Violinist (Thought Experiment)
Encyclopedia
The Violinist is a famous thought experiment
first posed by Judith Jarvis Thomson
in 1971.
As Thomson recognizes, this analogy is most applicable in cases of rape.
Having identified this question, Thomson attempted to circumvent this issue by "[immediately granting] that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception"; which then allowed her to address what she felt was the only issue involved: that of whether the pregnant woman, or the fetus, had the "stronger and more stringent… right to life".
's "Killing and Letting Die", Thomson’s thought experiment is directly criticized. Foot discredits the suggested mirror-situation between the violinist and abortion by applying and weighing negative and positive rights
.
First, Foot derives the moral difference between killing and letting die:
The rights to noninterference constitute ‘negative rights’ and the rights to goods or services constitute 'positive rights'.
Foot claims that, "Typically, it takes more to justify an interference than to justify the withholding of goods or services…". In other words, ceteris paribus
, a negative right holds greater moral weight than a positive right, and so it is harder to morally justify overriding a negative right than a positive right. Foot builds on this by specifying, "So if, in any circumstances, the right to noninterference is the only right that exists, or if it is the only right special circumstances have not overridden, then it may not be permissible to initiate a fatal sequence, but it may be permissible to withhold aid". Foot classifies initiating a fatal sequence as a morally objectionable act, while legitimizing the morality of not aiding.
This holds substantial implications for Thomson’s violinist experiment. Whereas Thomson requests the reader to draw a moral parallel between unhooking oneself from the violinist and a woman aborting her fetus, Foot seeks a deeper explanation of why this should be the case. But, in Foot’s opinion, under her framework, things are not as Thomson would like. Foot notes, “According to my thesis, the two cases must be treated quite differently because one involves the initiation of a fatal sequence and the other the refusal to save a life”.
The distinction arises from the rights due to the violinist and fetus, and the duty one holds not to violate them. In the case of Thomson’s experiment, the violinist holds only a positive right to be saved: he requires the service of being hooked up to another’s body. Now, as the argument will go, if you find yourself hooked up to the dying violinist, you have an obligation to not ‘kill him’ by separating yourself from him. However, it is important not to allocate rights to which the violinist is not entitled. You, the person to whom he is attached, did not bring about the sequence of his death, and so cannot be burdened with, say, the negative duty ‘not to kill the violinist’ – since, ultimately, it is the ailment that is killing the violinist. Consequently, the only right to which the violinist has a claim is a positive right. And, Foot explains, “…although charity or duties of care could have dictated that the help be given, it seems perfectly reasonable to treat this as a case in which such presumptions are overridden by other rights—those belonging to the person whose body would be used.” Thus, in this case one may unhook from the violinist, since his positive right does not hold enough weight to justify disregarding another’s right to his or her own body.
Foot gives an account of the other case, abortion:
According to Foot, abortion is uniquely different from the violinist case, since the fetus holds a negative right not to be killed (since it holds a full right to life, as granted to it by Thomson). The woman, by having an abortion administered, directly initiates the event which takes the fetus’s life, completely violating its negative right. For this reason, in any normal circumstances a woman cannot morally legitimize having an abortion.
Thought experiment
A thought experiment or Gedankenexperiment considers some hypothesis, theory, or principle for the purpose of thinking through its consequences...
first posed by Judith Jarvis Thomson
Judith Jarvis Thomson
Judith Jarvis Thomson is an American moral philosopher and metaphysician, best known for her use of thought experiments to make philosophical points.- Career :...
in 1971.
The "famous violinist" thought experiment
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes her thought experiment as follows:- Judith Jarvis Thomson provided one of the most striking and effective thought experiments in the moralMoralA moral is a message conveyed or a lesson to be learned from a story or event. The moral may be left to the hearer, reader or viewer to determine for themselves, or may be explicitly encapsulated in a maxim...
realm. Her example is aimed at a popular anti-abortion argument that goes something like this: The fetus is an innocent person with a right to life. AbortionAbortionAbortion is defined as the termination of pregnancy by the removal or expulsion from the uterus of a fetus or embryo prior to viability. An abortion can occur spontaneously, in which case it is usually called a miscarriage, or it can be purposely induced...
results in the death of a fetus. Therefore, abortion is morally wrong.
- In her thought experiment we are asked to imagine a famous violinist falling into a comaComaIn medicine, a coma is a state of unconsciousness, lasting more than 6 hours in which a person cannot be awakened, fails to respond normally to painful stimuli, light or sound, lacks a normal sleep-wake cycle and does not initiate voluntary actions. A person in a state of coma is described as...
. The society of music lovers determines from medical records that you and you alone can save the violinist's life by being hooked up to him for nine months. The music lovers break into your home while you are asleep and hook the unconscious (and unknowing, hence innocent) violinist to you. You may want to unhook him, but you are then faced with this argument put forward by the music lovers: The violinist is an innocent person with a right to life. Unhooking him will result in his death. Therefore, unhooking him is morally wrong.
- However, the argument does not seem convincing in this case. You would be very generous to remain attached and in bed for nine months, but you are not morally obliged to do so. The parallel with the abortion case is evident. The thought experiment is effective in distinguishing two concepts that had previously been run together: "right to life" and "right to what is needed to sustain life." The fetus and the violinist may each have the former, but it is not evident that either has the latter. The upshot is that even if the fetus has a right to life (which Thomson does not believe but allows for the sake of the argument), it may still be morally permissible to abort.
As Thomson recognizes, this analogy is most applicable in cases of rape.
Relation to abortion debate
In her introduction to her "Famous Violinist Problem", Thomson notes that much of the inadequate debate on abortion was getting lost within the issue of whether the fetus is a person or a mass of tissue.Having identified this question, Thomson attempted to circumvent this issue by "[immediately granting] that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception"; which then allowed her to address what she felt was the only issue involved: that of whether the pregnant woman, or the fetus, had the "stronger and more stringent… right to life".
Foot’s response – killing versus letting die
In Philippa FootPhilippa Foot
Philippa Ruth Foot was a British philosopher, most notable for her works in ethics. She was one of the founders of contemporary virtue ethics...
's "Killing and Letting Die", Thomson’s thought experiment is directly criticized. Foot discredits the suggested mirror-situation between the violinist and abortion by applying and weighing negative and positive rights
Negative and positive rights
Philosophers and political scientists make a distinction between negative and positive rights . According to this view, positive rights permit or oblige action, whereas negative rights permit or oblige inaction. These permissions or obligations may be of either a legal or moral character...
.
First, Foot derives the moral difference between killing and letting die:
- …There are rights to noninterference, which form one class of rights; and there are also rights to goods or services, which are different. And corresponding to these two types of rights are, on the one hand, the duty not to interfere, called a 'negative duty', and on the other the duty to provide the goods or services, called a 'positive duty'.
The rights to noninterference constitute ‘negative rights’ and the rights to goods or services constitute 'positive rights'.
Foot claims that, "Typically, it takes more to justify an interference than to justify the withholding of goods or services…". In other words, ceteris paribus
Ceteris paribus
or is a Latin phrase, literally translated as "with other things the same," or "all other things being equal or held constant." It is an example of an ablative absolute and is commonly rendered in English as "all other things being equal." A prediction, or a statement about causal or logical...
, a negative right holds greater moral weight than a positive right, and so it is harder to morally justify overriding a negative right than a positive right. Foot builds on this by specifying, "So if, in any circumstances, the right to noninterference is the only right that exists, or if it is the only right special circumstances have not overridden, then it may not be permissible to initiate a fatal sequence, but it may be permissible to withhold aid". Foot classifies initiating a fatal sequence as a morally objectionable act, while legitimizing the morality of not aiding.
This holds substantial implications for Thomson’s violinist experiment. Whereas Thomson requests the reader to draw a moral parallel between unhooking oneself from the violinist and a woman aborting her fetus, Foot seeks a deeper explanation of why this should be the case. But, in Foot’s opinion, under her framework, things are not as Thomson would like. Foot notes, “According to my thesis, the two cases must be treated quite differently because one involves the initiation of a fatal sequence and the other the refusal to save a life”.
The distinction arises from the rights due to the violinist and fetus, and the duty one holds not to violate them. In the case of Thomson’s experiment, the violinist holds only a positive right to be saved: he requires the service of being hooked up to another’s body. Now, as the argument will go, if you find yourself hooked up to the dying violinist, you have an obligation to not ‘kill him’ by separating yourself from him. However, it is important not to allocate rights to which the violinist is not entitled. You, the person to whom he is attached, did not bring about the sequence of his death, and so cannot be burdened with, say, the negative duty ‘not to kill the violinist’ – since, ultimately, it is the ailment that is killing the violinist. Consequently, the only right to which the violinist has a claim is a positive right. And, Foot explains, “…although charity or duties of care could have dictated that the help be given, it seems perfectly reasonable to treat this as a case in which such presumptions are overridden by other rights—those belonging to the person whose body would be used.” Thus, in this case one may unhook from the violinist, since his positive right does not hold enough weight to justify disregarding another’s right to his or her own body.
Foot gives an account of the other case, abortion:
- The case of abortion is of course completely different. The fetus is not in jeopardy because it is in its mother’s womb; it is merely dependent on her in the way children are dependent on their parents for food. An abortion, therefore, originates the sequence which ends in the death of the fetus, and the destruction comes about “through the agency” of the mother who seeks the abortion.
According to Foot, abortion is uniquely different from the violinist case, since the fetus holds a negative right not to be killed (since it holds a full right to life, as granted to it by Thomson). The woman, by having an abortion administered, directly initiates the event which takes the fetus’s life, completely violating its negative right. For this reason, in any normal circumstances a woman cannot morally legitimize having an abortion.
External links
- "Thought Experiments", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy