Paul Sanders MA DEA (IEP Paris), PhD (Cambridge), FRHistS is an Anglo-German historian and management scholar. He teaches at associate professor rank at ESC

ESC

-As an abbreviation:* Ecole Supérieure de Commerce, a business school in the French system of "Grandes Ecoles"* Edison State College* Edmonton Ski Club* Electronic stability control* Electronic Systems Center* Electronic speed control...

 Bourgogne in Dijon, France. Sanders' first book, The Ultimate Sacrifice (1998), was a significant factor in shifting UK public opinion on the controversial debate surrounding Channel Islands collaboration during the German occupation in World War 2. His second monograph, published in French, is the standard academic reference text on the black market in Nazi-occupied Europe. In 2004, the Jersey Heritage Trust commissioned him to write a new official history of the Occupation of the Channel Islands

Occupation of the Channel Islands

The Channel Islands were occupied by Nazi Germany for much of World War II, from 30 June 1940 until the liberation on 9 May 1945. The Channel Islands are two British Crown dependencies and include the bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey as well as the smaller islands of Alderney and Sark...

. A special copy of this book was presented to HM the Queen on 9 May 2005. In 2010 Sanders advised Downing Street in conjunction with an award honouring 'British Heroes of the Holocaust'. He is currently preparing two monographs, on Western Russia narratives and on the Channel Islands Occupation (with Gillian Carr and Louise Willmot). Since 2006 his primary academic interest has shifted to historical and media narratives, and emergency ethics ('dirty hands').

Monographs

• The British Channel Islands under German Occupation 1940-1945, Jersey Heritage Trust/Société Jersiaise, 2005, XXVIII, 288 p.
• Histoire du marché noir 1940-46, Editions Perrin, Paris, 2001, 365 p.
• The Ultimate Sacrifice. The Jersey Twenty and their 'Offences against the Occupying Authorities, 1940–1945, Jersey Heritage Trust, 2004 (2nd ed.), 200 p.

International business ethics and EU-Russia relations

Despite an impressive bottom-line in economic development and poverty reduction, emerging markets lag behind the West in human development, social and political rights. Thus globalization has not always lived up to its reputation of 'emancipation of mankind'. Quite to the contrary, oppressive regimes have become expert in turning economic engagement into a tool that works in their favour. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs have demonstrated the method: opening markets, but restricting access to strategic "coordination goods", i.e. "those public goods [such as media freedom and access to higher education] that critically affect the ability of political opponents to coordinate, but that have relatively little impact on economic growth" (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005). Still, the question how exactly West governments and businesses can engineer change by "engaging" with dictatorships and semi-democracies has remained unanswered.

While some MNCs feel severely challenged by the ethical dilemmas of emerging markets, others have responded with 'doublethink' and 'green-washing': depending on the stakeholder audience, the message differs. The issue is not entirely new. It was exposed to the public eye through the 'sweatshop problem' of international apparel makers in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, business ethicists have proven incapable of tackling this international dimension of ethics. This is due, in part, to an exaggerated emphasis on CSR mainstreaming or transparency drives, instrumental approaches which fail to take into account context.

Governments haven’t really been 'there to help': much of the government advice given to business in emerging markets, such as 'improving business performance', 'generating social capital', 'adopting global standards and best practices' or 'working with leaders', is taken straight from the benign context of developed market democracies, but has little practical relevance in more challenging environments. What underpins this naiveté is the paradigm that Russia (and other emerging markets) are going through a transition to a market-based economy; and the tendency to attribute the ills of the current system either to the long-term consequences of Communism and central planning, or to current Russian economic policy. EU-Russia political, economic and business relations offer a particularly good case study of the dilemma of engaging. Starting at the top of the pyramid one can cite the EU attempt to further the relationship with Russia in a Partnership and Cooperation agreement (PCA) first signed in 1997. This was followed by other declarations such as the "Four Common Spaces" (economy and environment; external security; freedom, security and justice; research and education), signed at the 2003 EU-Russia Summit in Saint Petersburg. Has this had any bearing in terms of furthering convergence in business culture and business ethics? Unfortunately the indication is that rules-based integration may have landed EU Russia relations in a dead end, from which it is difficult to back out. Strategic direction over the relationship to Russia is one of the principal issues dividing EU-27 members. The division is periodically punctuated by acute crises, such as in August 2008, or during the re-play of the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in January 2009. No genuine EU consensus seems in sight. One EU faction led by the Eastern Europeans (but also featuring the UK and Sweden), desires a more resolute stance toward what is perceived as Russian expansionism or aggression, along the lines of Cold War containment. A second, more powerful camp, lays claim to a "new pragmatism". This is traded under the by-words 'Integration und Verflechtung' (integration and interpenetration), 'Wandel durch Handel' (change through trade) or simply 'liberal engagement'. The pragmatic camp is critical of the West's attitude to Russia since the end of the Cold War. It points to the wastage of opportunities in the 1990s, misrepresentations of Russia, the loss of Western leverage and the futility of "lecturing" a more self-assertive Russia on common values. It stresses the long-term mutual benefits of integrating Russia into common political and economic structures. Germany's role within this group is preponderant, but she is closely supported by France and the core EU-6. Economic considerations are the dominating influence within this group which claims that engagement is more effective than confrontation. One argument consists in crediting the interpenetration of Russian and European business with positive spillover effects that will align Russia on international standards, norms and values. Indicative of this orientation is Gerhard Schröder's dictum that "mutual interpenetration leads to common interests, more security and the opening of the Russian economy and society". In a similar vein, Schröder's comrade-in-arms and former German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has made reference to European integration, and in particular the Franco-German couple, as a model to follow for EU-Russia relations. Based on the decades-long experience of stable commercial relations with the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia, and the realisation that détente was more effective in engineering change than confrontation, the success of current liberal engagement becomes a foregone conclusion.

The trouble with this argument is that it is largely normative. It also rests on empirically shaky ground, for counter-examples exist proving that the activity of Western companies in Russia has not always produced liberal spillovers. An example is the role played by investment bank Dresdner Kleinwort in the liquidation of the assets of the Yukos oil company. Swedish retail giant IKEA also proved to be out of tune with its 'zero tolerance' CSR codes, when it was shaken by a recent corruption scandal in St Petersburg.

Does all this mean there is no leverage? No. As Pierre Noel notes in an ECFR report published in 2008, EU energy dependence on Russia is exaggerated; its 'Gazprom problem' to a large extent self-concocted, due to the failure to build a single gas market. Economic interdependence also needs be considered, for the EU is Russia's no. 1 investment and commercial partner. A track record of commercial relations and social capital creation indicates that Russia has little intention of disengaging. Thus the quasi totality of new Russian pipeline projects (Nord Stream, South Stream und Blue Stream), will provide energy to Europe, and not to Asia, where demand is just as high. Our understanding of Russian foreign policy requires similar nuance. Despite diplomatic overtures, Russia is not prepared to place all its bets on an Eastern alliance with China. For the time being the Kremlin decision makers have most to gain by playing China against the West. But more important - and routinely overlooked - is the cultural dimension: the West as an anchor of Russian cultural belonging is a considerable "pull" factor. This tradition of influencing change could be resumed, but it requires leadership and better direction.

In any case, the crucial ethical question remains: what can the West do to make economic interpenetration benefit Russian civil society and democracy, and how can this knowledge be coordinated in a structured approach?

Meta-narratives and New Cold War discourse

Engaging the new Russia confronts as many obstacles as it solicits differences in approaches. Following a promising start in the 1990s, today one could argue that there is more that separates than unites Russia and the West. Some have pointed to geopolitics, others to the value gap as the underlying cause of tension. This would imply that negative Western perceptions decrease when Russian power is on the wane. However, as the example of the 1990s - when Russia was weak - testifies, what predominated in the West on this occasion was not a more conciliatory view, but simply another negative narrative, that of 'ineluctable decomposition'.

While much of the 'bad blood' is attributable to calculated or clumsy Russian action, it would be too easy to simply 'blame it on the Russians'. One should also ask critically whether the West has always made good on its opportunities. What will emerge is that in many cases cognitive barriers have proven formidable stumbling blocks to a better understanding. The gist of how the West perceives Russia can be gauged from any media or academic discussion, and from the public framing of the relationship. A 2007 Intelligence Squared debate in New York, moderated by Edward Lucas, the author of The New Cold War (2008), carried the motion 'Russia is becoming our enemy again' (Intelligence Squared, 2007). The motion won the day, with 47% of the polled convinced that Russia was, indeed, 'becoming the enemy again'. Such results come at a time when a New Cold War is an anachronism, but this has changed frightfully little about the fact that on several other occasions, such as the 2006 Litvinenko affair and the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes, the consensus prevailed that it was appropriate for the West to point its accusing finger at Russia or, directly, at her leadership. The pinnacle of this asymmetric perception of Russia was, no doubt, the 2008 Georgia crisis (s. BBC Newsnight, 28 Oct 2008 "What really happened in South Ossetia?"). Once the hard evidence was put to the test, it emerged that these situations should have called for more caution; alas, too late to revise the critical media threshold, with a negative image of Russia remaining in the public memory.

It is for reasons like this that narratives have attracted academic attention. Narratives and memory may seem arcane issues, but one needs to realise that they are highly significant and politically charged waters, as attested by the acrimonious dispute surrounding the removal of a Soviet-era war memorial in the Estonian capital, Tallinn, in May 2007. A social science loan from literary theory, narratives represent "compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn" (Freedman, 2006, 22). They are not necessarily analytical or evidence-based, can be more or less virtual, and correspond to a "'telescoping' of logic and temporality" (Barthes, 1977). Narratives rely on deliberate gaps and fashion collective blind spots (Jarausch, 2002). However, their purpose transcends (possible) manipulation, they have a far more important function in the formation and formulation of collective identity (Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 2001), as well as in the structuring of the responses of others to developing events (Freedman, 2006). This link to identity formation explains the persistence and power of narratives: for precisely this reason the postmodern postulate to disconnect from narratives is impossible. 'Story-telling' responds to an elementary human need for meaning (Sinnstiftung). One may deplore the distortion of reality through narratives, but, in one form or another, narrativity always prevails.

Examples of the instrumental role of narratives in the Western relationship with Russia emerge from Martin Malia's The Bronze Horseman (1999) and David Foglesong's The American Mission and the Evil Empire (2007). Looking at the post-Soviet context Stephen Cohen described the principal Western master narrative of the Russian 1990s as the confrontation of "liberals" (supported by the West) and Soviet "reactionaries" or reform opponents. The central tenet of this master narrative was (and is) "democratization". Accordingly, President Yeltsin's liberal policies as well as the efforts of Western governments, NGOs and international organisations were allegedly motivated by a concern for "promoting freedom" (Failed Crusade: America and the tragedy of post-Communist Russia, New York, 2001). This narrative omits, for example, that the illiberal seeds of 'managed democracy' were laid in Yeltsin's Russia. Also, Western displeasure with Putin did not commence in 2000 - when the West was undecided - nor as late as the 'Colour Revolutions'. The most plausible chronology for a worsening of relations is 2003-04, when Western hopes of easy access to Russia's energy riches were dashed in the wake of the YUKOS affair. Only then did Western opinion start to interpret Putin's ascent to power in 2000 as the "return of the old guard". In a further twist this new antipathy mutated into a "New Cold War" discourse. This toed the line that the Kremlin first used economic "soft" power in order to reassert Russia as a regional and global power, before finally using brute military force in 2008.

This asymmetric vision is nothing new. In fact, the currently operating Western meta-narrative of relations with Russia since the 19th century is a 'super-story' of engagement driven by the ideological notions of liberty, freedom and, recently, democratisation. This meta-narrative has alternated a quixotic Orientalist search for a Russian civilisational 'black box' [s. de Custine, A., La Russie en 1839 (1843)] with missionary visions oscillating between, on the one hand, a determination to recreate Russia in the Western image and, on the other, claims of essentialist incompatibility (s. Foglesong). During the Cold War era these memes were enriched by the new scientific narratives of 'path dependency' and 'patrimonialism', both of which are now superseded. The 'New Cold War' strain is a recent addition to the meta-narrative. Exhortations to 'come clean' in a number of areas considered critical by the West, in order to be considered part of the Western community of destiny, are corollaries of the same. The meta-narrative has never moved in a straight functional line, but, as indicated by Malia and Foglesong, in dialectic cycles of indifference-engagement-disengagement. Naturally, as befits a pluralist and democratic public opinion, it has never been uncontested; but at the same time it has maintained itself as the dominating and majority consensual view in terms of framing historical and current relations between Russia and the West.

The Channel Islands Occupation

In The British Channel Islands under German Occupation 1940–1945 (2005) Sanders offers an authoritative thematic study covering all aspects of the period, including economics and ethics. The book followed upon a previous publication on the occupation of Jersey

Jersey

Jersey, officially the Bailiwick of Jersey is a British Crown Dependency off the coast of Normandy, France. As well as the island of Jersey itself, the bailiwick includes two groups of small islands that are no longer permanently inhabited, the Minquiers and Écréhous, and the Pierres de Lecq and...

, titled The Ultimate Sacrifice (1998). This study had focused on defiance and resistance in the Nazi-occupied Channel Island of Jersey, exploring the cases of 22 wartime residents deported to prisons and concentration camps for various offences. The Ultimate Sacrifice created a paradigm shift, for in the years preceding its publication the Channel Islands had been the object of adverse publicity in the UK media and academia. This had amounted to collective blanket claims against Channel Islanders for their supposedly collaborationist wartime record. The tactic used by authors and journalists (such as Guardian journalist Madeleine Bunting) to justify their over-focus on collaboration was to minimize or blank out insular opposition to the Occupation. The Ultimate Sacrifice redressed the balance. Sanders did not rely on oral evidence, but followed the paper trail left by the Jersey 22 in archives across Europe. This was no mean undertaking, as the main resource for the research of personal data of wartime deportees, the International Tracing Service

International Tracing Service

The International Tracing Service in Bad Arolsen, Germany, is the internationally governed archive whose task it is to document the fate of millions of civilian victims of Nazi Germany. The documents in the ITS archives include original records from concentration camps, details of forced labour,...

 in Arolsen, only declassified its archives in 2006. The book is dedicated to Joe Mière and Peter Hassall, two occupation survivors who made important contributions to documenting the book. The book's research findings provided the evidentiary basis for a ceremony at 10 Downing Street on 9 March 2010, during which Channel Islanders Louisa Gould, Harold Le Druillenec and Ivy Forster were awarded the title 'British Heroes of the Holocaust'.

The author's implicit aim in The British Channel Islands under German Occupation 1940–1945 is to investigate why the Channel Islands occupation remains such a misunderstood, controversial, and, ultimately, repressed episode of British history. The key to unraveling the continuing uneasiness does not lie in the notion of 'islanders trying to dodge their historical responsibility', but, again, in narratives and memory. The genuine nexus of the issue is not 'collaboration', but the subalternity of Channel Islanders combined with the emotionally charged and identity-constituting memory of the Occupation (plus its associated narrative). In fact, the reception of the Channel Islands occupation is a 'seismic zone' where three 'tectonic plates' of mutually exclusive narratives clash: the Leitkultur of UK war memory (the 'Churchillian paradigm'); European 'Vichy syndrome'; and the 'paradoxical' memory of the Channel Islands ('vanquished victor')

In terms of historiographial content the work focuses on collaboration, resistance, survival culture, economic life and relations between Germans and islanders. Other chapters feature novel approaches to the much-discussed fate of slave and forced workers as well as - building on the groundwork of Freddie Cohen

Freddie Cohen

Frederick Ellyer Cohen is a politician in the Bailiwick of Jersey.Born in Manchester, England, Cohen was educated in Jersey at Moorestown, St. Michael's Preparatory School, Victoria College and then studied accountancy at London South Bank University.Following a career in construction, he became...

 and David Fraser - to the circumstances of the islands' Jewish population. The book also presents an in-depth account of British post-war policy towards island collaboration - a foreboding of the continuing clash of Channel Islands occupation memory and British war memory.

Professor Tony Kushner, director of the Parkes Institute

Parkes Institute

The Parkes Institute is a research centre for the study of Jewish and non-Jewish relations, based at the University of Southampton in England. It includes an extensive archive of books, journals, official documents and other resources donated by James Parkes, a Christian theologian who sought to...

 at Southampton University, described the book in the following terms:

"This book represents an extraordinary achievement. It addresses a controversial past but, through scholarly sophistication, moves beyond the polemic that has so often been associated with the history of the Channel Islands during the Second World War. In no way apologetic or defensive, it manages to convey the acute dilemmas facing Channel Islanders and shows the range and complexity of their responses. It does justice to their unique situation whilst placing the occupation in a comparative framework within and beyond the Second World War. Based on detailed archive work in many different countries it also utilises written and oral testimony to produce a humane and immensely readable narrative that covers all aspects of this remarkable story."

The current focus of this ongoing work has moved to the question why resistance in the islands is still an area of contestation. The Nazi occupation in World War 2 is acknowledged as a defining juncture and an important identity building experience throughout contemporary Europe. Civilian disobedience, defiance and resistance is what ‘saves’ European societies from an otherwise checkered record of collaboration on the part of their economic, political, cultural and religious elites. Opposition took pride of place as a legitimizing device in the postwar order and has become an indelible part of the collective consciousness.
Among previously occupied territories the Channel Islands are the odd one out. Collective identity construction in the islands still relies on the notion of ‘orderly and correct relations’ with the Nazis, while talk of ‘resistance’ earns raised eye-brows. Unsurprisingly, the general attitude to the many witnesses of conscience who existed in the islands remains ambiguous. The stance is justified through the supposedly benign character of the occupation: opposition - so goes the argument - was not only unnecessary, but it also exposed the wider population to the risk of reprisals. Accordingly, it could only have been the handiwork of a delusional or irresponsible minority. Recent studies on atrocities against Jews, forced workers or islanders on the wrong side of occupation law have put this argument into perspective. If it is untenable, or even immoral, to maintain that the German occupation was ‘business as usual’, what is it, then, that prevents genuine acts of heroism from receiving the recognition they deserve, almost seven decades after the end of the Second World War?

A tentative answer would be that British common law was not equipped to deal with the double quandary of enemy occupation. 'Doing the right thing' under these circumstances required an ability to navigate a median course between the Scylla of compliance with the occupier; and the Charybdis of patriotism calling for 'something to be done'. Law made no provision at all for the latter disposition, effectively 'stranding' resisters in a legal no-man’s land. The islands' unwritten constitutions magnify this effect, as they maintain the nonsensical fiction of a continuity of British law, despite Nazi rule. Finally, failed attempts to rehabilitate resistance in the postwar period cast a pungent light on the constitutional relationship between the islands and the UK.

The black market during the Occupation

In his work on the wartime black market Sanders stresses the importance of the subject to a correct understanding of the social, economic and political stakes of the occupation. It is these wider implications that led French historian Dominique Veillon (CNRS) to credit Histoire du marché noir 1940-46 (2001) as a book that would leave a "lasting mark". Sanders' thesis allows for a re-examination of German occupation policy, while also highlighting topics as varied as civilian survival strategies, wealth distribution and the changing occupier-occupied relationship. The author's particular (but not sole) focus is on the German occupier: in France, the latter spent at least 15% of all financial resources available through the Vichy occupation levy on the illegal market. This purchasing started from the onset of occupation. Until December 1941 German economic agencies bought 'anything, at any price'. The uncoordinated bidding led to a black market bubble, the effects of which spilled over into the official markets. Spring 1942 brought the centralisation of German purchasing and during the ensuing second phase (until spring 1943) the occupier still bought 'anything', but no longer at 'any price'. Although this stabilised prices, it also encouraged illegal production, with raw materials diverted from official industry allocations. During this second period 50-60% of all Vichy occupation payments were spent on the black market, at a strategic juncture of the war when such extravagance was no longer justifiable. This undermined German finances in France and became a liability to exploitation and collaboration. The third phase of black market exploitation, from summer 1943 to the end of the occupation, was the most rational. During this period the Germans restricted purchasing to genuinely indispensable strategic raw materials. This built on the effective implementation of a German black market purchasing ban in spring 1943, the support of the Vichy government and French industrial leaders for economic collaboration, business concentrations and closures, market monitoring and resource management methods. As a result, the illegal market in the industrial economy was largely brought under control. Sanders argues that the same degree of economic mobilisation could have been achieved one or even two years earlier, had the Germans abstained from unilateral black market purchasing and instead heeded Vichy calls for closer cooperation. German failure in this area was due to lack of coordination, institutional chaos, economic dilettantism, endemic corruption and reckless resource competition - all of which have their origin in the structure of the Nazi system. While the Germans were relatively successful in their exploitation of French and Belgian industrial resources, illegal food markets demonstrated the limits of coercion. As the nutritional value of official civilian rations remained below subsistence level, the French continued to evade all control efforts and depended on the illegal market for their survival. Thus countermanding food restrictions became something of a national pastime. This further compounded Vichy's lack of will (and authority) in enforcing thorough economic control over agricultural production.

External links

GENERAL

• Webpage of Paul Sanders, ESC Bourgogne
• 'Le fabuleux procès d’« Amélie de Seattle »', LesEchos.fr, 19 October 2011

RUSSIAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

• De la place Tahrir à Benghazi…en passant par Sarajevo : Trois leçons du printemps arabe, CEREN working papers, 35, summer 2011'
• Русская Служба Новостей | Гости | Пол Сандерс, 2 March 2011
• 'Paul Sanders parle de la corruption en Russie', CapCampus, January 2011
• 'La Russie et WikiLeaks : retour sur un état mafieux', LeMonde.fr, 14 December 2010, Russian version: WikiLeaks и Россия: снова о "мафиозном государстве"
• Пол Сандерс: "Возможности влияния России на Европу сильно преувеличены",Yaroslavl Global Policy Forum, 2010
• 'La Russie et la Chine face aux sanctions économiques contre la République islamique d'Iran', LeMonde.fr, 4 May 2010 (with Djamchid Assadi), Russian version: Россия, Китай и экономические санкции против Ирана
• 'Rules of engagement: EU-Russia relations and international ethics', ISA Convention, Feb. 2010

• 'Russische Direktinvestitionen in der EU – Wahrnehmung, Realität und Herausforderung', Jan.-Feb. 2010 Part 1 Part 2

• Vadim Volkov, violence management and the problem of credible commitment in Russia, CEREN working papers, 28, autumn 2009'

• 'Russia, Iran and the West after the August 2008 war', 2009 (in French)

• Globalization, economic interpenetration and business ethics in emerging markets', June 2009

• 'Torheit und Pragmatik: Krieg im Kaukasus', 25 Sept. 2008
• 'Wie notwendig ist eine Kehrtwende im europäischen Russlandbild?', Jan. 2008, French version: 'Plaidoyer pour un nouveau partenariat Europe-Russie'

• Foreign retail groups in Russia - The limits of development', paper presented at IXth International Academic Conference on Economic Modernization and Globalization, Moscow, Higher School of Economics, April 1–3, 2008'

• Large-Scale Retailing in Russia - The Outlook for Foreign Groups', Le Courrier des pays de l'Est, no. 1063, Sept.-Oct. 2007

CHANNEL ISLANDS OCCUPATION

• Ceremony honouring 'British Heroes of the Holocaust', 10 Downing Street, 9 March 2010

• British Channel Islands under German Occupation 1940-45, full online-text version

• 'Managing Under Duress: Ethical Leadership, Social Capital and the Civilian Administration of the British Channel Islands During the Nazi Occupation, 1940–1945', Journal of business ethics, Aug. 2010

http://www.springerlink.com/content/d6g682w688688161/

• Review of The British Channel Islands under German Occupation 1940-45, by Ryan Holte, H-Net, December 2008

http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=23112

• The Ultimate Sacrifice, full online-text version

http://www.cohen.je/ultsac.pdf

• BBC, Russian Service, Историк: на островах в Ла-Манше работали советские пленные, 8 May 2009

http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/international/2009/05/090508_interview_sanders.shtml

• BBC News, Review of The British Channel Islands under German Occupation 1940-45, 'No collaboration choice says book', 6 May 2005

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/jersey/4521451.stm

• Isabella Matauschek, Web-Rezension zu Holocaust Memorial Day and Channel Islands Occupation Memorial, H-Soz-u-Kult, 29 January 2005

http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/id=72&type=rezwww

BLACK MARKET

• 'Economic draining - German black market operations in France, 1940-1944', Global Crime, vol. 9 (1&2), Feb. 2008
• Review of Histoire du marche noir, 1940-1946 by Hervé Le Bot, 2002, 229-232
• Review of Histoire du marche noir, 1940-1946 by Dominique Veillon, Vingtième Siècle, 76, Oct.- Dec. 2002, 168-169
• Review of Histoire du marché noir 1940-46 by Jean-Paul Hamelin, Marianne, 7 Jan 2002
• Review of Histoire du marché noir 1940-46, LeTemps.ch, 'Plongée dans la guerre secrète du marché noir', 2 March 2002

• Review of The Occupation, the French State, and Business, Olivier Dard, Jean-Claude Daumas, and François Marcot (edd.), by Donald Reid, Business History Review, Harvard Business School, Spring 2002

http://www.hbs.edu/bhr/archives/bookreviews/76/2002springdreid.pdf

• Economic choice in dark times - The Vichy economy by Kenneth Mouré, University of California at Santa Barbara

http://www.univ-paris8.fr/histoire/wp-content/uploads/2007/03/frenchpoliticscultureandsociety-2007.pdf

• 'The German Occupation of Byelorussia 1941-44', in Joachim Lund (ed.), Working for the New Order, 2006

http://books.google.fr/books?id=uIRmaM0ld1QC&pg=PA11&lpg=PA11&dq=Paul+Sanders%2BCopenhagen%2Boccupation&source=bl&ots=B0bmrA22ZC&sig=Tw5J6LZrXv0Zpu2mW3lBJ8r82NI&hl=fr&ei=9Tb4SaOvGt2QjAehx_zRDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3#PPA157,M1