Zablocki v. Redhail
Encyclopedia
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978), was a U.S. Supreme Court
decision that held that Wisconsin
Statutes §§ 245.10 (1), (4), (5) (1973) violated the Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection clause
. Section 245.10 required noncustodial parents who were Wisconsin residents attempting to marry inside or outside of Wisconsin to seek a court order prior to receiving a marriage license. In order to receive such a court order, the noncustodial parent could not be in arrears on his or her child support, and the court had to believe that the child(ren) would not become dependent on the State.
In 1974, Redhail attempted to obtain a marriage license in Milwaukee County. Due to the aforementioned § 245.10(1), one of the agents of the county clerk denied his application because he did not have a court order allowing him to marry. Redhail proceeded to file a class action suit against Thomas Zablocki, who was the county clerk of Milwaukee County (and whose official capacity was to issue such licenses) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
, and since the action sought a permanent injunction
against the statute, required a three-judge court.
Judge John Reynolds wrote for the three-judge court. After disposing with issues regarding interactions with State court actions and class action procedure, he reached the substantive matter under which Redhail filed suit. Finding that the Wisconsin statute created two separate classes of individuals, Reynolds then proceeded to observe that under a number of Supreme Court decisions, marriage was held to be a fundamental right. Accordingly, the judge applied strict scrutiny
to determine whether the Wisconsin statute could survive constitutional review.
Examining the State's interest in the matter, Reynolds found that while Wisconsin surely had a legitimate interest in counseling, that interest was not perceived as a compelling interest. While he found that the State's interest in child welfare was potentially compelling, that interest was insufficient because the Wisconsin statute was not connected to the restriction imposed by the statute. As the Wisconsin law could not withstand strict scrutiny, Reynolds declared the law unconstitutional.
, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977). The case was argued early in the October term of 1977, and the judgment was issued in January 1978.
Justice Marshall wrote for the majority in a 5-3-1 court holding. Affirming the judgment of the District Court, Marshall concurred with the District Court's reading of marriage being a fundamental right, relying on Loving v. Virginia
(1967) and Griswold v. Connecticut
(1965). Marshall, however, diverged from the District Court's analysis by refusing to apply strict scrutiny. Instead, he determined if Wisconsin's law was "supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests". Marshall's standard is similar to strict scrutiny as his "closely tailored" is similar to the strict scrutiny standard of requiring a statute to be narrowly tailored to the interest, but it requires only an "important state interest", which is akin to intermediate scrutiny
.
Applying this standard, Marshall examined the same two justifications that the District Court confronted—child welfare and counseling noncustodial parents about their obligations. These justifications are defeated because as Marshall explained, Wisconsin could find other ways to achieve the interest without resorting to infringement of a fundamental right, and that the latter reason is defective because it fails to achieve the objectives it sets out to meet (which is one of the necessities of being narrowly tailored). Accordingly Marshall affirmed the District Court by focusing the lack of connection and efficacy of the measures Wisconsin advances, rather than confronting the importance of Wisconsin's interests.
interest of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause
. Reasoning that lacking money is not an acceptable reason to restrict a person's liberty, he concludes that the traditions of the United States forbid such a restriction, and that the proper justification for holding the law to be unconstitutional is substantive due process.
test—that the law need be only rationally related to a legitimate State interest. Rehnquist's contends that the appropriate frame of analysis for the Court should be one that is deferential to the concerns of the legislature. The key to this viewpoint is the realization that Wisconsin "'adopted this rule in the course of constructing a complex social welfare system that necessarily deals with the intimacies of family life'"—that Wisconsin made a "permissible exercise of [its] power" even though its results may not be as intended.
Rehnquist also disagreed that Redhail had standing
to bring his claim. Examining the record of the District Court and of oral arguments, he finds that it was never verified that Redhail could not pay for his child support obligations. With this argument, the Justice notes that Redhail may not be an acceptable member of his class and thus might not have been able to bring the challenge that he brought. However Rehnquist notes that because he finds the law to be valid, there is no need to reach the question of standing.
Case citation
Case citation is the system used in many countries to identify the decisions in past court cases, either in special series of books called reporters or law reports, or in a 'neutral' form which will identify a decision wherever it was reported...
(1978), was a U.S. Supreme Court
Supreme Court of the United States
The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest court in the United States. It has ultimate appellate jurisdiction over all state and federal courts, and original jurisdiction over a small range of cases...
decision that held that Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin is a U.S. state located in the north-central United States and is part of the Midwest. It is bordered by Minnesota to the west, Iowa to the southwest, Illinois to the south, Lake Michigan to the east, Michigan to the northeast, and Lake Superior to the north. Wisconsin's capital is...
Statutes §§ 245.10 (1), (4), (5) (1973) violated the Fourteenth Amendment
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted on July 9, 1868, as one of the Reconstruction Amendments.Its Citizenship Clause provides a broad definition of citizenship that overruled the Dred Scott v...
equal protection clause
Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause, part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"...
. Section 245.10 required noncustodial parents who were Wisconsin residents attempting to marry inside or outside of Wisconsin to seek a court order prior to receiving a marriage license. In order to receive such a court order, the noncustodial parent could not be in arrears on his or her child support, and the court had to believe that the child(ren) would not become dependent on the State.
History
In 1972, Roger Redhail, then in high school, was sued in a paternity action in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. Admitting that he was the father, the court ordered him to pay child support in the amount of $109 per month until the child reached eighteen years of age, plus court costs. Since Redhail was in high school at the time, he had no way to pay the court costs or child support. It went in arrears, reaching a total of $3,732 by the end of 1974. Meanwhile, Redhail's noncustodial child was a public charge, and received $109 per month as support from the State of Wisconsin.In 1974, Redhail attempted to obtain a marriage license in Milwaukee County. Due to the aforementioned § 245.10(1), one of the agents of the county clerk denied his application because he did not have a court order allowing him to marry. Redhail proceeded to file a class action suit against Thomas Zablocki, who was the county clerk of Milwaukee County (and whose official capacity was to issue such licenses) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Civil Rights Act of 1871
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, , enacted April 20, 1871, is a federal law in force in the United States. The Act was originally enacted a few years after the American Civil War, along with the 1870 Force Act. One of the chief reasons for its passage was to protect southern blacks from the Ku Klux...
, and since the action sought a permanent injunction
Injunction
An injunction is an equitable remedy in the form of a court order that requires a party to do or refrain from doing certain acts. A party that fails to comply with an injunction faces criminal or civil penalties and may have to pay damages or accept sanctions...
against the statute, required a three-judge court.
Judge John Reynolds wrote for the three-judge court. After disposing with issues regarding interactions with State court actions and class action procedure, he reached the substantive matter under which Redhail filed suit. Finding that the Wisconsin statute created two separate classes of individuals, Reynolds then proceeded to observe that under a number of Supreme Court decisions, marriage was held to be a fundamental right. Accordingly, the judge applied strict scrutiny
Strict scrutiny
Strict scrutiny is the most stringent standard of judicial review used by United States courts. It is part of the hierarchy of standards that courts use to weigh the government's interest against a constitutional right or principle. The lesser standards are rational basis review and exacting or...
to determine whether the Wisconsin statute could survive constitutional review.
Examining the State's interest in the matter, Reynolds found that while Wisconsin surely had a legitimate interest in counseling, that interest was not perceived as a compelling interest. While he found that the State's interest in child welfare was potentially compelling, that interest was insufficient because the Wisconsin statute was not connected to the restriction imposed by the statute. As the Wisconsin law could not withstand strict scrutiny, Reynolds declared the law unconstitutional.
Opinion of the Court
When federal suits proceed in three-judge courts, allows parties to appeal directly to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdictionJurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the practical authority granted to a formally constituted legal body or to a political leader to deal with and make pronouncements on legal matters and, by implication, to administer justice within a defined area of responsibility...
, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977). The case was argued early in the October term of 1977, and the judgment was issued in January 1978.
Justice Marshall wrote for the majority in a 5-3-1 court holding. Affirming the judgment of the District Court, Marshall concurred with the District Court's reading of marriage being a fundamental right, relying on Loving v. Virginia
Loving v. Virginia
Loving v. Virginia, , was a landmark civil rights case in which the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, declared Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, the "Racial Integrity Act of 1924", unconstitutional, thereby overturning Pace v...
(1967) and Griswold v. Connecticut
Griswold v. Connecticut
Griswold v. Connecticut, , was a landmark case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Constitution protected a right to privacy. The case involved a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives...
(1965). Marshall, however, diverged from the District Court's analysis by refusing to apply strict scrutiny. Instead, he determined if Wisconsin's law was "supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests". Marshall's standard is similar to strict scrutiny as his "closely tailored" is similar to the strict scrutiny standard of requiring a statute to be narrowly tailored to the interest, but it requires only an "important state interest", which is akin to intermediate scrutiny
Intermediate scrutiny
Intermediate scrutiny, in U.S. constitutional law, is the second level of deciding issues using judicial review. The other levels are typically referred to as rational basis review and strict scrutiny ....
.
Applying this standard, Marshall examined the same two justifications that the District Court confronted—child welfare and counseling noncustodial parents about their obligations. These justifications are defeated because as Marshall explained, Wisconsin could find other ways to achieve the interest without resorting to infringement of a fundamental right, and that the latter reason is defective because it fails to achieve the objectives it sets out to meet (which is one of the necessities of being narrowly tailored). Accordingly Marshall affirmed the District Court by focusing the lack of connection and efficacy of the measures Wisconsin advances, rather than confronting the importance of Wisconsin's interests.
Burger's Concurrence
Chief Justice Burger joined with Justice Marshall's opinion, and concurred separately to note that the Wisconsin statute was an "intentional and substantial interference with the right to marry", distinguishing this case and Califano v. Jobst (1977).Stewart's Concurrence in the Judgment
Justice Stewart reaches a conclusion nearly identical to the Court's conclusion, but wholly rejects the Court's equal protection analysis, likening it to be the improper analysis for the denial of a right. Stewart disagrees with the majority's contention that there is a fundamental right to marry, or even an explicit right to marry at all. Rather, he grounds his analysis in the libertyLiberty
Liberty is a moral and political principle, or Right, that identifies the condition in which human beings are able to govern themselves, to behave according to their own free will, and take responsibility for their actions...
interest of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause
Due process
Due process is the legal code that the state must venerate all of the legal rights that are owed to a person under the principle. Due process balances the power of the state law of the land and thus protects individual persons from it...
. Reasoning that lacking money is not an acceptable reason to restrict a person's liberty, he concludes that the traditions of the United States forbid such a restriction, and that the proper justification for holding the law to be unconstitutional is substantive due process.
Powell's Concurrence in the Judgment
Justice Powell concurs in the judgment in a similar manner to Justice Stewart. Powell's primary concern is that the near-application of strict scrutiny and the use of the equal protection clause is too strong and interferes with the legitimate regulation of the State on marriage. Similar to Justice Stewart, Powell would use the due process clause, but invoke it in a way that would be flexible enough to allow the State to pass reasonable regulations (regulations that probably would not be upheld under Marshall's standard).Stevens's Concurrence in the Judgment
Justice Stevens's concurrence in the judgment is different from the other two because he wishes to distinguish between different kinds of classifications. Stevens states that "[a] classification based on marital status is fundamentally different from a classification which determines who may lawfully enter into the marriage relationship." In making this distinction, Stevens wishes to separate Zablocki and Loving from Califano v. Jobst. The intent of his opinion is to illustrate that distinctions between married and unmarried people are largely acceptable, whereas bars to marriage itself should be treated with skepticism. Further, he too concludes that the methods of Wisconsin's law fall far short of achieving its objectives (reasoning through multiple claims that Wisconsin's desired outcome does not comport with the reality of the situation).Rehnquist's Dissent
Justice Rehnquist was the only justice to dissent completely from the ruling of the court. Agreeing with Justice Powell, Rehnquist concludes that there is no fundamental right to marriage. Further he would conclude that the appropriate measure for this case is the rational basisRational basis review
Rational basis review, in U.S. constitutional law, refers to a level of scrutiny applied by courts when deciding cases presenting constitutional due process or equal protection issues related to the Fifth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment. Rational basis is the lowest level of scrutiny that a...
test—that the law need be only rationally related to a legitimate State interest. Rehnquist's contends that the appropriate frame of analysis for the Court should be one that is deferential to the concerns of the legislature. The key to this viewpoint is the realization that Wisconsin "'adopted this rule in the course of constructing a complex social welfare system that necessarily deals with the intimacies of family life'"—that Wisconsin made a "permissible exercise of [its] power" even though its results may not be as intended.
Rehnquist also disagreed that Redhail had standing
Standing (law)
In law, standing or locus standi is the term for the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case...
to bring his claim. Examining the record of the District Court and of oral arguments, he finds that it was never verified that Redhail could not pay for his child support obligations. With this argument, the Justice notes that Redhail may not be an acceptable member of his class and thus might not have been able to bring the challenge that he brought. However Rehnquist notes that because he finds the law to be valid, there is no need to reach the question of standing.