German Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912
Encyclopedia
The German Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912 was an informal conference of some of the highest military and civilian leaders of the German Empire
to consider the tense military and diplomatic situation in Europe at the time. See Causes of WWI.
As a result of the recently announced Russian Great Military Programme (November 1912) and certain British communications, the possibility of war was a prime topic of an Imperial War Council meeting held in Berlin
on December 8th..
Attending the conference were Kaiser Wilhelm II, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz
- the Naval State Secretary, Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller
the Chief of the German Imperial Naval Cabinet
, General von Moltke
- the Army’s Chief of Staff, Admiral August von Heeringen
- the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and (probably) the Chief of the German Imperial Military Cabinet
General Moriz von Lyncker
. The importance of this meeting can be seen in that the leaders of both the German Army and Navy attended. On the other hand, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg
and General Josias von Heeringen
, the Prussian Minister of War, were not invited.
Wilhelm II called British balance of power
principles “idiocy”, but agreed that their statement was a “desirable clarification” of British policy . His opinion was that Austria-Hungary
should attack Serbia
that December, and if “Russia supports the Serbs, which she evidently does…then war would be unavoidable for us, too,” and that this would be better than a war later after completion the just begun massive modernization and expansion of the Russian army and railway system toward Germany. Moltke agreed. In his professional military opinion “a war is unavoidable and the sooner the better”. Moltke “wanted to launch an immediate attack.” .
Both Wilhelm II and the Army leadership agreed that if a war were necessary it were best launched soon. Admiral Tirpitz, however, asked for a “postponement of the great fight for one and a half years” because the Navy was not ready for a general war that included Britain as an opponent. He insisted that the completion of the construction of the U-boat
base at Heligoland
and the widening of the Kiel Canal
were the Navy’s prerequisites for war. The British historian John Röhl has pointed out the coincidence that the date for completion of the widening of the Kiel Canal was the summer of 1914, but a reading of the report of the conference shows no agreement as to a war in 1914. Though Moltke objected to the postponement of the war as unacceptable, Wilhelm sided with Tirpitz. Moltke yielded “only reluctantly.”
Historians more sympathetic to the government of Wilhelm II often reject the importance of this War Council as only showing the thinking, and recommendations of those present, with no decisions taken. They often cite the passage from Admiral Muller’s diary (below), which states: “That was the end of the conference. The result amounted to nothing.” Certainly the only decision taken was to do nothing.
Historians more sympathetic to the Entente, such as British historian John Röhl, sometimes rather ambitiously interpret these words of Admiral Mueller (an advocate of launching a war soon) as saying that "nothing" was decided for 1912-13, but that war was decided on for the Summer of 1914. Röhl is on safer ground when he argues that even if this War Council did not reach a binding decision - which it clearly was not - it does nonetheless offer a clear view of their intentions, or at least their thoughts.
It was clearly established that, if there was going to be a war, the German Army wanted it before the new Russian armaments program began to bear fruit, and before Russian military railway terminals were hundreds of miles closer to Berlin. Entente sympathetic historians such as Röhl see this as a conference in which "The result amounted to nothing.” as setting a clear deadline when a war was to begin, namely the summer of 1914.
The following is an English translation of Admiral Mueller’s report:
‘Sunday: summoned to the palace to see His Majesty (Kaiser Wilhelm II) at 11 o’clock along with Tirpitz, Heeringen (Vice Admiral), and General von Moltke. H.M. with a telegraphic report on the political situation sent by the ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowski. As Grey’s spokesman, Haldane informed Lichnowski that if we attack France, England will come to France’s aid, for England cannot tolerate a disturbance in the European balance of power. H.M. welcomed this message as providing the desired clarification for all those who have been lulled into a false sense of security by the recently friendly English press.
H.M. painted the following picture:
‘Austria must deal firmly with the Slavs living outside its borders (the Serbs) if it does not want to lose control over the Slavs under the Austrian monarchy. If Russia were to support the Serbs, which she is apparently already doing (Sassonow’s remark that Russia will go straight into Galicia if the Austrians march into Serbia), war would be inevitable for us. But there is hope that Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania—and perhaps even Turkey—will take our side. Bulgaria has already offered Turkey an alliance. We really went to great lengths to persuade the Turks. Recently, H.M. also tried to convince the crown prince of Romania, who stopped here on his way to Brussels, to come to an agreement with Bulgaria. If these powers ally themselves with Austria, it will free us up to throw our full weight behind a war against France. According to His Majesty, the fleet will naturally have to prepare for war against England. After Haldane’s statement, the possibility of a war against Russia alone—as discussed by the chief of the Admiralty in his last talk—will not be considered. So, immediate submarine warfare against English troop transports on the Schelde River or near Dunkirk, mine warfare up to the Thames. To Tirpitz: rapid construction of additional submarines, etc. A conference is recommended for all interested naval offices. Gen. v. Moltke: “I consider a war inevitable—the sooner, the better. But we should do a better job of gaining popular support for a war against Russia, in line with the Kaiser’s remarks.” H.M. confirmed this and asked the secretary of state to use the press to work toward this end. T. called attention to the fact that the navy would gladly see a major war delayed by one and a half years. Moltke said that even then the navy would not be ready, and the army’s situation would continue to worsen, since due to our limited financial resources our opponents are able to arm themselves more rapidly.
‘That was the end of the meeting. There were almost no results.
‘The chief of the general staff says: the sooner war comes, the better; however, he hasn’t concluded from this that we should give Russia or France, or even both, an ultimatum that would trigger a war for which they would carry the blame.
‘I wrote to the chancellor in the afternoon about influencing the press.’
Source: Entry from the diary of Georg Alexander von Müller (December 8, 1912). Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg [BArch N 159/4 Fol. 169-171].
Original German text reprinted in John C. G. Röhl, Kaiser, Hof und Staat: Wilhelm II. und die Deutsche Politik [Kaiser, Court and State: Wilhelm II and German Politics]. Munich, 1987, pp. 175–76.
Translation: Adam Blauhut
This material is Public Domain. Found at: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=799
German Empire
The German Empire refers to Germany during the "Second Reich" period from the unification of Germany and proclamation of Wilhelm I as German Emperor on 18 January 1871, to 1918, when it became a federal republic after defeat in World War I and the abdication of the Emperor, Wilhelm II.The German...
to consider the tense military and diplomatic situation in Europe at the time. See Causes of WWI.
As a result of the recently announced Russian Great Military Programme (November 1912) and certain British communications, the possibility of war was a prime topic of an Imperial War Council meeting held in Berlin
Berlin
Berlin is the capital city of Germany and is one of the 16 states of Germany. With a population of 3.45 million people, Berlin is Germany's largest city. It is the second most populous city proper and the seventh most populous urban area in the European Union...
on December 8th..
Attending the conference were Kaiser Wilhelm II, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz
Alfred von Tirpitz
Alfred von Tirpitz was a German Admiral, Secretary of State of the German Imperial Naval Office, the powerful administrative branch of the German Imperial Navy from 1897 until 1916. Prussia never had a major navy, nor did the other German states before the German Empire was formed in 1871...
- the Naval State Secretary, Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller
Georg Alexander von Müller
Georg Alexander von Müller was an Admiral of the German Imperial Navy and close to the Kaiser in the run up to the First World War....
the Chief of the German Imperial Naval Cabinet
German Imperial Naval Cabinet
The German Imperial Naval Cabinet was a government office of German Imperial Navy, 1871-1918, which was responsible for the commanding naval officers, marine officers, engineers, naval stores, and munitions....
, General von Moltke
Helmuth von Moltke the Younger
Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke , also known as Moltke the Younger, was a nephew of Field Marshal Count Moltke and served as the Chief of the German General Staff from 1906 to 1914. The two are often differentiated as Moltke the Elder and Moltke the Younger...
- the Army’s Chief of Staff, Admiral August von Heeringen
August von Heeringen
August von Heeringen was a Prussian admiral of the German Empire. He headed the Imperial Navy News Office and served as the Chief of the German Naval General Staff 12 March 1911 - 31 March 1913, and was present at the famous War Council of 8 December, 1912.He worked with leaders of the German...
- the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and (probably) the Chief of the German Imperial Military Cabinet
German Imperial Military Cabinet
The Prussian Military Cabinet or the German Military Cabinet was a military institution under the direct command authority of the Prussian king and German emperor for handling personnel matters of the army officer corps....
General Moriz von Lyncker
Moriz von Lyncker
Moriz Freiherr von Lyncker was a Prussian officer of the German Empire and chief of the Prussian Military Cabinet....
. The importance of this meeting can be seen in that the leaders of both the German Army and Navy attended. On the other hand, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg
Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg
Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg was a German politician and statesman who served as Chancellor of the German Empire from 1909 to 1917.-Origins:...
and General Josias von Heeringen
Josias von Heeringen
Josias von Heeringen was a German general of the imperial era who saw service in the First World War.-Biography:Heeringen was born in Kassel in the Electorate of Hesse...
, the Prussian Minister of War, were not invited.
Wilhelm II called British balance of power
Balance of power in international relations
In international relations, a balance of power exists when there is parity or stability between competing forces. The concept describes a state of affairs in the international system and explains the behavior of states in that system...
principles “idiocy”, but agreed that their statement was a “desirable clarification” of British policy . His opinion was that Austria-Hungary
Austria-Hungary
Austria-Hungary , more formally known as the Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the Imperial Council and the Lands of the Holy Hungarian Crown of Saint Stephen, was a constitutional monarchic union between the crowns of the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary in...
should attack Serbia
Serbia
Serbia , officially the Republic of Serbia , is a landlocked country located at the crossroads of Central and Southeast Europe, covering the southern part of the Carpathian basin and the central part of the Balkans...
that December, and if “Russia supports the Serbs, which she evidently does…then war would be unavoidable for us, too,” and that this would be better than a war later after completion the just begun massive modernization and expansion of the Russian army and railway system toward Germany. Moltke agreed. In his professional military opinion “a war is unavoidable and the sooner the better”. Moltke “wanted to launch an immediate attack.” .
Both Wilhelm II and the Army leadership agreed that if a war were necessary it were best launched soon. Admiral Tirpitz, however, asked for a “postponement of the great fight for one and a half years” because the Navy was not ready for a general war that included Britain as an opponent. He insisted that the completion of the construction of the U-boat
U-boat
U-boat is the anglicized version of the German word U-Boot , itself an abbreviation of Unterseeboot , and refers to military submarines operated by Germany, particularly in World War I and World War II...
base at Heligoland
Heligoland
Heligoland is a small German archipelago in the North Sea.Formerly Danish and British possessions, the islands are located in the Heligoland Bight in the south-eastern corner of the North Sea...
and the widening of the Kiel Canal
Kiel Canal
The Kiel Canal , known as the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Kanal until 1948, is a long canal in the German state of Schleswig-Holstein.The canal links the North Sea at Brunsbüttel to the Baltic Sea at Kiel-Holtenau. An average of is saved by using the Kiel Canal instead of going around the Jutland Peninsula....
were the Navy’s prerequisites for war. The British historian John Röhl has pointed out the coincidence that the date for completion of the widening of the Kiel Canal was the summer of 1914, but a reading of the report of the conference shows no agreement as to a war in 1914. Though Moltke objected to the postponement of the war as unacceptable, Wilhelm sided with Tirpitz. Moltke yielded “only reluctantly.”
Historians more sympathetic to the government of Wilhelm II often reject the importance of this War Council as only showing the thinking, and recommendations of those present, with no decisions taken. They often cite the passage from Admiral Muller’s diary (below), which states: “That was the end of the conference. The result amounted to nothing.” Certainly the only decision taken was to do nothing.
Historians more sympathetic to the Entente, such as British historian John Röhl, sometimes rather ambitiously interpret these words of Admiral Mueller (an advocate of launching a war soon) as saying that "nothing" was decided for 1912-13, but that war was decided on for the Summer of 1914. Röhl is on safer ground when he argues that even if this War Council did not reach a binding decision - which it clearly was not - it does nonetheless offer a clear view of their intentions, or at least their thoughts.
It was clearly established that, if there was going to be a war, the German Army wanted it before the new Russian armaments program began to bear fruit, and before Russian military railway terminals were hundreds of miles closer to Berlin. Entente sympathetic historians such as Röhl see this as a conference in which "The result amounted to nothing.” as setting a clear deadline when a war was to begin, namely the summer of 1914.
The following is an English translation of Admiral Mueller’s report:
‘Sunday: summoned to the palace to see His Majesty (Kaiser Wilhelm II) at 11 o’clock along with Tirpitz, Heeringen (Vice Admiral), and General von Moltke. H.M. with a telegraphic report on the political situation sent by the ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowski. As Grey’s spokesman, Haldane informed Lichnowski that if we attack France, England will come to France’s aid, for England cannot tolerate a disturbance in the European balance of power. H.M. welcomed this message as providing the desired clarification for all those who have been lulled into a false sense of security by the recently friendly English press.
H.M. painted the following picture:
‘Austria must deal firmly with the Slavs living outside its borders (the Serbs) if it does not want to lose control over the Slavs under the Austrian monarchy. If Russia were to support the Serbs, which she is apparently already doing (Sassonow’s remark that Russia will go straight into Galicia if the Austrians march into Serbia), war would be inevitable for us. But there is hope that Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania—and perhaps even Turkey—will take our side. Bulgaria has already offered Turkey an alliance. We really went to great lengths to persuade the Turks. Recently, H.M. also tried to convince the crown prince of Romania, who stopped here on his way to Brussels, to come to an agreement with Bulgaria. If these powers ally themselves with Austria, it will free us up to throw our full weight behind a war against France. According to His Majesty, the fleet will naturally have to prepare for war against England. After Haldane’s statement, the possibility of a war against Russia alone—as discussed by the chief of the Admiralty in his last talk—will not be considered. So, immediate submarine warfare against English troop transports on the Schelde River or near Dunkirk, mine warfare up to the Thames. To Tirpitz: rapid construction of additional submarines, etc. A conference is recommended for all interested naval offices. Gen. v. Moltke: “I consider a war inevitable—the sooner, the better. But we should do a better job of gaining popular support for a war against Russia, in line with the Kaiser’s remarks.” H.M. confirmed this and asked the secretary of state to use the press to work toward this end. T. called attention to the fact that the navy would gladly see a major war delayed by one and a half years. Moltke said that even then the navy would not be ready, and the army’s situation would continue to worsen, since due to our limited financial resources our opponents are able to arm themselves more rapidly.
‘That was the end of the meeting. There were almost no results.
‘The chief of the general staff says: the sooner war comes, the better; however, he hasn’t concluded from this that we should give Russia or France, or even both, an ultimatum that would trigger a war for which they would carry the blame.
‘I wrote to the chancellor in the afternoon about influencing the press.’
Source: Entry from the diary of Georg Alexander von Müller (December 8, 1912). Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg [BArch N 159/4 Fol. 169-171].
Original German text reprinted in John C. G. Röhl, Kaiser, Hof und Staat: Wilhelm II. und die Deutsche Politik [Kaiser, Court and State: Wilhelm II and German Politics]. Munich, 1987, pp. 175–76.
Translation: Adam Blauhut
This material is Public Domain. Found at: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=799