Hawes Junction rail crash
Encyclopedia
The Hawes Junction rail crash occurred on 24 December 1910, on the Midland Railway
's Settle and Carlisle mainline at the junction with the Wensleydale Railway
in Westmorland
(now Cumbria
), England
. It was caused when a busy signalman (Sutton) forgot about a pair of light engines waiting at his down (northbound) starting signal to return to their base at Carlisle. They were still waiting there when the signalman set the road for the down Scotch express. When the signal cleared, the light engines set off in front of the express into the same block section. Since the light engines were travelling at low speed from a stand at Hawes Junction, and the following express was travelling at high speed, a collision was inevitable. The express caught the light engines just after Moorcock Tunnel near Ais Gill summit
in Mallerstang
and was almost wholly derailed.
Casualties were made worse by the telescoping (over-riding) of the timber-bodied coaches, and by fire which broke out in the coaches, fed by the gas for the coaches' lights leaking from ruptured pipes and ignited by the coals from the locomotives' fireboxes. Twelve people lost their lives as a result of this accident, some of whom were trapped in the wreckage and were burned to death.
In the sequence of events as related in "Red for Danger", another driver waiting to return south to Leeds saw the two light engines move off when the starting signal was cleared. The signal did not return to danger, and the express passed through shortly afterwards. The driver went to the signalbox and related what he had seen. Signalman Sutton refused to believe him until he had checked his train register, and then telephoned the signal box at Ais Gill to the north to ask whether the two light engines had gone through. The Ais Gill signalman replied that none had been offered to him; nor had the express passed. Sutton then asked Signalman Simpson, who was about to relieve him and had just come into the signal box, to "Go to Bunce [the stationmaster] and tell him I am afraid I have wrecked the Scotch Express". It is apparent from this account that Sutton had been under the mistaken impression that he had despatched the two light engines to Carlisle some time earlier
Although the signalman naturally bore the chief blame for the accident, the drivers of the light engines were also at fault for failing to carry out Rule 55
which was designed to remind signalmen in this situation. Under this rule, they should have sounded their engine whistles on coming to a stop, and when the signal was not cleared, they should have sent one of the firemen to walk to the signalbox to remind the signalman personally. In 1910, the time after which this should be done was not specified, but was generally accepted to be two or three minutes. The engines were actually detained for twenty minutes. Nock states that ten minutes was allowed, but does not give a source for this.
The two light engine drivers (Scott and Bath) stated that they had sounded their whistles as they moved off, and this was confirmed by the driver of the engine waiting to return to Leeds. The signalman had not been alerted by this, probably because driving rain was being blown against the windows of the signalbox, making it hard to hear sounds outside, and because other engines were moving around the station and yard at the same time, so that the signalman would not have attached any particular significance to a train whistle.
Many railways had adopted reminder appliances, simple mechanical collars that the signalmen were required to place on signal levers, as a back-up to prevent improper clearance of signals. The Midland Railway had not adopted these simple devices.
The accident would have been prevented if track circuits had been installed to detect the presence of a train (or in this case the light engines) on the main lines, and interlocking with the signals would have prevented them being cleared by the signalman. Track circuits had been invented in the 1870s and had proved to be very successful; unfortunately most British railway companies were slow to install them. The high level of traffic movements made Hawes Junction a prime location for their installation. The Board of Trade accident report unequivocally recommended this, and the Midland Railway rapidly complied both here and at 900 other locations on their network.
The issue arose of whether the signalman was overworked. The Midland Railway had a policy of using small engines only, and on the steeply-graded Settle and Carlisle line, this required frequent double-heading
(two locomotives coupled together to operate a single train) or the use of pilot engines to assist engines in pulling trains up to Ais Gill at the summit of the line. Double-heading would not increase the amount of traffic, but pilot engines detached at Ais Gill would usually proceed to Hawes Junction where there was a turntable, to be turned and marshalled together to return to their sheds at Carlisle (or Leeds). These light engine movements would naturally increase the total amount of traffic at Hawes Junction, but the Railway Inspectorate report specifically rejected the assertion that overwork was a factor. However, between moving the two light engines onto the down line and accepting the express, the signalman had to deal with two up goods trains and several up light engines, movements which would require all his concentration to avoid delay, and make it easy to forget about the down line.
, and his report is reproduced here:
Major Pringle's Report (pdf).
Midland Railway
The Midland Railway was a railway company in the United Kingdom from 1844 to 1922, when it became part of the London, Midland and Scottish Railway....
's Settle and Carlisle mainline at the junction with the Wensleydale Railway
Wensleydale Railway
The Wensleydale Railway is a railway line in Wensleydale and Lower Swaledale in North Yorkshire, England and the name of the company that operates services on the line....
in Westmorland
Westmorland
Westmorland is an area of North West England and one of the 39 historic counties of England. It formed an administrative county from 1889 to 1974, after which the entirety of the county was absorbed into the new county of Cumbria.-Early history:...
(now Cumbria
Cumbria
Cumbria , is a non-metropolitan county in North West England. The county and Cumbria County Council, its local authority, came into existence in 1974 after the passage of the Local Government Act 1972. Cumbria's largest settlement and county town is Carlisle. It consists of six districts, and in...
), England
England
England is a country that is part of the United Kingdom. It shares land borders with Scotland to the north and Wales to the west; the Irish Sea is to the north west, the Celtic Sea to the south west, with the North Sea to the east and the English Channel to the south separating it from continental...
. It was caused when a busy signalman (Sutton) forgot about a pair of light engines waiting at his down (northbound) starting signal to return to their base at Carlisle. They were still waiting there when the signalman set the road for the down Scotch express. When the signal cleared, the light engines set off in front of the express into the same block section. Since the light engines were travelling at low speed from a stand at Hawes Junction, and the following express was travelling at high speed, a collision was inevitable. The express caught the light engines just after Moorcock Tunnel near Ais Gill summit
Aisgill
Aisgill is the southernmost of the hamlets that comprise the parish of Mallerstang in the English county of Cumbria. It is on the B6259 road, at the head of Mallerstang dale, just before the boundary between Cumbria and North Yorkshire....
in Mallerstang
Mallerstang
Mallerstang is a civil parish in the extreme east of Cumbria, and, geographically, a dale at the head of the upper Eden Valley. Originally part of Westmorland, it lies about south of the nearest town, Kirkby Stephen...
and was almost wholly derailed.
Casualties were made worse by the telescoping (over-riding) of the timber-bodied coaches, and by fire which broke out in the coaches, fed by the gas for the coaches' lights leaking from ruptured pipes and ignited by the coals from the locomotives' fireboxes. Twelve people lost their lives as a result of this accident, some of whom were trapped in the wreckage and were burned to death.
Causes
The immediate cause of the accident was that the signalman forgot that he had moved the two light engines to the down line, waiting there to proceed to Carlisle. He later improperly cleared the down line signals without ascertaining that the line was clear.In the sequence of events as related in "Red for Danger", another driver waiting to return south to Leeds saw the two light engines move off when the starting signal was cleared. The signal did not return to danger, and the express passed through shortly afterwards. The driver went to the signalbox and related what he had seen. Signalman Sutton refused to believe him until he had checked his train register, and then telephoned the signal box at Ais Gill to the north to ask whether the two light engines had gone through. The Ais Gill signalman replied that none had been offered to him; nor had the express passed. Sutton then asked Signalman Simpson, who was about to relieve him and had just come into the signal box, to "Go to Bunce [the stationmaster] and tell him I am afraid I have wrecked the Scotch Express". It is apparent from this account that Sutton had been under the mistaken impression that he had despatched the two light engines to Carlisle some time earlier
Although the signalman naturally bore the chief blame for the accident, the drivers of the light engines were also at fault for failing to carry out Rule 55
Rule 55
Rule 55 was an operating rule which applied on the former British Railways in the 19th century, and was made defunct when the was introduced following privatisation of the railway.- Overview :...
which was designed to remind signalmen in this situation. Under this rule, they should have sounded their engine whistles on coming to a stop, and when the signal was not cleared, they should have sent one of the firemen to walk to the signalbox to remind the signalman personally. In 1910, the time after which this should be done was not specified, but was generally accepted to be two or three minutes. The engines were actually detained for twenty minutes. Nock states that ten minutes was allowed, but does not give a source for this.
The two light engine drivers (Scott and Bath) stated that they had sounded their whistles as they moved off, and this was confirmed by the driver of the engine waiting to return to Leeds. The signalman had not been alerted by this, probably because driving rain was being blown against the windows of the signalbox, making it hard to hear sounds outside, and because other engines were moving around the station and yard at the same time, so that the signalman would not have attached any particular significance to a train whistle.
Many railways had adopted reminder appliances, simple mechanical collars that the signalmen were required to place on signal levers, as a back-up to prevent improper clearance of signals. The Midland Railway had not adopted these simple devices.
The accident would have been prevented if track circuits had been installed to detect the presence of a train (or in this case the light engines) on the main lines, and interlocking with the signals would have prevented them being cleared by the signalman. Track circuits had been invented in the 1870s and had proved to be very successful; unfortunately most British railway companies were slow to install them. The high level of traffic movements made Hawes Junction a prime location for their installation. The Board of Trade accident report unequivocally recommended this, and the Midland Railway rapidly complied both here and at 900 other locations on their network.
The issue arose of whether the signalman was overworked. The Midland Railway had a policy of using small engines only, and on the steeply-graded Settle and Carlisle line, this required frequent double-heading
Double-heading
In railroad terminology, double-heading or double heading indicates the use of two locomotives at the front of a train, each operated individually by its own crew. The practice of triple-heading involves the use of three locomotives....
(two locomotives coupled together to operate a single train) or the use of pilot engines to assist engines in pulling trains up to Ais Gill at the summit of the line. Double-heading would not increase the amount of traffic, but pilot engines detached at Ais Gill would usually proceed to Hawes Junction where there was a turntable, to be turned and marshalled together to return to their sheds at Carlisle (or Leeds). These light engine movements would naturally increase the total amount of traffic at Hawes Junction, but the Railway Inspectorate report specifically rejected the assertion that overwork was a factor. However, between moving the two light engines onto the down line and accepting the express, the signalman had to deal with two up goods trains and several up light engines, movements which would require all his concentration to avoid delay, and make it easy to forget about the down line.
Railway Inspectorate Report
Since the earliest days of public railways in the UK, railway accidents were investigated by the Railway Inspectorate, an independent body of experts. In the case of the Hawes Junction collision, the investigating officer was Major PringleJohn Wallace Pringle
Colonel Sir John Wallace Pringle was Chief Inspecting Officer of the Railways Inspectorate of the Ministry of Transport from 1916 to 1929...
, and his report is reproduced here:
Major Pringle's Report (pdf).
Similar accidents
- Quintinshill rail crashQuintinshill rail crashThe Quintinshill rail disaster occurred on 22 May 1915 in Scotland near Gretna Green at Quintinshill, an intermediate signal box with sidings on each side on the Caledonian Railway Main Line . The crash involved five trains and killed 226 people...
- also involved a signalman forgetting about a train on the main line. - Thirsk rail crash (1892) - an overtired and ill signalman dozed off and forgot about a train waiting at his signals.
- Winwick rail crashWinwick rail crashThe Winwick rail crash took place at Winwick Junction, near Warrington on the London, Midland and Scottish Railway, on 28 September 1934.-Background:...
- signalman and booking boy forgot about train on main line.
External links
- A Christmas Tragedy - description of the crash on the Danger Ahead historic railway disasters website.
- Mallerstang Section of the Settle-Carlisle line: including a commemoration (and the names) of all those who died during its construction, and in all the subsequent crashes