tend to distance themselves from the “noncognitivist” label applied to Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare. What distinguishes these “new wave” expressivists is that they resist reductive analyses
Reduction (philosophy)
In philosophy, reduction is the process by which one object, property, concept, theory, etc., is shown to be explicable in terms of another, lower level, entity...
of moral sentences or their corresponding psychological states, moral judgments, and they allow for moral sentences/judgments to have truth value.
Horgan and Timmons’ label “cognitivist expressivism” in particular captures the philosophical commitment they share with Blackburn and Gibbard to regard moral judgments as cognitive psychological states, i.e. belief
Belief
Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a proposition or premise to be true.-Belief, knowledge and epistemology:The terms belief and knowledge are used differently in philosophy....
s, and moral sentences as vehicles for genuine assertions or truth-claims. Much of the current expressivist project is occupied with defending a theory of the truth of moral sentences that is consistent with expressivism but can resist the Frege-Geach objection (see below). Expressivists tend to rely on a minimalist or deflationary theory of truth
Truth
Truth has a variety of meanings, such as the state of being in accord with fact or reality. It can also mean having fidelity to an original or to a standard or ideal. In a common usage, it also means constancy or sincerity in action or character...
to provide an irrealist account for the truth of moral sentences.
The Open Question Argument
According to the open question argumentArgument
In philosophy and logic, an argument is an attempt to persuade someone of something, or give evidence or reasons for accepting a particular conclusion.Argument may also refer to:-Mathematics and computer science:...
(originally articulated by intuitionist
Ethical intuitionism
Ethical intuitionism is usually understood as a meta-ethical theory that embraces the following theses:# Moral realism, the view that there are objective facts of morality,...
and non-naturalist
Ethical non-naturalism
Ethical non-naturalism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:# Ethical sentences express propositions.# Some such propositions are true.# Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion....
G. E. Moore), for any proposed definition of a moral term, e.g. " 'good' = 'the object of desire' ", a competent speaker of English who understands the meaning of the terms involved in the statement of the definition could still hold that the question, "Is the object of desire good?" remains unanswered.
The upshot of this argument is that normative or moral terms cannot be analytically reduced to "natural" or non-moral terms. Expressivists argue that the best explanation of this irreducibility is that moral terms are not used to describe objects, but rather to evaluate them. Many philosophers regard expressivists or noncognitivists as "the real historical beneficiar[ies] of the [open question argument."
Some moral realists
Moral realism
Moral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:# Ethical sentences express propositions.# Some such propositions are true.# Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion....
maintain that a synthetic reduction of moral terms to natural terms is possible. Other realists (including Moore himself) have concluded that moral terms refer to non-natural, sui generis
Sui generis
Sui generis is a Latin expression, literally meaning of its own kind/genus or unique in its characteristics. The expression is often used in analytic philosophy to indicate an idea, an entity, or a reality which cannot be included in a wider concept....
properties or relations; but non-naturalism is vulnerable to the argument from queerness (see below).
The Argument from Moral Disagreement
Persons may disagree in their moral evaluations of the same object, while possessing all the same information about the "natural" or descriptive facts about the object of evaluation. Expressivists argue that such deep moral disagreement is evidence that moral judgment is not a species of descriptive or factual judgment.The Embedding Problem (or, the Frege–Geach objection)
The Frege–Geach problem — named for Peter GeachPeter Geach
Peter Thomas Geach is a British philosopher. His areas of interest are the history of philosophy, philosophical logic, and the theory of identity.He was educated at Balliol College, Oxford...
, who developed it from the writings of Gottlob Frege
Gottlob Frege
Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German mathematician, logician and philosopher. He is considered to be one of the founders of modern logic, and made major contributions to the foundations of mathematics. He is generally considered to be the father of analytic philosophy, for his writings on...
— claims that by subscribing to Expressivism one necessarily accepts that the meaning of "It is wrong to tell lies" is different from the meaning of the "it is wrong to tell lies" part of the conditional "If it is wrong to tell lies, then it is wrong to get your little brother to lie", and that therefore Expressivism is an inadequate explanation for moral language.
Frege–Geach contends that "It is wrong to get your little brother to tell lies" can be deduced from the two premises by modus ponens
Modus ponens
In classical logic, modus ponendo ponens or implication elimination is a valid, simple argument form. It is related to another valid form of argument, modus tollens. Both Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens can be mistakenly used when proving arguments...
as follows:
- It is wrong to tell lies.
- If it is wrong to tell lies, then it is wrong to get your little brother to tell lies.
- Therefore, It is wrong to get your little brother to tell lies.
In the second statement the expressivist account appears to fail, in that the speaker asserting the hypothetical premise is expressing no moral position towards lying, condemnatory or otherwise. The expressivist thus cannot account for the meaning of moral language in this kind of unasserted context.
The Illocutionary Act-Intention Argument
Terence Cuneo argues against expressivism by means of the following premise:
It is false that, in ordinary optimal conditions, when an agent performs the sentential act of sincerely uttering a moral sentence, that agent does not thereby intend to assert a moral proposition, but intends to express an attitude toward a non-moral state of affairs or object.
Proponents of expressivism are concerned to preserve the participants in ordinary moral thought and discourse from charges of deep error. But, Cuneo argues, there is evidence that many such participants do intend to represent a factual moral reality when they make moral judgments. Hence, if the expressivists are correct and moral language is not properly used to make factual, descriptive assertions, many participants in ordinary moral discourse are frustrated in their illocutionary act
Illocutionary act
Illocutionary act is a term in linguistics introduced by John L. Austin in his investigation of the various aspects of speech acts. We may sum up Austin's theory of speech acts with the following example...
intentions. On these grounds it is argued that we should give up expressivism, unless the expressivists are to give up on their claim that expressivism is not an essentially revisionist view of moral thought and discourse.