Tyler Burge
Encyclopedia
Tyler Burge is a Professor of Philosophy at UCLA. He has made contributions to several areas of philosophy
, including the philosophy of mind
, epistemology, and the history of philosophy
. In the history of philosophy, he has published articles on the philosophy of Gottlob Frege
. A collection of his writings on Frege, along with a substantial introduction and several postscripts by the author, has been published (Burge, 2005). In epistemology, he has written on such topics as self-knowledge and the warrant to testimony. He is perhaps most well-known for his contributions to the philosophy of mind, including his views on de re belief and, most notably, anti-individualism
with respect to mental content, which is also known as externalism
. A festschrift
devoted mostly to Burge's work on anti-individualism, including extensive replies from Burge to the contributors, has also appeared (Hahn and Ramberg 2003). Burge is also an elected Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. He was the recipient of the 2010 Jean Nicod Prize
and delivered a series of lectures in Paris that were hosted by the French National Centre for Scientific Research. Three of Burge's articles have appeared in the The Philosopher's Annual, a ten-article collection of the year's best published articles in all areas of philosophy. The journal began in 1978.
. In Burge’s words, anti-individualism is a theory that asserts the following: “individuating many of a person or animal’s mental kinds … is necessarily dependent on relations that the person bears to the physical, or in some cases social, environment" (Burge 1988, 650). This view, and some variants, has been called "content externalism", or just "externalism
." Burge favors "anti-individualism" over this terminology, in part because he considers the central issue to be what individuates content, rather than where contents may be located, as "externalism" may suggest. (Burge 2003, 435-6).
In “Individualism and the Mental” (1979), Burge argued that a language speaker’s thought contents are dependent on the conventional meanings of the words in her community. The argumentative methodology employed by Burge proceeds by intuitive reflection on hypothetical cases, inspired by the Twin Earth thought experiment
of Hilary Putnam
. Burge asks us to consider a patient who goes to see his doctor, and sincerely tells his doctor that he has arthritis
in the thigh. According to Burge’s intuitions, the patient believes that he has arthritis in the thigh (a belief that is false, since one cannot have arthritis in the thigh, by definition). Next we are asked to consider the same patient in a world in which the only difference is the conventional meaning of the word “arthritis.” Here, “arthritis” designates arthritis and other rheumatoid ailments, including the patient’s thigh ailment. Burge’s intuitions are that the patient in this scenario does not believe that he has arthritis in the thigh. If we are to report the patient’s belief, we would need to coin a word that reflects this usage of “arthritis” and say that he believes he has tharthritis (say) in his thigh. The beliefs the patient has in the two cases are different, on Burge’s intuitions. But since the only difference between the two cases is the conventional meaning of the word “arthritis”, Burge concludes that the patient’s thought contents depend on the conventional meanings as determined by the linguistic community.
Burge argues in a similar fashion that a person’s beliefs are dependent on the physical world. In his thought experiment
he attempted to demonstrate that all thoughts and beliefs have wide contents. Whereas Burge argued for removing our beliefs from our minds, Putnam removed all meanings.
In “The Meaning of Meaning” (1975), Putnam had argued that the meaning of a natural kind
term such as “water” depends on the nature of the physical world. Putnam asked us to imagine a hypothetical world – Twin Earth – that is exactly like Earth, except that the liquid that looks and acts like H2O is not H2O, but a chemically different substance, which is simply abbreviated as XYZ. Putnam holds that the word "water" on Twin Earth does not refer to H2O, but rather to XYZ. Burge (1982) agrees with Putnam that the reference of the word is different, but holds also that the thoughts of persons on Twin Earth differ from those of persons on Earth: while persons on Earth have thoughts about H2O, persons on Twin Earth have thoughts about XYZ. The difference in the thoughts is attributable to the difference between the nature of stuffs in the respective physical environments. As with the "arthritis" thought experiment, dependence of thought on the physical environment is a conclusion that is supposed to follow purely from reflection on the cases in the thought experiment.
Burge has extended the thesis of anti-individualism into the realm of the theory of vision, arguing that the contents of representations posited by a computational theory of vision, such as that pioneered by David Marr, are dependent on the environment of the organism's evolutionary history. (See Burge 1986.)
Anti-individualism about thoughts is a controversial thesis. It has been disputed on a number of grounds. For example, it has been claimed that the thesis undermines a person’s authoritative knowledge of their own thought contents. (See, e.g., McKinsey 1991.) It has also been thought to cause problems for our understanding of the way that mental states cause behavior. (See, e.g., Fodor 1991.) Burge (1988) has argued that anti-individualism is compatible with knowledge of our own mental states. He has also argued that it presents no problems for our understanding of causation. (See Burge 1989.)
Philosophy
Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems, such as those connected with existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language. Philosophy is distinguished from other ways of addressing such problems by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on rational...
, including the philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind-body problem, i.e...
, epistemology, and the history of philosophy
History of philosophy
The history of philosophy is the study of philosophical ideas and concepts through time. Issues specifically related to history of philosophy might include : How can changes in philosophy be accounted for historically? What drives the development of thought in its historical context? To what...
. In the history of philosophy, he has published articles on the philosophy of Gottlob Frege
Gottlob Frege
Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German mathematician, logician and philosopher. He is considered to be one of the founders of modern logic, and made major contributions to the foundations of mathematics. He is generally considered to be the father of analytic philosophy, for his writings on...
. A collection of his writings on Frege, along with a substantial introduction and several postscripts by the author, has been published (Burge, 2005). In epistemology, he has written on such topics as self-knowledge and the warrant to testimony. He is perhaps most well-known for his contributions to the philosophy of mind, including his views on de re belief and, most notably, anti-individualism
Anti-individualism
Anti-individualism is an approach in various areas of thinking and philosophy. These areas have in common the view that what seems to be internal to the individual is to some degree dependent on the social environment...
with respect to mental content, which is also known as externalism
Externalism
Externalism is a group of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that the mind is not only the result of what is going on inside the nervous system but also of what either occur or exist outside the subject. It is often contrasted with internalism which holds that the mind emerges out of...
. A festschrift
Festschrift
In academia, a Festschrift , is a book honoring a respected person, especially an academic, and presented during his or her lifetime. The term, borrowed from German, could be translated as celebration publication or celebratory writing...
devoted mostly to Burge's work on anti-individualism, including extensive replies from Burge to the contributors, has also appeared (Hahn and Ramberg 2003). Burge is also an elected Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. He was the recipient of the 2010 Jean Nicod Prize
Jean Nicod Prize
The Jean Nicod Prize is awarded annually in Paris to a leading philosopher of mind or philosophically-oriented cognitive scientist. The lectures are organized by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique as part of its effort to promote interdisciplinary research in cognitive science in...
and delivered a series of lectures in Paris that were hosted by the French National Centre for Scientific Research. Three of Burge's articles have appeared in the The Philosopher's Annual, a ten-article collection of the year's best published articles in all areas of philosophy. The journal began in 1978.
Anti-individualism
Burge arguably has been philosophy's foremost expositor and defender of anti-individualismAnti-individualism
Anti-individualism is an approach in various areas of thinking and philosophy. These areas have in common the view that what seems to be internal to the individual is to some degree dependent on the social environment...
. In Burge’s words, anti-individualism is a theory that asserts the following: “individuating many of a person or animal’s mental kinds … is necessarily dependent on relations that the person bears to the physical, or in some cases social, environment" (Burge 1988, 650). This view, and some variants, has been called "content externalism", or just "externalism
Externalism
Externalism is a group of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that the mind is not only the result of what is going on inside the nervous system but also of what either occur or exist outside the subject. It is often contrasted with internalism which holds that the mind emerges out of...
." Burge favors "anti-individualism" over this terminology, in part because he considers the central issue to be what individuates content, rather than where contents may be located, as "externalism" may suggest. (Burge 2003, 435-6).
In “Individualism and the Mental” (1979), Burge argued that a language speaker’s thought contents are dependent on the conventional meanings of the words in her community. The argumentative methodology employed by Burge proceeds by intuitive reflection on hypothetical cases, inspired by the Twin Earth thought experiment
Twin Earth thought experiment
The Twin Earth thought experiment was presented by philosopher Hilary Putnam in his 1973 paper "Meaning and Reference" and subsequent 1975 paper "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", as an early argument for what has subsequently come to be known as semantic externalism...
of Hilary Putnam
Hilary Putnam
Hilary Whitehall Putnam is an American philosopher, mathematician and computer scientist, who has been a central figure in analytic philosophy since the 1960s, especially in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of science...
. Burge asks us to consider a patient who goes to see his doctor, and sincerely tells his doctor that he has arthritis
Arthritis
Arthritis is a form of joint disorder that involves inflammation of one or more joints....
in the thigh. According to Burge’s intuitions, the patient believes that he has arthritis in the thigh (a belief that is false, since one cannot have arthritis in the thigh, by definition). Next we are asked to consider the same patient in a world in which the only difference is the conventional meaning of the word “arthritis.” Here, “arthritis” designates arthritis and other rheumatoid ailments, including the patient’s thigh ailment. Burge’s intuitions are that the patient in this scenario does not believe that he has arthritis in the thigh. If we are to report the patient’s belief, we would need to coin a word that reflects this usage of “arthritis” and say that he believes he has tharthritis (say) in his thigh. The beliefs the patient has in the two cases are different, on Burge’s intuitions. But since the only difference between the two cases is the conventional meaning of the word “arthritis”, Burge concludes that the patient’s thought contents depend on the conventional meanings as determined by the linguistic community.
Burge argues in a similar fashion that a person’s beliefs are dependent on the physical world. In his thought experiment
Thought experiment
A thought experiment or Gedankenexperiment considers some hypothesis, theory, or principle for the purpose of thinking through its consequences...
he attempted to demonstrate that all thoughts and beliefs have wide contents. Whereas Burge argued for removing our beliefs from our minds, Putnam removed all meanings.
In “The Meaning of Meaning” (1975), Putnam had argued that the meaning of a natural kind
Natural kind
In philosophy, a natural kind is a "natural" grouping, not an artificial one. Or, it is something that a set of things has in common which distinguishes it from other things as a real set rather than as a group of things arbitrarily lumped together by a person or group of people.If any natural...
term such as “water” depends on the nature of the physical world. Putnam asked us to imagine a hypothetical world – Twin Earth – that is exactly like Earth, except that the liquid that looks and acts like H2O is not H2O, but a chemically different substance, which is simply abbreviated as XYZ. Putnam holds that the word "water" on Twin Earth does not refer to H2O, but rather to XYZ. Burge (1982) agrees with Putnam that the reference of the word is different, but holds also that the thoughts of persons on Twin Earth differ from those of persons on Earth: while persons on Earth have thoughts about H2O, persons on Twin Earth have thoughts about XYZ. The difference in the thoughts is attributable to the difference between the nature of stuffs in the respective physical environments. As with the "arthritis" thought experiment, dependence of thought on the physical environment is a conclusion that is supposed to follow purely from reflection on the cases in the thought experiment.
Burge has extended the thesis of anti-individualism into the realm of the theory of vision, arguing that the contents of representations posited by a computational theory of vision, such as that pioneered by David Marr, are dependent on the environment of the organism's evolutionary history. (See Burge 1986.)
Anti-individualism about thoughts is a controversial thesis. It has been disputed on a number of grounds. For example, it has been claimed that the thesis undermines a person’s authoritative knowledge of their own thought contents. (See, e.g., McKinsey 1991.) It has also been thought to cause problems for our understanding of the way that mental states cause behavior. (See, e.g., Fodor 1991.) Burge (1988) has argued that anti-individualism is compatible with knowledge of our own mental states. He has also argued that it presents no problems for our understanding of causation. (See Burge 1989.)
Books
- 2005. Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege. Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-927853-9.
- 2007. Foundations of Mind. Oxford University Press, ISBN 0199216231.
- 2010. Origins of Objectivity. Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-958140-5.
Articles
- 1977. "Belief De Re". The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 74, No. 6, pp. 338–362.
- 1979. "Sinning against Frege". The Philosophical Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 398–432.
- 1979. "Individualism and the Mental". Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73-121.
- 1982. "Other Bodies". In Woodfield, Andrew, ed., Thought and Object. New York: Oxford.
- 1986. "Individualism and Psychology." Philosophical Review 45: 3-45.
- 1986. "Frege on Truth". in Haaparanta & Hintikka (1986).
- 1986. "Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind". The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 83, No. 12, pp. 697-720.
- 1988. "Individualism and Self-Knowledge". The Journal of Philosophy 85: 649-663.
- 1989. "Individuation and Causation in Psychology". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70: 303-322.
- 1990. "Frege on Sense and Linguistic Meaning". in Bell & Cooper (1990).
- 1992. "Frege on Knowing the Third Realm". Mind, Vol. 101, pp. 633–650.12, pp. 697-720.
- 1993. "Content Preservation". The Philosophical Review, Vol. 102, No. 4, pp. 457–488.
- 2003. "Reply to Loar". In Hahn and Ramberg (1991).
- 2003. "Perceptual Entitlement". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67, pp. 503–548.
- 2003. "Memory and Persons". The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 3, pp. 289–337.