Expropriation of the Princes in the Weimar Republic
Encyclopedia
The expropriation of the princes in the Weimar Republic, was the question of what to do with the assets of the German princely houses that had been stripped of power in the wake of the November Revolution politically. These conflicts began in the months of the Revolution, and continued in subsequent years as contract negotiations or legal proceedings between different dynasties and the countries of the German Empire. Highlights of the conflict were in the first half of 1926 following a successful referendum and a failed referendum on the expropriation without compensation.
The referendum was initiated by the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), with the reluctantly support of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). Not only voters of the KPD and the SPD supported the expropriation without compensation. Many followers of the German Centre Party (center) and the German Democratic Party (DDP) also supported it. . In certain regions of Germany also supported conservative voters-national parties, the legislative initiative. Adel associations, the churches of the two major denominations, large agricultural and industrial interest groups and political parties and associations of the right wing argued for the princes. They worried by boycott calls eventually for the failure of the referendum. In place of the expropriation without compensation were individual severance agreements. They regulated the distribution of estates between the respective countries and the former ruling dynasties.
In politics and history, the events are interpreted cariously. While the official party history of the GDR in particular praised the actions of the former Communist Party, West German historians called attention to the substantial burdens that resulted from the plebiscite initiatives for cooperation between the SPD and the Republican parties of the bourgeoisie. Attention was also drawn on the generation gap, which showed itself in this political context. Occasionally, the campaign for a referendum on expropriation without compensation was considered a positive example of direct democracy.
On the national level were no seizures, because there was no corresponding natgional-level property. Therefore, the kingdom declined to a rich uniform rules and left it to the countries such as these, the confiscations would govern each. Moreover, fear of the Council of People's Representatives, expropriation desires of the victorious powers to feed it with those based on expropriated, former princely estates reparation could make.
The Weimar Constitution of 1919 guaranteed the property by Article 153. However, the same article opened an opportunity for expropriations, if they served the public good. Such expropriations had to be made on a statutory basis and the dispossessed were to be reasonably compensates . Article 153 provided for disputes to go before the courts. [2]
The negotiations between the governments of each country covered with the royal houses, due to differing views on the level of compensation. Also, negotiators often struggled to clarify the question of what the former ruling prince of the state held as private property, in contrast to what they held only as state property. Some royal families called the light of Article 153 of the Constitution, moreover, the complete surrender of their former property and compensation for lost investment income. The situation was complicated by the continuing devaluation in the wake of inflation in Germany, which diminished the value of compensation payments. Some royal families challenged the contracts they had previously signed with the parties of the countrys.
The economic importance of the armed objects was significant. In particular, the existence of small countries depended on whether they were able to ride only the essential elements of capital. In Mecklenburg-Strelitz, for example, only made the disputed lands percent of state land from 55th In other smaller republics, the proportion was at least 20 to 30 percent. In the United States such as Prussia or Bavaria land was disputed, however, the percentage of little importance. The absolute numbers there reached dimensions that the size of duchies could come close anywhere else. [3] The claims, the royal houses in total to each country is presented which, added up to a sum of 2.6 billion marks. [4]
In litigation, the conservative and monarchist judges repeatedly considered compensation in terms of dynasties. There was, in particular, public resentment against a ruling by the Supreme Court of 18 June 1925. It rose to a law that those of the Independent Social Democrats dominated national assembly of Saxe-Gotha on 31 July 1919 for the purpose of execution of the full Domanialbesitzes the Dukes of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha was adopted. This Law was in the eyes of the judges not constitutional. [6] They said the prince forest estate house the entire country and back. The total value of this judicial returned assets amounted to 37.2 million gold marks. (The head of the royal house at that time was Carl Eduard Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, a declared enemy of the republic.)
Prussia also negotiated a long time with the House of Hohenzollern . A first attempt failed to reach agreement in 1920 because of the opposition of the Socialist parliamentary group, a second disagreed 1924 because of Hohenzollern opposition. [8] The Prussian Ministry of Finance laid on 12 October 1925 a new treaty draft, which was heavily criticized in public, however, because it was provided, about three quarters of the disputed real property be returned to the Princely House. Against this comparison is braced not only the SPD, but also the DDP, which is so against their own Finance Minister Hermann Höpker-Aschoff turned. In this situation, the DPP submitted to the Reichstag on 23 November 1925 a draft law. This should empower the states to adopt in the clashes with the former princely houses state laws governing property disputes. Legal action against the contents of this country's laws should be specifically excluded. The SPD was against this bill introduced by the DDP very few objections, but even they had in 1923 a very similar bill developed.
The addressee of this bill was not primarily the Reichstag, where such a request would hardly find the necessary majority, but the people. It would bring on the path of a referendum their will for a radical change in ownership at the expression – initially referred to the prince seized property.
The Communists were aware that such a legislative initiative was attractive at the time, with the rise in unemployment due to the sharp economic downturn since November 1925. and also by the so-called rationalization crisis . Moreover, the hyperinflation was in recent memory. They had shown what could have particular value immobile assets queuing here for distribution. In the spirit of a united front policy aimed at the CP initiative on lost voters to recover and also members of the middle class to speak may have the inflation were among the losers. As an expression of such a strategy, the Communist Party invited on 2 December 1925, the SPD, the General German Trade Union Confederation (ADGB), the AfA-Bund, the German Civil Servants Association, the kingdom of black, red and gold banners and the Red Front Fighters one, petitions, on the way to bring together.
At first, the SPD reacted negatively. They saw it as an obvious CP effort to drive a wedge between the social-democratic "masses" and the so-called "fat cats". It also warned against the coloring of a referendum and parliament critical decisions were. Further, the leadership of the SPD saw still room to solve the issues parliament. Another reason for reservations about the initiative plebiscite was their likely failure. It took more than half of all voters in Germany, nearly 20 million voters, a similar referendum so agree, provided that the standing law amending the constitution was in question. [10] KPD and SPD reached in the previous general election of 7 December 1924 but only about 10.6 million votes. [11]
After the year 1925/26, the mood turned within the SPD. Discussions on the inclusion of social democrats in the national government failed in January, so the SPD was now again able to concentrate more on opposition politics. For this reason, another bill Luther had been worked out was rejected in the Cabinet. They finally, on 2 February presented the draft provided for a shift of the dispute to a newly created legal level. A special court under the chairmanship of Supreme Court President Walter Simons would be solely responsible for judging asset disputes. Revisions of already concluded agreements between countries and former princes were not provided. In contrast to the parliamentary initiative of the DDP by November 1925 this was a prince-friendly development. These factors were important for the SPD leadership, but subordinate – the main reason for the change of mood in the SPD leadership was different: At the base of the SPD, there was a clear support for the legislative initiative of the Communist Party. The party leadership was afraid of the considerable influence, membership and voters losses that would ensue if they would ignore this sentiment.
On 19 January 1926, the chairman of the CP, Ernst Thalmann began with the organization of the so-called Committee Kuczynski [12]. This mid-December 1925 ad hoc committee formed from the circle of the German Peace Society and the German League for Human Rights was named for the statistician Robert René Kuczynski, and prepared a petition for the prince expropriation. About 40 different pacifist, leftist and communist groups were members of the committee. Within this committee the Communist Party and its organizations had the most important role. [13] The SPD still refused on 19 January, the Communist Party's proposal to join the committee, and asked instead ADGB to mediate talks. This should be undertaken in order to present the people in a referendum supporting the Prince expropriation of a bill, behind the largest possible group of political supporters stood. The ADGB corresponded with this request. The talks between the Communist Party, the SPD and the Committee Kuczynski began on 20 January 1926. Three days later, they agreed on a common bill. This saw "for the public good" the expropriation without compensation of the former princes and their family members. On 25 January, the bill went to the Reich Ministry of the Interior with a request to quickly schedule a referendum.. The Ministry appealed the implementation of the referendum on the period from 4 to 17 March 1926 set. [14]
The united front tactics of the Communists was by then only technically – the SPD and the KPD had created an agreement on the production and distribution of Einzeichnungslisten and posters. A united front of political leaning, the SPD still sharply. They made a point of agitation for events petition by themselves, not by any means together with the Communist Party. SPD local associations were warned or reprimanded against the advances of the Communist Party, if such offers had been accepted. Even the ADGB held in public, there is no united front with the Communists. [15]
In addition to the workers' parties. the referendum was supported by the ADGB, the Red Front Fighters and some individuals, such as Albert Einstein, Kathe Kollwitz, John Heartfield and Kurt Tucholsky. Opponents of the project were particularly the bourgeois parties, the National Rural Confederation, and a variety of "national" organizations and the churches.
In rural areas, however, there were often strong opposition to the plebiscite. Especially in Ostelbien KPD and SPD were the last general election not achieve their results. Administrative obstacles to the referendum [19] and threats of large agricultural employers to their employees [20] were doing their effect. In Bavaria, in particular in Lower Bavaria, a similar below-average participation in the referendum was seen. After the tiny country of Waldeck had Bayern's second-lowest contribution to the. [21] The Bavarian People's Party (BVP) and the Catholic Church advised energetically and participation in the referendum on. In addition, the succeeed in 1923 in reaching a largely uncontroversial agreement with the House of Wittelsbach.
Reich President Paul von Hindenburg had on 15 March set a new hurdle that would impede the success of the referendum. That day he told Reich Justice Minister Wilhelm Marx that the desired expropriations in his view would not serve the public good, but would be only a property fraud for political reasons . This was not provided by the Constitution. The government explicitly confirmed on 24 Luther April 1926 the legal opinion of the President. For this reason, a simple majority would not be sufficient for the success of the referendum . Rather, it would need 50 percent of the voters, so about 20 million voters.
As is was expected that this number would not be reached, parliament and government began further parliamentary negotiations. These conversations were also burdened by the reference to the constitution-amending nature of the corresponding statutory provisions, for parliamentary expropriations were now enforceable only by a two thirds majority. But a law which could agree on the political left parts of the SPD and the political right parts of the German National People's Party (DNVP) would have been promising.
It was expected that the number of those on 20 advocate in June 1926, the Prince expropriation without compensation, would grow again. A number of reasons for this assumption: because the vote would be decisive in June which was to start from an even more successful mobilization of the left than voters in March at the referendum. The failure of all previous parliamentary compromise attempts had also in the bourgeois parties, the louder voices of those can be who advocated such a radical change in royal ownership as well. For example, youth organizations called for the center and the DDP a "yes" vote. The DDP was divided into a total of proponents and opponents of the referendum. The party leadership put the DDP supporters free to present, on which side they would fight. Even those associations representing the interests of the victim called inflation, now on to agree to the referendum.
Two other factors put the opponents of the referendum, which is on 15 April 1926 under the umbrella of the Technical Committee against the referendum " [35] had come together, extra pressure, similar to the popular initiative among these opponents, the associations and parties of the rights, agricultural and industrial interest groups, churches and the Association of German Court Chamber – So the trade association for the former Federal princes. First, was the home of Heinrich Class , the leader of the Pan-German Association , the Prussian Interior Ministry searches were bidding on. However, substantial coup plans were revealed. Even people from his district employees such searches yielded similar evidence. On the other, on 7 June 1926 published excerpts of a letter on the 22nd of Hindenburg May 1926 to the President of the Reich Citizenship Council , Friedrich Wilhelm von Loebell had sent. In the letter referred to von Hindenburg the plebiscite as "great injustice" that show a "regrettable lack of sense of tradition" and "gross ingratitude." It is contrary "to the foundations of morality and law." [36] From Hindenburg words tolerated the use of his refusal to posters of the expropriation opponents. He sat out the suspicion that he does not stand above parties and interest groups, but open to change my camp of the conservatives.
The expropriation of opponents increased their efforts against this background. Core message of their agitation the claim that the proponents of the referendum was going there not only to the expropriation of princely estate. They would rather the abolition of private property intended as such. The opponents called for a boycott of accordingly of the referendum. This made sense from their perspective, as each abstention had (as well as any invalid vote), the same weight as a negative vote. Due to the boycott call the secret ballot was transformed into a virtually open. [37]
By opponents of the referendum significant financial resources have been mobilized. The DNVP was shown in the agitation against the referendum funds, that total was well above that for the election campaigns of 1924. Also in the Reichstag elections of 1928 were not used in this funding level. The funds for the agitation against the referendum came from contributions of dynasties of industrialists and other donations. [38]
Again especially east of the Elbe peasants from participation in the referendum on economic and personal sanctions were threatened. Small farmers trying to scare you with the claim that concern is not just about the expropriation of the Prince property, but also the expropriation of livestock, equipment and country of each small farm operation. Moreover, the enemy held on 20 June 1926 in some free beer festivals to target voters away from the vote. [39]
The National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) exacerbated the populist dimension to the political right, held by the Prince of expropriation expropriation since 1 August 1914 immigrant Eastern Jews demanded. Initially, the left wing of the NSDAP by Gregor Strasser of the Nazis at the Prince expropriation campaign aimed at. involvement, Adolf Hitler had the Bamberger leaders meeting in February 1926 this requirement, however. from the middle [40] In allusion to the emperor word in August 1914 he said: "For We have no princes today, but only German. " [41]
This is indicated by the approximately 39.7 million eligible voters, 20 June 1926 nearly 15.6 million (39.3 percent) cast their vote. "Yes" voted about 14.5 million, with "No" about 0.59 million. About 0.56 million votes were invalid. [42] The referendum was therefore failed, as less than the required 50 percent of voters took part. [43]
Again, the referendum on the expropriation without compensation was in strongholds of the Centre was endorsed. The same was true for large urban electoral districts. There, evidence increasingly part of that electorate have been addressed traditionally bourgeois, national and conservative elected. Although it is often substantially more votes there than in the referendum, the agreement remained in agricultural areas of the country (especially Ostelbien) again below average. The participation rate fell in Bavaria in comparison to other regions from this time also low, despite the overall increase in participation there as well. [44]
With that assertion, the willingness of the SPD was meant to look in the Reichstag to pursue a legal solution to the dispute. The SPD is expected for two reasons considerable opportunities for participation in a range of statutory regulation, even if such a law needed a two thirds majority. First, they interpreted the referendum as a strong support of social democratic positions. Second, the flirted minority government of Wilhelm Marx with a recording of the SPD into the government, which is to form a grand coalition, which advance the approach to take would be necessary in the social democratic demands. The social-democratic change requests to the government bill for Prince compensation were rejected after lengthy negotiations: The proposed new Empire Special Court, there should be no strengthening of the lay element, and the SPD's proposal to the judges of that court should be elected by parliament, was also not enforceable and the recovery already completed property disputes, which were considered detrimental to the country, was not also provided for. [47]
The party leadership of the SPD tried on 1 July 1926 to persuade the Reichstag faction of the SPD but the adoption of the Bill, and good standing the following day in the Reichstag to vote. The group refused, however. The price for inclusion in a new national government was too high for the majority faction. It also did not have the most pressing arguments of the Prussian government under Otto Braun and the votes from the Socialist Group of the Prussian State Parliament convince the kingdom also wanted a law to complete the disputes with the Hohenzollern on this basis.
On July 2, 1926 established the factions of the SPD on the one hand and the other part DNVP no to her bill. Thereupon this bill was not chosen – the government moved him back.
In the countries had to agree with the royal houses from now on, finally searched on the direct negotiations. The position of countries has been secured it to the end of June 1927 by a so-called blocking law that attempts to strip the royal houses, to enforce the claims directed against the countries in the way of civil actions. [48] In Prussia was the desired agreement on 6 October 1926 about – a contract proposal by the State of Prussia and the chief representative of the Hohenzollern, Friedrich von Berg, signed. From the confiscated assets total approximately 250,000 acres land fell to Prussia, the royal house, together with all ancillary lines remained approximately 383 000 morning. [49] Prussia also took over the ownership of a large number of locks at several other assets. [50] This comparison was from the perspective of state government better than the one that was provided in October 1925. The parliamentary group of the SPD abstained on 15 October 1926 of the voice, although the majority faction rejected the contract inside. You went out the property gifts to the Hohenzollern too far. In the plenary session seemed an open "no" of the SPD but not necessary, because in this case Otto Braun had threatened to resign. With the escape of the SPD parliamentary group in the abstention was the way for the ratification of the contract by the Prussian Diet. The path to these parliamentary blessing had the Communist Party can no longer block, although in plenary during the second reading on 12 October 1926 had led to tumultuous scenes. [51]
Even before the legal settlement between Prussia and the Hohenzollerns, most disputes between countries and principalities were governed by consensus. With the former ruling royal families fought for October 1926 but still the states of Thuringia, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and especially lip. The negotiations continued for many years. [52] A total of 26 contracts concerning property disputes between the countries and the princely houses were completed. [53] These contracts were the so-called load objects in general to the state. These included castles, gardens and buildings. Commercial properties, such as forests or valuable ground, were assigned mainly to the royal houses. In many cases they received collections, theaters, museums, libraries and archives in newly established foundations, accessible as the public. The state often also adopted in these contracts the costs of the court officials and servants and their related security costs. Apanages and the so-called civil list, that is part of that budget, which once was the head of state and his court had declared fell off compensation to continue in most cases. [54]
In the time of the presidential it has in the Reichstag by both the KPD and the SPD, where several attempts to question the prince expropriation or reduce compensation to revive the prince. They should be a political response to the massive wage and salary reduction trends of those years. Greater political attention generated but none of these initiatives. The Communist Party claims were rejected by the other parties outright. SPD proposals were at best relegated to the legal committee. There they sanded, among other things, because it was repeated to premature dissolution of the Reichstag. [55]
The Nazi state created after some initial hesitation on 1 February 1939 by the law to intervene in dispute ended contracts. On the whole, this instrument was, however, a prevention and Drohmittel, rather than a means of legal design. Claims of royal families from the state, there had been occasionally in the early years of the Third Reich should be warded off with the "law on property rights disputes between the countries and the former ruling dynasties. The threat to make as a countermeasure against royal action in favor of the financial situation of the Nazi state from scratch, should suppress all the complaints and lawsuits from princely sustainable way. A direct connection of the contract situation was not intentional. [56]
The Kreuz Zeitung, the political DNVP related parties, wrote: "After the royal property of others is one of the series to come. For the Jewish spirit decomposition of Bolshevism knows no borders. " [23]
The Bishop of Passau said dramatically that participation in the referendum was "a serious sin against the 7th Commandment of God. " [27] He urged those who had supported the referendum, to withdraw their signatures.
in Germany, avoided as in its opinion, the stimulus word "prince". His warning was nonetheless clear: "loyalty and faith be shaken, basics of an orderly state system undermined if individual fellow all her property to be removed completely without compensation." [28]
The German Protestant Church Committee, the highest body of the German Federation of Protestant Churches, declined from the expropriation plan. "The requested expropriation means the disenfranchisement of German citizens and contradicts clear and unambiguous principles of the Gospel." [29]
The CP-MP Daniel Greiner said on 5 March 1926 in the Hesse state parliament "They know that once the private property of the prince is attacked, it is then not far until the next step, expropriation of private property. It would be a blessing if it would finally come. " [33]
Otmar Jung put forward his thesis of 1985, the most comprehensive study of the expropriation. In the first part, he analyzes the historical, economic and legal aspects of all assets disputes for each country of the German Empire. This consideration includes approximately 500 pages of the more than 1,200-page document. Jung wants to prevent the danger with this approach, the Prussian solution than the typical rash disclosed. In the second part of writing is characterized by Jung the course of events in detail. His intention is to show that the absence of elements of direct democracy in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany could not be justified by "bad experiences" from the Weimar Republic, although this was often done. Upon closer examination of the Weimar experience is different. The people's legislative initiative of 1926 was to welcome the young attempt to amend the parliamentary system, where he apparently was not capable of solution – the issue of clear and definitive distinction between the state capital and former princes. Here, the referendum is a legitimate problem-solving process was to protest character. The results of the campaign was Prince expropriation according to Jung, finally, that it contains technical flaws in the people the legislative process itself revealed, among other things, because abstention and no votes had exactly the same. With the correction of common judgments about elements of the Weimar Republic plebiscite will pave the way Jung to discuss in the presence of unprejudiced elements of direct democracy.
Thomas Kluck examining the attitudes of German Protestantism. He makes it clear that the majority of theologians and publicists of the Protestant churches, the prince refused to expropriation. The reason given was often recourses to Christian commandments. Often formulated in the negative opinions, a backward-looking nostalgia for the seemingly harmonious times of the Empire or the desire for a new, strong leadership. Kluck establishes that the presence of conflicts, which included the dispute over the estates of the former ruling princes were often interpreted by the German Protestant demonological: Behind these conflicts machinations of the devil were seen, which would tempt people to sin. In addition to the devil as misanthropic "masterminds" are part of the national conservative Protestantism Jews as the cause and beneficiary of political conflicts branded. Such an attitude was wide open to the ideology of National Socialism and, as it gave the theological consecration. This "ideological legwork" was "a piece of Protestant history of guilt." [60]
Ulrich cites the stresses that in 1918 the question of the prince expropriation, legitimized by revolutionary violence, had no major problems can be solved. In this respect, here lies a failure before the November Revolution. Despite the failure of the subsequent referendum has undertaken an important indirect effect. After June 20, 1926 plebiscite initiative has increased the willingness to compromise in the conflict between Prussia and the House of Hohenzollern, so between them in October, a contractual agreement could be reached. [61] also makes clear incitement that showed the prince expropriation campaign tangible erosion trends in bourgeois parties. This was particularly the DPP and the DNVP, but also the center. Stir suspects who have facing decreasing binding power of these bourgeois parties contributed to the rise of National Socialism after 1930. [62]
A key theme in the evaluation by non-Marxist historians is the question of whether the plebiscite have weighed the arguments Weimar compromise between moderate labor movement and a moderate middle class. In this context, the policy of the SPD comes into focus. Peter Longerich notes that the relative success of the referendum is not for the SPD have had to implement. The plebiscite also difficult, in his opinion the cooperation of the SPD with the bourgeois parties. [63] This interpretation line Heinrich August Winkler draws strongest. It is understandable that the SPD leadership had supported the plebiscite to lose the ties to social democratic basis. The price is, however, was high. The SPD is it after 20 June 1926 been difficult, "on its familiar path back of the class compromise." [64] have been concentrated in the dispute over the expropriation without compensation prince the dilemma of the SPD in the Weimar Republic. When they showed against the bourgeois parties willing to compromise, it was likely, supporters and voters to the Communist Party to lose. She stressed class positions and found them ready to part covenants with the KPD, they alienated the moderate bourgeois parties, and tolerated, that this is the right of the political spectrum sought allies who see the existence of the Republic had little interest. [65] The plebiscites would not strengthen confidence in the power of the parliamentary system, but weakened. They had also raised expectations that were met virtually undetected. The work resulting frustration could Winkler's view, representative democracy only to the destabilizing effect. [66] This assessment Winkler stands out by Otmar Jung's position.
Hans Mommsen draws attention, on the other hand, to the mentality and generational conflicts in the Republic. In his opinion, the plebiscites of 1926 revealed significant differences in mentality and deep divisions between the generations in Germany. A large proportion, perhaps even the majority of Germans, had been on the side of the Republic, supporters who were protesting the plebiscites against the "backward-looking loyalty bond bourgeois elites." Mommsen also draws on the mobilization of anti-Bolshevik and anti-Semitic sentiments carefully the opponents of the expropriation without compensation. This mobilization was an anticipation of that constellation, "in which should be broken up since 1931, the ruins of the parliamentary system."
The referendum was initiated by the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), with the reluctantly support of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). Not only voters of the KPD and the SPD supported the expropriation without compensation. Many followers of the German Centre Party (center) and the German Democratic Party (DDP) also supported it. . In certain regions of Germany also supported conservative voters-national parties, the legislative initiative. Adel associations, the churches of the two major denominations, large agricultural and industrial interest groups and political parties and associations of the right wing argued for the princes. They worried by boycott calls eventually for the failure of the referendum. In place of the expropriation without compensation were individual severance agreements. They regulated the distribution of estates between the respective countries and the former ruling dynasties.
In politics and history, the events are interpreted cariously. While the official party history of the GDR in particular praised the actions of the former Communist Party, West German historians called attention to the substantial burdens that resulted from the plebiscite initiatives for cooperation between the SPD and the Republican parties of the bourgeoisie. Attention was also drawn on the generation gap, which showed itself in this political context. Occasionally, the campaign for a referendum on expropriation without compensation was considered a positive example of direct democracy.
Developments to the end of 1925
The November revolution ended the rule of the ruling dynasties in Germany. These had either been forced to resign voluntarily because of the new overall political situation, or were removed from power against their will. Their property was confiscated, but they were – in contrast to the situation in Austria – not immediately confiscated.On the national level were no seizures, because there was no corresponding natgional-level property. Therefore, the kingdom declined to a rich uniform rules and left it to the countries such as these, the confiscations would govern each. Moreover, fear of the Council of People's Representatives, expropriation desires of the victorious powers to feed it with those based on expropriated, former princely estates reparation could make.
The Weimar Constitution of 1919 guaranteed the property by Article 153. However, the same article opened an opportunity for expropriations, if they served the public good. Such expropriations had to be made on a statutory basis and the dispossessed were to be reasonably compensates . Article 153 provided for disputes to go before the courts. [2]
The negotiations between the governments of each country covered with the royal houses, due to differing views on the level of compensation. Also, negotiators often struggled to clarify the question of what the former ruling prince of the state held as private property, in contrast to what they held only as state property. Some royal families called the light of Article 153 of the Constitution, moreover, the complete surrender of their former property and compensation for lost investment income. The situation was complicated by the continuing devaluation in the wake of inflation in Germany, which diminished the value of compensation payments. Some royal families challenged the contracts they had previously signed with the parties of the countrys.
The economic importance of the armed objects was significant. In particular, the existence of small countries depended on whether they were able to ride only the essential elements of capital. In Mecklenburg-Strelitz, for example, only made the disputed lands percent of state land from 55th In other smaller republics, the proportion was at least 20 to 30 percent. In the United States such as Prussia or Bavaria land was disputed, however, the percentage of little importance. The absolute numbers there reached dimensions that the size of duchies could come close anywhere else. [3] The claims, the royal houses in total to each country is presented which, added up to a sum of 2.6 billion marks. [4]
In litigation, the conservative and monarchist judges repeatedly considered compensation in terms of dynasties. There was, in particular, public resentment against a ruling by the Supreme Court of 18 June 1925. It rose to a law that those of the Independent Social Democrats dominated national assembly of Saxe-Gotha on 31 July 1919 for the purpose of execution of the full Domanialbesitzes the Dukes of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha was adopted. This Law was in the eyes of the judges not constitutional. [6] They said the prince forest estate house the entire country and back. The total value of this judicial returned assets amounted to 37.2 million gold marks. (The head of the royal house at that time was Carl Eduard Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, a declared enemy of the republic.)
Prussia also negotiated a long time with the House of Hohenzollern . A first attempt failed to reach agreement in 1920 because of the opposition of the Socialist parliamentary group, a second disagreed 1924 because of Hohenzollern opposition. [8] The Prussian Ministry of Finance laid on 12 October 1925 a new treaty draft, which was heavily criticized in public, however, because it was provided, about three quarters of the disputed real property be returned to the Princely House. Against this comparison is braced not only the SPD, but also the DDP, which is so against their own Finance Minister Hermann Höpker-Aschoff turned. In this situation, the DPP submitted to the Reichstag on 23 November 1925 a draft law. This should empower the states to adopt in the clashes with the former princely houses state laws governing property disputes. Legal action against the contents of this country's laws should be specifically excluded. The SPD was against this bill introduced by the DDP very few objections, but even they had in 1923 a very similar bill developed.
Initiative for a referendum
Two days later, on 25 November 1925, the KPD initiated a draft law. This did not provide balance of interests between the countries and principalities, but an expropriation without compensation. The lands should pass to peasants and tenant farmers, locks were designed to be converted into convalescent homes or to alleviate the housing shortage, the cash would eventually get the war-disabled and survivors.The addressee of this bill was not primarily the Reichstag, where such a request would hardly find the necessary majority, but the people. It would bring on the path of a referendum their will for a radical change in ownership at the expression – initially referred to the prince seized property.
The Communists were aware that such a legislative initiative was attractive at the time, with the rise in unemployment due to the sharp economic downturn since November 1925. and also by the so-called rationalization crisis . Moreover, the hyperinflation was in recent memory. They had shown what could have particular value immobile assets queuing here for distribution. In the spirit of a united front policy aimed at the CP initiative on lost voters to recover and also members of the middle class to speak may have the inflation were among the losers. As an expression of such a strategy, the Communist Party invited on 2 December 1925, the SPD, the General German Trade Union Confederation (ADGB), the AfA-Bund, the German Civil Servants Association, the kingdom of black, red and gold banners and the Red Front Fighters one, petitions, on the way to bring together.
At first, the SPD reacted negatively. They saw it as an obvious CP effort to drive a wedge between the social-democratic "masses" and the so-called "fat cats". It also warned against the coloring of a referendum and parliament critical decisions were. Further, the leadership of the SPD saw still room to solve the issues parliament. Another reason for reservations about the initiative plebiscite was their likely failure. It took more than half of all voters in Germany, nearly 20 million voters, a similar referendum so agree, provided that the standing law amending the constitution was in question. [10] KPD and SPD reached in the previous general election of 7 December 1924 but only about 10.6 million votes. [11]
After the year 1925/26, the mood turned within the SPD. Discussions on the inclusion of social democrats in the national government failed in January, so the SPD was now again able to concentrate more on opposition politics. For this reason, another bill Luther had been worked out was rejected in the Cabinet. They finally, on 2 February presented the draft provided for a shift of the dispute to a newly created legal level. A special court under the chairmanship of Supreme Court President Walter Simons would be solely responsible for judging asset disputes. Revisions of already concluded agreements between countries and former princes were not provided. In contrast to the parliamentary initiative of the DDP by November 1925 this was a prince-friendly development. These factors were important for the SPD leadership, but subordinate – the main reason for the change of mood in the SPD leadership was different: At the base of the SPD, there was a clear support for the legislative initiative of the Communist Party. The party leadership was afraid of the considerable influence, membership and voters losses that would ensue if they would ignore this sentiment.
On 19 January 1926, the chairman of the CP, Ernst Thalmann began with the organization of the so-called Committee Kuczynski [12]. This mid-December 1925 ad hoc committee formed from the circle of the German Peace Society and the German League for Human Rights was named for the statistician Robert René Kuczynski, and prepared a petition for the prince expropriation. About 40 different pacifist, leftist and communist groups were members of the committee. Within this committee the Communist Party and its organizations had the most important role. [13] The SPD still refused on 19 January, the Communist Party's proposal to join the committee, and asked instead ADGB to mediate talks. This should be undertaken in order to present the people in a referendum supporting the Prince expropriation of a bill, behind the largest possible group of political supporters stood. The ADGB corresponded with this request. The talks between the Communist Party, the SPD and the Committee Kuczynski began on 20 January 1926. Three days later, they agreed on a common bill. This saw "for the public good" the expropriation without compensation of the former princes and their family members. On 25 January, the bill went to the Reich Ministry of the Interior with a request to quickly schedule a referendum.. The Ministry appealed the implementation of the referendum on the period from 4 to 17 March 1926 set. [14]
The united front tactics of the Communists was by then only technically – the SPD and the KPD had created an agreement on the production and distribution of Einzeichnungslisten and posters. A united front of political leaning, the SPD still sharply. They made a point of agitation for events petition by themselves, not by any means together with the Communist Party. SPD local associations were warned or reprimanded against the advances of the Communist Party, if such offers had been accepted. Even the ADGB held in public, there is no united front with the Communists. [15]
In addition to the workers' parties. the referendum was supported by the ADGB, the Red Front Fighters and some individuals, such as Albert Einstein, Kathe Kollwitz, John Heartfield and Kurt Tucholsky. Opponents of the project were particularly the bourgeois parties, the National Rural Confederation, and a variety of "national" organizations and the churches.
Results of the referendum
The results of the first half of March 1926 referendum underscored the mobilization capacity of the two workers' parties. Of the 39.4 million eligible voters, 12.5 million participated. This surpassedg the required rate of 10 percent of the voters more than three times. [16] The number of votes, the KPD and SPD in the general election in December 1924 reached had was with the referendum by nearly 18 percent exceeded. Particularly striking was the strong support in strongholds of the center. The number of proponents of the referendum petition here was much higher than the total number of the last in the Reichstag elections of KPD and SPD of votes received. Even in domains of liberalism, for example, in Württemberg, showed similar trends. [17] Especially significant were the gains that were recorded in large cities. Not only supporters of the workers' parties, but many voters in the middle and right-wing parties advocated expropriation without compensation. [18]In rural areas, however, there were often strong opposition to the plebiscite. Especially in Ostelbien KPD and SPD were the last general election not achieve their results. Administrative obstacles to the referendum [19] and threats of large agricultural employers to their employees [20] were doing their effect. In Bavaria, in particular in Lower Bavaria, a similar below-average participation in the referendum was seen. After the tiny country of Waldeck had Bayern's second-lowest contribution to the. [21] The Bavarian People's Party (BVP) and the Catholic Church advised energetically and participation in the referendum on. In addition, the succeeed in 1923 in reaching a largely uncontroversial agreement with the House of Wittelsbach.
Preparation and results of the referendum
On 6 May 1926 the Reichstag saw the bill for uncompensated expropriation of the princes come to a vote. It failed a majority. Only if the draft had been adopted without any amendments, a referendum would be eliminated. Now it was on Terminated in June 1926. 20Reich President Paul von Hindenburg had on 15 March set a new hurdle that would impede the success of the referendum. That day he told Reich Justice Minister Wilhelm Marx that the desired expropriations in his view would not serve the public good, but would be only a property fraud for political reasons . This was not provided by the Constitution. The government explicitly confirmed on 24 Luther April 1926 the legal opinion of the President. For this reason, a simple majority would not be sufficient for the success of the referendum . Rather, it would need 50 percent of the voters, so about 20 million voters.
As is was expected that this number would not be reached, parliament and government began further parliamentary negotiations. These conversations were also burdened by the reference to the constitution-amending nature of the corresponding statutory provisions, for parliamentary expropriations were now enforceable only by a two thirds majority. But a law which could agree on the political left parts of the SPD and the political right parts of the German National People's Party (DNVP) would have been promising.
It was expected that the number of those on 20 advocate in June 1926, the Prince expropriation without compensation, would grow again. A number of reasons for this assumption: because the vote would be decisive in June which was to start from an even more successful mobilization of the left than voters in March at the referendum. The failure of all previous parliamentary compromise attempts had also in the bourgeois parties, the louder voices of those can be who advocated such a radical change in royal ownership as well. For example, youth organizations called for the center and the DDP a "yes" vote. The DDP was divided into a total of proponents and opponents of the referendum. The party leadership put the DDP supporters free to present, on which side they would fight. Even those associations representing the interests of the victim called inflation, now on to agree to the referendum.
Two other factors put the opponents of the referendum, which is on 15 April 1926 under the umbrella of the Technical Committee against the referendum " [35] had come together, extra pressure, similar to the popular initiative among these opponents, the associations and parties of the rights, agricultural and industrial interest groups, churches and the Association of German Court Chamber – So the trade association for the former Federal princes. First, was the home of Heinrich Class , the leader of the Pan-German Association , the Prussian Interior Ministry searches were bidding on. However, substantial coup plans were revealed. Even people from his district employees such searches yielded similar evidence. On the other, on 7 June 1926 published excerpts of a letter on the 22nd of Hindenburg May 1926 to the President of the Reich Citizenship Council , Friedrich Wilhelm von Loebell had sent. In the letter referred to von Hindenburg the plebiscite as "great injustice" that show a "regrettable lack of sense of tradition" and "gross ingratitude." It is contrary "to the foundations of morality and law." [36] From Hindenburg words tolerated the use of his refusal to posters of the expropriation opponents. He sat out the suspicion that he does not stand above parties and interest groups, but open to change my camp of the conservatives.
The expropriation of opponents increased their efforts against this background. Core message of their agitation the claim that the proponents of the referendum was going there not only to the expropriation of princely estate. They would rather the abolition of private property intended as such. The opponents called for a boycott of accordingly of the referendum. This made sense from their perspective, as each abstention had (as well as any invalid vote), the same weight as a negative vote. Due to the boycott call the secret ballot was transformed into a virtually open. [37]
By opponents of the referendum significant financial resources have been mobilized. The DNVP was shown in the agitation against the referendum funds, that total was well above that for the election campaigns of 1924. Also in the Reichstag elections of 1928 were not used in this funding level. The funds for the agitation against the referendum came from contributions of dynasties of industrialists and other donations. [38]
Again especially east of the Elbe peasants from participation in the referendum on economic and personal sanctions were threatened. Small farmers trying to scare you with the claim that concern is not just about the expropriation of the Prince property, but also the expropriation of livestock, equipment and country of each small farm operation. Moreover, the enemy held on 20 June 1926 in some free beer festivals to target voters away from the vote. [39]
The National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) exacerbated the populist dimension to the political right, held by the Prince of expropriation expropriation since 1 August 1914 immigrant Eastern Jews demanded. Initially, the left wing of the NSDAP by Gregor Strasser of the Nazis at the Prince expropriation campaign aimed at. involvement, Adolf Hitler had the Bamberger leaders meeting in February 1926 this requirement, however. from the middle [40] In allusion to the emperor word in August 1914 he said: "For We have no princes today, but only German. " [41]
This is indicated by the approximately 39.7 million eligible voters, 20 June 1926 nearly 15.6 million (39.3 percent) cast their vote. "Yes" voted about 14.5 million, with "No" about 0.59 million. About 0.56 million votes were invalid. [42] The referendum was therefore failed, as less than the required 50 percent of voters took part. [43]
Again, the referendum on the expropriation without compensation was in strongholds of the Centre was endorsed. The same was true for large urban electoral districts. There, evidence increasingly part of that electorate have been addressed traditionally bourgeois, national and conservative elected. Although it is often substantially more votes there than in the referendum, the agreement remained in agricultural areas of the country (especially Ostelbien) again below average. The participation rate fell in Bavaria in comparison to other regions from this time also low, despite the overall increase in participation there as well. [44]
Further treatment of expropriation issue
A sustained trend to the left was the result not connected, although this some opponents of the expropriation without compensation feared and the SPD and the KPD hopes have been part of war. [45] Many traditional voters of the DNVP voted for example, only for the referendum because they thus on the broken promise of the DNVP election of 1924 reacted to obtain adequate compensation for inflation damage. The duration of ideological conflicts between the SPD and KPD were by the joint campaign for the referendum and the referendum also not overcome. On 22 June 1926 had the Red Flag, the party newspaper of the Communist Party, said that the success of the Social Democratic leaders had deliberately thwarted the decision. Four days later the Central Committee of Communist Party said it, the Social Democrats would "shameless robbery Prince" now secretly promote. [46]With that assertion, the willingness of the SPD was meant to look in the Reichstag to pursue a legal solution to the dispute. The SPD is expected for two reasons considerable opportunities for participation in a range of statutory regulation, even if such a law needed a two thirds majority. First, they interpreted the referendum as a strong support of social democratic positions. Second, the flirted minority government of Wilhelm Marx with a recording of the SPD into the government, which is to form a grand coalition, which advance the approach to take would be necessary in the social democratic demands. The social-democratic change requests to the government bill for Prince compensation were rejected after lengthy negotiations: The proposed new Empire Special Court, there should be no strengthening of the lay element, and the SPD's proposal to the judges of that court should be elected by parliament, was also not enforceable and the recovery already completed property disputes, which were considered detrimental to the country, was not also provided for. [47]
The party leadership of the SPD tried on 1 July 1926 to persuade the Reichstag faction of the SPD but the adoption of the Bill, and good standing the following day in the Reichstag to vote. The group refused, however. The price for inclusion in a new national government was too high for the majority faction. It also did not have the most pressing arguments of the Prussian government under Otto Braun and the votes from the Socialist Group of the Prussian State Parliament convince the kingdom also wanted a law to complete the disputes with the Hohenzollern on this basis.
On July 2, 1926 established the factions of the SPD on the one hand and the other part DNVP no to her bill. Thereupon this bill was not chosen – the government moved him back.
In the countries had to agree with the royal houses from now on, finally searched on the direct negotiations. The position of countries has been secured it to the end of June 1927 by a so-called blocking law that attempts to strip the royal houses, to enforce the claims directed against the countries in the way of civil actions. [48] In Prussia was the desired agreement on 6 October 1926 about – a contract proposal by the State of Prussia and the chief representative of the Hohenzollern, Friedrich von Berg, signed. From the confiscated assets total approximately 250,000 acres land fell to Prussia, the royal house, together with all ancillary lines remained approximately 383 000 morning. [49] Prussia also took over the ownership of a large number of locks at several other assets. [50] This comparison was from the perspective of state government better than the one that was provided in October 1925. The parliamentary group of the SPD abstained on 15 October 1926 of the voice, although the majority faction rejected the contract inside. You went out the property gifts to the Hohenzollern too far. In the plenary session seemed an open "no" of the SPD but not necessary, because in this case Otto Braun had threatened to resign. With the escape of the SPD parliamentary group in the abstention was the way for the ratification of the contract by the Prussian Diet. The path to these parliamentary blessing had the Communist Party can no longer block, although in plenary during the second reading on 12 October 1926 had led to tumultuous scenes. [51]
Even before the legal settlement between Prussia and the Hohenzollerns, most disputes between countries and principalities were governed by consensus. With the former ruling royal families fought for October 1926 but still the states of Thuringia, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and especially lip. The negotiations continued for many years. [52] A total of 26 contracts concerning property disputes between the countries and the princely houses were completed. [53] These contracts were the so-called load objects in general to the state. These included castles, gardens and buildings. Commercial properties, such as forests or valuable ground, were assigned mainly to the royal houses. In many cases they received collections, theaters, museums, libraries and archives in newly established foundations, accessible as the public. The state often also adopted in these contracts the costs of the court officials and servants and their related security costs. Apanages and the so-called civil list, that is part of that budget, which once was the head of state and his court had declared fell off compensation to continue in most cases. [54]
In the time of the presidential it has in the Reichstag by both the KPD and the SPD, where several attempts to question the prince expropriation or reduce compensation to revive the prince. They should be a political response to the massive wage and salary reduction trends of those years. Greater political attention generated but none of these initiatives. The Communist Party claims were rejected by the other parties outright. SPD proposals were at best relegated to the legal committee. There they sanded, among other things, because it was repeated to premature dissolution of the Reichstag. [55]
The Nazi state created after some initial hesitation on 1 February 1939 by the law to intervene in dispute ended contracts. On the whole, this instrument was, however, a prevention and Drohmittel, rather than a means of legal design. Claims of royal families from the state, there had been occasionally in the early years of the Third Reich should be warded off with the "law on property rights disputes between the countries and the former ruling dynasties. The threat to make as a countermeasure against royal action in favor of the financial situation of the Nazi state from scratch, should suppress all the complaints and lawsuits from princely sustainable way. A direct connection of the contract situation was not intentional. [56]
DNVP
"If only the cowardly raid on the property of the defenseless princes of the principle that property is sacred, once broken, then the general socialization, follow the general expropriation of any private property soon, no matter whether they are large factories or carpentry workshop whether it is a huge department stores or Grünkramladen, whether it is an estate or a suburban garden, whether a large bank or the bank-book of a worker is there. " [22]The Kreuz Zeitung, the political DNVP related parties, wrote: "After the royal property of others is one of the series to come. For the Jewish spirit decomposition of Bolshevism knows no borders. " [23]
BVP
They considered the referendum an "intrusion of Bolshevik aspirations" in the state and society, and considered the expropriation plan as a "serious violation of the moral imperative of protection of private property." The referendum would also be an impermissible interference in the internal affairs of Bavaria, which hs alresdy made an agreement with the Wittelsbachs . [24] This would amount to violation of the Bavarian people righta . [25]Catholic Church
In the Fulda and Freising Bishops united Catholic clergy saw the expropriation project a "confusion of moral principles" that must be countered. Opposing property was "inconsistent with the principles of the Christian moral law compatible. The property is protected because it was "the natural moral order rooted in and protected by the commandment of God." [26]The Bishop of Passau said dramatically that participation in the referendum was "a serious sin against the 7th Commandment of God. " [27] He urged those who had supported the referendum, to withdraw their signatures.
Evangelical Church
The Church Senate, governing body of the Evangelical Church of the old-Prussian Union, largest regional Protestant bodyLandeskirche
In Germany and Switzerland, a Landeskirche is the church of a region. They originated as the national churches of the independent states, States of Germany or Cantons of Switzerland , that later unified to form modern Germany or modern Switzerland , respectively.-Origins in the Holy Roman...
in Germany, avoided as in its opinion, the stimulus word "prince". His warning was nonetheless clear: "loyalty and faith be shaken, basics of an orderly state system undermined if individual fellow all her property to be removed completely without compensation." [28]
The German Protestant Church Committee, the highest body of the German Federation of Protestant Churches, declined from the expropriation plan. "The requested expropriation means the disenfranchisement of German citizens and contradicts clear and unambiguous principles of the Gospel." [29]
SPD
The 20th June is the day which the "Decisive Battle [...] between the democratic Germany and the re-righting the powers of the past" will be held on. [30] "It's about the future of the German Republic. It's about whether the political power that is embodied in the state, the power in the hands of an upper class or a tool of liberation in the hands of the working masses should be a tool. " [31]KPD
The KPD looked at the campaign for the expropriation without compensation as a first step on the way to a revolutionary transformation of society. In this sense, said the Central Committee of the Communist Party: "hatred of the robbers is the winning class hatred against capitalism and its system of slavery! The" [32]The CP-MP Daniel Greiner said on 5 March 1926 in the Hesse state parliament "They know that once the private property of the prince is attacked, it is then not far until the next step, expropriation of private property. It would be a blessing if it would finally come. " [33]
Judgement of historians
The Marxist-Leninist historiography of the GDR interpreted the expropriation of the princes and the actions of the workers' parties from a perspective that coincided with that of the former Communist Party. The united front strategy of the Communist Party was seen as a correct step in the class struggle. The plebiscite actions were "the most powerful unit of the German working class action in the period of relative stabilization of capitalism". [57] They attacked the SPD leadership and the leadership of the free trade unions, particularly if they sought a compromise with the bourgeois parties. The attitude of the leaders of the SPD and the ADGB hampered the development of the popular movement against the great princes." [58] [59]Otmar Jung put forward his thesis of 1985, the most comprehensive study of the expropriation. In the first part, he analyzes the historical, economic and legal aspects of all assets disputes for each country of the German Empire. This consideration includes approximately 500 pages of the more than 1,200-page document. Jung wants to prevent the danger with this approach, the Prussian solution than the typical rash disclosed. In the second part of writing is characterized by Jung the course of events in detail. His intention is to show that the absence of elements of direct democracy in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany could not be justified by "bad experiences" from the Weimar Republic, although this was often done. Upon closer examination of the Weimar experience is different. The people's legislative initiative of 1926 was to welcome the young attempt to amend the parliamentary system, where he apparently was not capable of solution – the issue of clear and definitive distinction between the state capital and former princes. Here, the referendum is a legitimate problem-solving process was to protest character. The results of the campaign was Prince expropriation according to Jung, finally, that it contains technical flaws in the people the legislative process itself revealed, among other things, because abstention and no votes had exactly the same. With the correction of common judgments about elements of the Weimar Republic plebiscite will pave the way Jung to discuss in the presence of unprejudiced elements of direct democracy.
Thomas Kluck examining the attitudes of German Protestantism. He makes it clear that the majority of theologians and publicists of the Protestant churches, the prince refused to expropriation. The reason given was often recourses to Christian commandments. Often formulated in the negative opinions, a backward-looking nostalgia for the seemingly harmonious times of the Empire or the desire for a new, strong leadership. Kluck establishes that the presence of conflicts, which included the dispute over the estates of the former ruling princes were often interpreted by the German Protestant demonological: Behind these conflicts machinations of the devil were seen, which would tempt people to sin. In addition to the devil as misanthropic "masterminds" are part of the national conservative Protestantism Jews as the cause and beneficiary of political conflicts branded. Such an attitude was wide open to the ideology of National Socialism and, as it gave the theological consecration. This "ideological legwork" was "a piece of Protestant history of guilt." [60]
Ulrich cites the stresses that in 1918 the question of the prince expropriation, legitimized by revolutionary violence, had no major problems can be solved. In this respect, here lies a failure before the November Revolution. Despite the failure of the subsequent referendum has undertaken an important indirect effect. After June 20, 1926 plebiscite initiative has increased the willingness to compromise in the conflict between Prussia and the House of Hohenzollern, so between them in October, a contractual agreement could be reached. [61] also makes clear incitement that showed the prince expropriation campaign tangible erosion trends in bourgeois parties. This was particularly the DPP and the DNVP, but also the center. Stir suspects who have facing decreasing binding power of these bourgeois parties contributed to the rise of National Socialism after 1930. [62]
A key theme in the evaluation by non-Marxist historians is the question of whether the plebiscite have weighed the arguments Weimar compromise between moderate labor movement and a moderate middle class. In this context, the policy of the SPD comes into focus. Peter Longerich notes that the relative success of the referendum is not for the SPD have had to implement. The plebiscite also difficult, in his opinion the cooperation of the SPD with the bourgeois parties. [63] This interpretation line Heinrich August Winkler draws strongest. It is understandable that the SPD leadership had supported the plebiscite to lose the ties to social democratic basis. The price is, however, was high. The SPD is it after 20 June 1926 been difficult, "on its familiar path back of the class compromise." [64] have been concentrated in the dispute over the expropriation without compensation prince the dilemma of the SPD in the Weimar Republic. When they showed against the bourgeois parties willing to compromise, it was likely, supporters and voters to the Communist Party to lose. She stressed class positions and found them ready to part covenants with the KPD, they alienated the moderate bourgeois parties, and tolerated, that this is the right of the political spectrum sought allies who see the existence of the Republic had little interest. [65] The plebiscites would not strengthen confidence in the power of the parliamentary system, but weakened. They had also raised expectations that were met virtually undetected. The work resulting frustration could Winkler's view, representative democracy only to the destabilizing effect. [66] This assessment Winkler stands out by Otmar Jung's position.
Hans Mommsen draws attention, on the other hand, to the mentality and generational conflicts in the Republic. In his opinion, the plebiscites of 1926 revealed significant differences in mentality and deep divisions between the generations in Germany. A large proportion, perhaps even the majority of Germans, had been on the side of the Republic, supporters who were protesting the plebiscites against the "backward-looking loyalty bond bourgeois elites." Mommsen also draws on the mobilization of anti-Bolshevik and anti-Semitic sentiments carefully the opponents of the expropriation without compensation. This mobilization was an anticipation of that constellation, "in which should be broken up since 1931, the ruins of the parliamentary system."
General Works
- Günter Abramowski: Einleitung, in: Akten der Reichskanzlei. Die Kabinette Marx III und IV. 17. Mai 1926 bis 29. Januar 1927, 29. Januar 1927 bis 29. Juni 1928. Bearb. von Günter Abramowski. Bd. 1. Mai 1926 bis Mai 1927. Dokumente Nr. 1 bis 242, Oldenbourg, München 1988, S. XVII-CII. ISBN 3-7646-1861-2.
- Richard Freyh: Stärken und Schwächen der Weimarer Republik, in: Walter Tormin (ed.): Die Weimarer Republik. 22. Aufl., unveränd. Nachdr. d. 13. Aufl. 1977, Fackelträger, Hannover 1977, S. 137–187. ISBN 3-7716-2092-9.
- Ernst Rudolf Huber: Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, Band VII. Ausbau, Schutz und Untergang der Weimarer Republik, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz 1984. ISBN 3-17-008378-3.
- Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. v. 4. Von 1924 bis Januar 1933. Hrsg. vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Dietz, Berlin (O) 1966.
- Otmar Jung: Direkte Demokratie in der Weimarer Republik. Die Fälle „Aufwertung“, „Fürstenenteignung“, „Panzerkreuzerverbot“ und „Youngplan“, Campus, Frankfurt/Main, New York 1989. ISBN 3-593-33985-4.
- Eberhard KolbEberhard KolbProfessor Eberhard Kolb is one of Germany's foremost authorities on German history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.- Biography :...
: Die Weimarer Republik, 2. ed., Oldenbourg, München 1988. ISBN 3-486-48912-7. - Peter Longerich: Deutschland 1918–1933. Die Weimarer Republik. Handbuch zur Geschichte, Fakelträger, Hannover 1995. ISBN 3-7716-2208-5.
- Stephan Malinowski: Vom König zum Führer. Sozialer Niedergang und politische Radikalisierung im deutschen Adel zwischen Kaiserreich und NS-Staat, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 2003. ISBN 3-05-003554-4.
- Hans Mommsen: Die verspielte Freiheit. Der Weg der Republik von Weimar in den Untergang. 1918 bis 1933, Propyläen, Berlin 1989. ISBN 3-549-05818-7.
- Heinrich August Winkler: Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik. Der Schein der Normalität. 1924–1930, Dietz, Berlin/Bonn 1985. ISBN 3-8012-0094-9.
- Heinrich August Winkler: Weimar 1918–1933. Die Geschichte der ersten deutschen Demokratie, 2. ed.., Beck, München 1994. ISBN 3-406-37646-0.
Case Studies
- Otmar Jung: Volksgesetzgebung. Die „Weimarer Erfahrungen“ aus dem Fall der Vermögensauseinandersetzungen zwischen Freistaaten und ehemaligen Fürsten, zweibändig, 2. ed., Kovač, Hamburg 1996. ISBN 3-925630-36-8
- Thomas Kluck: Protestantismus und Protest in der Weimarer Republik. Die Auseinandersetzungen um Fürstenenteignung und Aufwertung im Spiegel des deutschen Protestantismus. Mit einem Vorwort von Günter Brakelmann, Lang, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris, Wien 1996. ISBN 3-631-50023-8
- Ulrich Schüren: Der Volksentscheid zur Fürstenenteignung 1926. Die Vermögensauseinandersetzung mit den depossedierten Landesherren als Problem der deutschen Innenpolitik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Verhältnisse in Preußen, Droste, Düsseldorf 1978. ISBN 3-7700-5097-5.
- Rainer Stentzel: Zum Verhältnis von Recht und Politik in der Weimarer Republik. Der Streit um die sogenannte Fürstenenteignung, in: Der Staat, Jg. 39 (2000), v. 2, p. 275-297.
External links
- Fürstenenteignung, Deutschen Historischen Museums
- Gerhard Immler: Volksabstimmung „Entschädigungslose Fürstenenteignung“, 1926, in: Historisches Lexikon Bayerns
- Rettet die Fürsten!, special number of the stirical publication SimplicissimusSimplicissimusSimplicissimus was a satirical German weekly magazine started by Albert Langen in April 1896 and published through 1967, with a hiatus from 1944-1954. It became a biweekly in 1964...
, 1926 (PDF, 6 MB)