Abbots Ripton rail disaster
Encyclopedia
The Abbots Ripton rail disaster occurred on 21 January 1876 at Abbots Ripton
, then in the county of Huntingdonshire
, England, now in Cambridgeshire
, on the Great Northern Railway
main line, previously thought to be exemplary for railway safety. In the accident, the Special Scotch Express, ( known as the Flying Scotsman after 1923) train from Edinburgh
to London
was involved in a collision
, during a blizzard
, with a coal train. An express travelling in the other direction then ran into the wreckage. The initial accident was caused by:
Additional factors in the second accident were:
The accident (and the subsequent inquiry into it) led to fundamental changes in British railway signalling practice.
at Abbots Ripton
to allow the much faster Flying Scotsman to pass. Because of a very bad snowstorm, both the coal train and the Flying Scotsman were running late and the signalman
at Holme
, the next station north of Abbots Ripton, judged that the coal train needed to go into sidings at Holme if it was not to delay the Flying Scotsman. He therefore set his signals to (as he thought) stop the coal train. However it continued on the main line, reached Abbots Ripton and had nearly completed shunting into the siding there when the Flying Scotsman ran into it at speed. The wreckage obstructed the down (northbound) line and a second collision occurred some minutes later when a northbound express to Leeds
crashed into the wreckage. Thirteen passengers lost their lives in the collisions, and 53 passengers and 6 traincrew members were injured.
The Great Northern was operating on the block
system, which was supposed to eliminate such accidents, so the accident caused considerable alarm. It was soon established that the main problem was with signals and snow:
The coal train had therefore seen nothing to make it stop at Holme, and the Flying Scotsman whilst catching up with it had run through a number of signals which had been set to 'danger' but were in fact showing 'clear'.
on the East Coast main line, on a section which in 1876 was twin track. To prevent slow (typically 20 mph (32 km/h)) goods trains obstructing fast trains such as the ‘Scotch express’ (averaging 45 mph (72 km/h) and hence unofficially nicknamed ‘The Flying Scotsman’ ) stations with ‘shunting sidings’ were provided at frequent intervals. A slow train being caught up with by a faster one would stop at the station and back into the shunting siding (clearing the main line in about 4 minutes) and emerging to resume its journey after the fast train had passed by. Abbots Ripton was one such station; for a south-bound (‘up’) train the previous shunting siding was 9.3 km (5.8 mi) further north at Holme 7 miles (11.3 km) south of Peterborough
.
All boxes could communicate with adjacent boxes by their block telegraph. Signals were normally kept at ‘all clear’ but were set to ‘danger’ to protect trains as follows. When a train entered a block by passing a home signal, the signalman would set the home signal to “danger”, thus preventing a following train entering the same block. The distant would also be set to 'danger'. Trains were required to stop at a home signal at ‘danger’ but were allowed to pass a distant signal at ‘danger’ this merely warning the driver of an approaching train to moderate speed so that the train could be stopped at the home signal. Both signals would be returned to “all clear” when the next box telegraphed ‘line clear’. Normally, as soon as a train was past a box’s home signal , the signalman would telegraph “line clear” to the preceding box. During foggy or snowy weather, however, when a train stopped at a station ‘line clear’ was not sent until the train had restarted, or been shunted into a siding. In good weather therefore a goods being shunted into a siding at Abbots Ripton should have been protected against another train running into it by the Abbots Ripton ‘home’ and ‘distant’ signals ; in falling snow, the home and distant signals of the previous box should have given further protection and the fast train should always have been at least one full block away.
Signal boxes serving stations/sidings had , as well as the block telegraph a ‘speaking telegraph’ which allowed more sophisticated messages to be sent. For example all stations could kept informed of how late the trains were running.
By day the signal arms were clearly visible from the signal box from which they were worked; the system therefore had no repeater in the signal box to indicate to a signalman the position a signal was actually at.
In emergency the signal could be set to ‘danger’ by cutting the wire, but a heavy weight lying on the wire would keep the signal at ‘all clear’ by effectively pulling on the wire: since the signals were normally set to ‘all clear’ any fault which stopped them being moved would almost certainly keep them at ‘all clear’ as well.
At night (or in poor visibility in daytime) an oil lamp displayed a white light when the signal was at 'all clear' ; when the signal arm moved to the horizontal “danger” position it brought a red lens in front of the light, so that a (less bright) red light was then displayed to oncoming trains. In poor visibility, GNR regulations called for detonators to be laid if possible on the track at the home signal when this was set to danger; at stations where platelayers were available, this should also be done at the distant signals.
The Holme station master told the enquiry that he then sent for the platelayers; whilst waiting for them he checked the up line home signal and saw it to be at 'danger'. However , when a down express went through he noticed that one of the signals did not go to 'danger' after it had passed.If true, this would be about 6.25, and hence after the Scotsman had left Peterborough (6.24) This appeared considerably at variance with other testimony.
The platelayers had to be sent for because they had been allowed to go home at the end of their normal working day, despite the weather. Their foreman was uneasy about this and came out of his house to watch the up distant signal whilst two trains went past: the first of these was the Manchester express, running about 13 minutes behind the Scotsman; the second a slow stopping passenger train, a further 6 minutes behind when it left Peterborough. As he feared, the signal showed a white light throughout. He put his work clothes back on and went to the signal. The arm was weighed down with snow; once he had shaken this off by working the arm up and down it showed a red light. He then walked to the station; on his way he met a platelayer despatched to the distant signal by the stationmaster.
Other witnesses also gave evidence strongly suggesting that the platelayers were not summoned until after the Scotsman had passed and were not back at work until after the Manchester express had passed (c 6.50.). They reported that other signals (including the up home signal) were - when first checked - in the same state as the up distant. The signalman also claimed that the stationmaster had reported the up home signal to not be working properly.
station to the south.There were two signal boxes at Huntingdon; Huntingdon North and Huntingdon South; both were on the ‘speaking telegraph’ – to contact the stationmaster at Huntingdon to get assistance Abbots Ripton should have 'spoken' to Huntingdon South (which is what he did, or rather attempted); to maximise the chances of getting the train held Huntingdon North (which he did not) He prefixed the message with the special ‘SP’ code indicating top priority but the signalman at Huntingdon did not answer. The Abbots Ripon signalman kept trying to raise Huntingdon, but without success; when the Huntingdon signalman did answer he first refused to accept any message not starting with a code to indicate time sent, and rebuffed subsequent sends with an 'MQ' code - roughly translating as "Go away, I'm busy".
Indeed he was; he was accepting the Leeds express and passing it on to the next signal box.
The Leeds express ploughed through the tender and carriages blocking the line (this, rather than the first collision, is when most -if not all- of the deaths are thought to have occurred).
Messages seeking assistance were then sent to Huntingdon and Peterborough.
The enquiry had heard evidence from experienced working-level witnesses that this (or a milder manifestation of this) was a known problem on snowy days but could easily be fixed if you knew how e.g. by "jiggling the arms". It implicitly rejected the evidence from GNR senior managers who denied that there was any prior history of problems, but made no comment on the discrepancy. No GNR documentation of the problem or how to fix it emerged, nor did all the signalmen and platelayers say they had heard of it; that would tend to suggest that GNR senior management were genuinely unaware.
Operating practice at that time was that the signals were left in the "clear" position continuously unless it was required to protect a static obstruction. Consequently the signals stood at clear for considerable periods of time, and there was little opportunity to spot the problem.
The inquiry report noted various suggested improvements to signal arrangements, but cautioned against over-elaborate solutions
It commented adversely
had no regulatory powers to enforce the recommendations of the inquiry report. The most important were:
Over a longer timescale, and after further accidents
Abbots Ripton
Abbots Ripton is a village and civil parish in Cambridgeshire, England. It is situated five miles north of Huntingdon, on the B1090...
, then in the county of Huntingdonshire
Huntingdonshire
Huntingdonshire is a local government district of Cambridgeshire, covering the area around Huntingdon. Traditionally it is a county in its own right...
, England, now in Cambridgeshire
Cambridgeshire
Cambridgeshire is a county in England, bordering Lincolnshire to the north, Norfolk to the northeast, Suffolk to the east, Essex and Hertfordshire to the south, and Bedfordshire and Northamptonshire to the west...
, on the Great Northern Railway
Great Northern Railway (Great Britain)
The Great Northern Railway was a British railway company established by the Great Northern Railway Act of 1846. On 1 January 1923 the company lost its identity as a constituent of the newly formed London and North Eastern Railway....
main line, previously thought to be exemplary for railway safety. In the accident, the Special Scotch Express, ( known as the Flying Scotsman after 1923) train from Edinburgh
Edinburgh
Edinburgh is the capital city of Scotland, the second largest city in Scotland, and the eighth most populous in the United Kingdom. The City of Edinburgh Council governs one of Scotland's 32 local government council areas. The council area includes urban Edinburgh and a rural area...
to London
London
London is the capital city of :England and the :United Kingdom, the largest metropolitan area in the United Kingdom, and the largest urban zone in the European Union by most measures. Located on the River Thames, London has been a major settlement for two millennia, its history going back to its...
was involved in a collision
Collision
A collision is an isolated event which two or more moving bodies exert forces on each other for a relatively short time.Although the most common colloquial use of the word "collision" refers to accidents in which two or more objects collide, the scientific use of the word "collision" implies...
, during a blizzard
Blizzard
A blizzard is a severe snowstorm characterized by strong winds. By definition, the difference between blizzard and a snowstorm is the strength of the wind. To be a blizzard, a snow storm must have winds in excess of with blowing or drifting snow which reduces visibility to 400 meters or ¼ mile or...
, with a coal train. An express travelling in the other direction then ran into the wreckage. The initial accident was caused by:
- over-reliance on signals and blockworking as allowing high-speed running even in adverse conditions
- systematic signal failure in the adverse conditions of that day due to a vulnerability to accumulation of snow and ice
Additional factors in the second accident were:
- inadequate braking performance of the second express
- failure to implement emergency procedures promptly and correctly
The accident (and the subsequent inquiry into it) led to fundamental changes in British railway signalling practice.
Overview
A coal train preceding the Flying Scotsman on the main East Coast up (south-bound) line was normally scheduled to be shunted into a sidingRail siding
A siding, in rail terminology, is a low-speed track section distinct from a running line or through route such as a main line or branch line or spur. It may connect to through track or to other sidings at either end...
at Abbots Ripton
Abbots Ripton
Abbots Ripton is a village and civil parish in Cambridgeshire, England. It is situated five miles north of Huntingdon, on the B1090...
to allow the much faster Flying Scotsman to pass. Because of a very bad snowstorm, both the coal train and the Flying Scotsman were running late and the signalman
Signalman (rail)
A signalman or signaller is an employee of a railway transport network who operates the points and signals from a signal box in order to control the movement of trains.- History :...
at Holme
Holme, Cambridgeshire
Holme is a village in Huntingdonshire , England, near Conington and Yaxley, and south of Peterborough.- The village :...
, the next station north of Abbots Ripton, judged that the coal train needed to go into sidings at Holme if it was not to delay the Flying Scotsman. He therefore set his signals to (as he thought) stop the coal train. However it continued on the main line, reached Abbots Ripton and had nearly completed shunting into the siding there when the Flying Scotsman ran into it at speed. The wreckage obstructed the down (northbound) line and a second collision occurred some minutes later when a northbound express to Leeds
Leeds
Leeds is a city and metropolitan borough in West Yorkshire, England. In 2001 Leeds' main urban subdivision had a population of 443,247, while the entire city has a population of 798,800 , making it the 30th-most populous city in the European Union.Leeds is the cultural, financial and commercial...
crashed into the wreckage. Thirteen passengers lost their lives in the collisions, and 53 passengers and 6 traincrew members were injured.
The Great Northern was operating on the block
British absolute block signalling
The principle of the British absolute block system of railway signalling is to ensure the safe operation of a railway by allowing only one train to occupy a defined section of track at a time...
system, which was supposed to eliminate such accidents, so the accident caused considerable alarm. It was soon established that the main problem was with signals and snow:
- the weight of snow on the semaphore arm and/or snow and ice on the wires by which the arm should be moved had meant that when signalmen had pulled levers to set signals to danger the signals did not actually move to the 'danger' position
- in normal conditions, signalmen could see the signals they were controlling - in a snowstorm they could not
The coal train had therefore seen nothing to make it stop at Holme, and the Flying Scotsman whilst catching up with it had run through a number of signals which had been set to 'danger' but were in fact showing 'clear'.
Geography
Abbots Ripton is about 4.5 miles (7.2 km) north of HuntingdonHuntingdon
Huntingdon is a market town in Cambridgeshire, England. The town was chartered by King John in 1205. It is the traditional county town of Huntingdonshire, and is currently the seat of the Huntingdonshire district council. It is known as the birthplace in 1599 of Oliver Cromwell.-History:Huntingdon...
on the East Coast main line, on a section which in 1876 was twin track. To prevent slow (typically 20 mph (32 km/h)) goods trains obstructing fast trains such as the ‘Scotch express’ (averaging 45 mph (72 km/h) and hence unofficially nicknamed ‘The Flying Scotsman’ ) stations with ‘shunting sidings’ were provided at frequent intervals. A slow train being caught up with by a faster one would stop at the station and back into the shunting siding (clearing the main line in about 4 minutes) and emerging to resume its journey after the fast train had passed by. Abbots Ripton was one such station; for a south-bound (‘up’) train the previous shunting siding was 9.3 km (5.8 mi) further north at Holme 7 miles (11.3 km) south of Peterborough
Peterborough
Peterborough is a cathedral city and unitary authority area in the East of England, with an estimated population of in June 2007. For ceremonial purposes it is in the county of Cambridgeshire. Situated north of London, the city stands on the River Nene which flows into the North Sea...
.
Block working
Traffic along the line was regulated by block working. Abbots Ripton and Holme had signal boxes and between them were two intermediate boxes. All controlled ‘home’ signals near the box and ‘distant’ signals about half a mile (c 800 m) before the home signals. The line was thus divided into three blocks, each roughly 2 miles (c 3.1 km) long; entry to each block was controlled by the signal box at the start of the block. Shunting into the siding at Abbots Ripton took place in a fourth block. The ‘home’ signals at Abbots Ripton were interlocked with the shunting siding points and therefore whenever the points were open to the main line the Abbots Ripton home signal should be at ‘danger’.All boxes could communicate with adjacent boxes by their block telegraph. Signals were normally kept at ‘all clear’ but were set to ‘danger’ to protect trains as follows. When a train entered a block by passing a home signal, the signalman would set the home signal to “danger”, thus preventing a following train entering the same block. The distant would also be set to 'danger'. Trains were required to stop at a home signal at ‘danger’ but were allowed to pass a distant signal at ‘danger’ this merely warning the driver of an approaching train to moderate speed so that the train could be stopped at the home signal. Both signals would be returned to “all clear” when the next box telegraphed ‘line clear’. Normally, as soon as a train was past a box’s home signal , the signalman would telegraph “line clear” to the preceding box. During foggy or snowy weather, however, when a train stopped at a station ‘line clear’ was not sent until the train had restarted, or been shunted into a siding. In good weather therefore a goods being shunted into a siding at Abbots Ripton should have been protected against another train running into it by the Abbots Ripton ‘home’ and ‘distant’ signals ; in falling snow, the home and distant signals of the previous box should have given further protection and the fast train should always have been at least one full block away.
Signal boxes serving stations/sidings had , as well as the block telegraph a ‘speaking telegraph’ which allowed more sophisticated messages to be sent. For example all stations could kept informed of how late the trains were running.
Signals
The signals used on the Great Northern to work the block system were lower quadrant semaphores.for a drawing & description see http://www.railsigns.co.uk/sect2page1/sect2page1.html A lever in the signal box was connected by a wire (under tension, and passing over intermediate pulleys) to a counterweighted arm on the signal. To set a signal to all clear, the signalman moved a lever in his signal box ; this pulled the arm down against the counterweight until it was pointing vertically down (in which position it was hidden from view, housed in a slot in the signal upright). When the lever was moved to set the signal to danger, this did not positively drive the signal to “danger” but paid out slack in the wire and allowed the counterweight to take the arm to a horizontal position. An intermediate position with the arm pointing downwards at 45 degrees to the signal upright had been used to indicate ‘proceed with caution’ when working to the time interval system. The position was no longer used in the block system, but some witnesses in the inquiry used it as a point of reference for how far below horizontal the signal arms were dippingBy day the signal arms were clearly visible from the signal box from which they were worked; the system therefore had no repeater in the signal box to indicate to a signalman the position a signal was actually at.
In emergency the signal could be set to ‘danger’ by cutting the wire, but a heavy weight lying on the wire would keep the signal at ‘all clear’ by effectively pulling on the wire: since the signals were normally set to ‘all clear’ any fault which stopped them being moved would almost certainly keep them at ‘all clear’ as well.
At night (or in poor visibility in daytime) an oil lamp displayed a white light when the signal was at 'all clear' ; when the signal arm moved to the horizontal “danger” position it brought a red lens in front of the light, so that a (less bright) red light was then displayed to oncoming trains. In poor visibility, GNR regulations called for detonators to be laid if possible on the track at the home signal when this was set to danger; at stations where platelayers were available, this should also be done at the distant signals.
Brakes
The express trains were made up of non-bogie non-corridor four- or six-wheeler carriages. There were 13 on the Leeds express, giving a weight (including the engine and tender) of somewhat over 200 tons. At this period, other railways often had to resort to using more than one engine to maintain a high top speed,; the Great Northern (favoured with one of the best engine classes of the period – the Stirling 8-foot singles) prided itself on not doing so. As with all the other railways, though, it had considerable difficulties in stopping the trains rapidly once they were at speed. To stop a train, the driver could shut off steam, get his fireman to apply a brake To avoid confusion, modern spelling is used, but the prevailing spelling at the time was "break" on the tender and put the engine into reverse. He had no means of applying brakes to the rest of the train; indeed most of the carriages did not have brakes. However, two or three of the carriages did, and each of the brake carriages had its own guard to apply the brakes on that carriage when (and if) he heard the driver ‘whistle for brakes’. In trials carried out after the accident under favourable conditions this was shown to bring the train to rest within 800-1150 yards when travelling at 40-45 mph. The Railway Inspectors considered that much shorter stopping distances would be possible if passenger trains were provided with continuous brakes operable by the driver, and had urged such systems be fitted. This had been resisted by the railway companies as unnecessary, unreliable, expensive and dangerous.Dangerous because it would not increase safety margins once engine drivers realised it allowed them to go faster and/or brake later in safety – similar to the counter-intuitive argument now applied (apparently with some validity) against making cars safer for their drivers - and they would be in a worst case if the brakes failedThe snowstorm
On the afternoon of the 21st the Peterborough-Huntingdon area was experiencing a very bad snow storm; more than one witness at the Inquiry said they had never known worse “freezing blowing and snowing...bad for seeing signals”. Crucially, the snow/sleet fell onto cold ground and equipment and froze on them.Further north telegraph wires accumulated ice to a diameter of 3 inches (75mm) and brought the telegraph poles downThe coal train
The southbound coal train had left Peterborough about 18 minutes late, and therefore with about 12 minutes less lead on the Flying Scotsman than normal. It progressed steadily to Abbots Ripton where it stopped by the signalbox (at about 6.41) and on the instructions of the Abbots Ripton signalman began to shunt (as it would normally have done) into a siding to let the Flying Scotsman overtake. The signalman urged the driver to hurry up, as he was "keeping the Scotchman standing at Wood Walton (the previous signal box)".Events at Holme
The signalman at Holme had been concerned that, because the coal train was so late, if it went to Abbots Ripton before shunting into a siding the Flying Scotsman would be delayed. To avoid this, he had decided to stop the train at Holme and put it into a siding there. He set his signals to danger, but when the coal train arrived at Holme at 6.21 pm it did not stop. He telegraphed to Abbots Ripton that the train had 'run past' the signals,to let Abbots Ripton know they would be shunting the coal train into the siding, not as a warning about signals misbehaving and told the stationmaster at Holme. As the Inquiry report noted "The evidence as to what then happened at the Holme station was unsatisfactorily given, and is not clear"The Holme station master told the enquiry that he then sent for the platelayers; whilst waiting for them he checked the up line home signal and saw it to be at 'danger'. However , when a down express went through he noticed that one of the signals did not go to 'danger' after it had passed.If true, this would be about 6.25, and hence after the Scotsman had left Peterborough (6.24) This appeared considerably at variance with other testimony.
The platelayers had to be sent for because they had been allowed to go home at the end of their normal working day, despite the weather. Their foreman was uneasy about this and came out of his house to watch the up distant signal whilst two trains went past: the first of these was the Manchester express, running about 13 minutes behind the Scotsman; the second a slow stopping passenger train, a further 6 minutes behind when it left Peterborough. As he feared, the signal showed a white light throughout. He put his work clothes back on and went to the signal. The arm was weighed down with snow; once he had shaken this off by working the arm up and down it showed a red light. He then walked to the station; on his way he met a platelayer despatched to the distant signal by the stationmaster.
Other witnesses also gave evidence strongly suggesting that the platelayers were not summoned until after the Scotsman had passed and were not back at work until after the Manchester express had passed (c 6.50.). They reported that other signals (including the up home signal) were - when first checked - in the same state as the up distant. The signalman also claimed that the stationmaster had reported the up home signal to not be working properly.
The Scotch express
The Scotsman had left Peterborough at 6.24 about 6 minutes late. It did not slacken speed for the bad weather; it passed through Holme at about 6.37, no attempt being to hold it there, and arrived at Wood Walton at 6.40. The signalman there had set his signals to 'danger' to protect the shunting at Abbots Ripton, but had not left his levers to set detonators at the home signal, nor did he supplement his fixed signals by displaying a hand-lamp from the signal box. He told the inquiry he was busy stopping a train of empty coal waggons on the down line, and because of the weather he did not hear the express until it ran past his cabin at full speed. At 6.44 the Scotsman reached Abbots Ripton, its driver having seen "nothing but white lights all the way from Peterboro". It was at full speed (40-45 mph) when it crashed into the coal train, which had not yet cleared the main line.Damage
Some coal waggons were smashed, but the coal train engine itself was largely unscathed. The express engine derailed and veered to the right. It ended up lying on its side, beyond the down line. Behind it, its tender and two passenger carriages were obstructing the down line.Sequence of events to the second collision
The railway workers involved were badly shaken, and took a few minutes to gather their wits.Up line
The guard of the express then walked back up the up line towards Wood Walton, laying fog-signals (detonators) on the rails to warn any further trains to stop. Despite the signals showing “all clear”, the Manchester express stopped in response to the Wood Walton signalman using a hand-lamp to show a red light from his signal-box. It finally pulled up beyond the Wood-Walton down distant signal; the Abbots Ripton up-distant signal could be seen ahead showing the clear white “all clear”.which would imply that it took over a mile to stop It then proceeded cautiously towards Abbots Ripton, being stopped successively by the Scotsman guard waving a red hand-lamp and then by a platelayer, eventually drawing up at the rear of the wrecked Scotsman.Down line
The fireman of the coal train similarly laid detonators on the down-line just inside the Abbots Ripton down distant signal, and was then picked up by the coal-train engine running light to Huntingdon to seek assistance. This was at the instigation of a GNR “relief clerk” (i.e. a clerk qualified to act as a ‘’locum’’ stationmaster) who had been travelling on the express.If Abbots Ripton had a station master on duty that night he did not give evidence to the inquiry, nor do other witnesses mention himSpeaking telegraph
The signalman was evidently dazed by the events, but after a delay he tried to send a message reporting the crash and seeking medical assistance. by the speaking telegraph to HuntingdonHuntingdon
Huntingdon is a market town in Cambridgeshire, England. The town was chartered by King John in 1205. It is the traditional county town of Huntingdonshire, and is currently the seat of the Huntingdonshire district council. It is known as the birthplace in 1599 of Oliver Cromwell.-History:Huntingdon...
station to the south.There were two signal boxes at Huntingdon; Huntingdon North and Huntingdon South; both were on the ‘speaking telegraph’ – to contact the stationmaster at Huntingdon to get assistance Abbots Ripton should have 'spoken' to Huntingdon South (which is what he did, or rather attempted); to maximise the chances of getting the train held Huntingdon North (which he did not) He prefixed the message with the special ‘SP’ code indicating top priority but the signalman at Huntingdon did not answer. The Abbots Ripon signalman kept trying to raise Huntingdon, but without success; when the Huntingdon signalman did answer he first refused to accept any message not starting with a code to indicate time sent, and rebuffed subsequent sends with an 'MQ' code - roughly translating as "Go away, I'm busy".
Indeed he was; he was accepting the Leeds express and passing it on to the next signal box.
Block telegraph
On being aware that both the up and down lines were blocked, the Abbots Ripton signalman should have set his signals in both directions to “danger” and used the block telegraph to send the special “line blocked” message – 5 beats/rings to the signal boxes controlling the adjacent blocks. In his confused state, he set his signals but became bogged down in his dealings with Huntingdon and did not send the “line blocked” signal until 6.52 (i.e. about 8 minutes after the accident).The Leeds express
The down Leeds express passed through Huntingdon at about 6.49 (at which time no message had been accepted there from Abbots Ripton) and reached Stukeley (the signal box for the block immediately south of Abbots Ripton) at 6.52. The signal man at Stukeley received the “line blocked” message seconds after the express had passed. The Abbots Ripton down distant signal was showing “all clear” and the Leeds express approached it at full speed.I found a white light at the distant signal at Abbotts Ripton. After passing that signal post, I was alarmed by passing over two fog-signals which exploded; I at once shut off steam and told my mate to put on the tender break. I was then going at 40 or 50 miles an hour. In another instant I met an engine on the up road giving sharp whistles,The coal train engine going to Huntingdon for help Elsewhere Wilson says he ‘whistled for brakes’. The three guards on the express all told the enquiry they applied their brake in response to the whistles of the coal train engine and saw a red lamp from it, which I took to mean that there was something out of the ordinary way. I reversed my engine, and reapplied my steam, and as soon as that was done the collision occurred
The Leeds express ploughed through the tender and carriages blocking the line (this, rather than the first collision, is when most -if not all- of the deaths are thought to have occurred).
Speaking telegraph (again)
The Abbots Ripton signalman had just started his 12-hour shift at 6 p.m. His colleague on the day shift returned to work on hearing of the first collision, arriving soon after the second collision. He took over the speaking telegraph, because whilst the duty signalman appeared to be doing his best to send the message he was confused at the time, and I felt I was more able to send the message than heMessages seeking assistance were then sent to Huntingdon and Peterborough.
Inquiry
A Court of Inquiry was convened, and took evidence from 24 January to 17 February, issuing its report on 23 February. The inquiry rejected the conclusion of the coroner’s jury that the block system was at fault and ‘’had proved ineffective in a case of emergency”, riposting ‘’such a conclusion, natural enough on a superficial view to those who are not thoroughly versed in the subject, really results from a confusion of ideas’’. The problem was with signals, and any system of working railways must be ineffective if signals could not be relied upon.Findings
The immediate cause was the accumulation of snow on the semaphore arms (and/or control wire) of several sets of signals.Popular retellings (including L T C Rolt Red for Danger a standard compendium of British rail accidents) talk of the arm being frozen in the slot but there is no direct statement to that effect in the Inquiry evidence, multiple mentions of the arm having risen part-way, and of the corrective action being to dislodge snow from the partly risen arm. On further inspection, other details in Rolt's account (generally the more dramatic ones) don't match the Inquiry evidence. On the night of the accident the weight of snow on some signal arms meant that the arm balanced well short of the 'danger' position and that the spectacle plate failed to drop sufficiently to move a red lens in front of the white lamp displayed in the "all clear" position. The signal therefore showed a clear white light (apparently "all clear") when the lever in the signal box was set to danger; the snow and ice (in the words of the Inquiry Report) thus rendering the signals to benot only useless for warning by red-lights the engine-driver of the Scotch-express-train, but also a means by the exhibition of white lights of luring him forward at full speed to the collision
The enquiry had heard evidence from experienced working-level witnesses that this (or a milder manifestation of this) was a known problem on snowy days but could easily be fixed if you knew how e.g. by "jiggling the arms". It implicitly rejected the evidence from GNR senior managers who denied that there was any prior history of problems, but made no comment on the discrepancy. No GNR documentation of the problem or how to fix it emerged, nor did all the signalmen and platelayers say they had heard of it; that would tend to suggest that GNR senior management were genuinely unaware.
Operating practice at that time was that the signals were left in the "clear" position continuously unless it was required to protect a static obstruction. Consequently the signals stood at clear for considerable periods of time, and there was little opportunity to spot the problem.
The inquiry report noted various suggested improvements to signal arrangements, but cautioned against over-elaborate solutions
It is well that these and other proposals for improvement, which are constantly invented or advocated, such as combining sight with sound at the signals, and the use of detonators, mechanically applied, to supersede the use of fogmen, should receive full consideration and discussion, after the experience of so terrible an accident, caused mainly by the failure of existing signal-arrangements. But, in the course of such deliberations, the facts must not be lost sight of, that men are still liable to make mistakes, machinery is still liable to fail, and further complication is by no means certain in all cases to produce greater safety
It commented adversely
- on the performance of individuals
- ‘'The want of judgement or precaution exhibited by the station-master at Holme’’ for not stopping the Scotsman and warning its driver of the signal problem
- ‘’The neglect of the Wood Walton signalman’’ in not putting detonators down or exhibiting a red handlamp to the Scotsman
- ‘’The delay of the signalman at the Huntingdon-south” signal box in answering Abbots Ripton
- and without blaming an individual on
- the delay in warning Stukeley of the obstruction on the down linethe evidence would clearly have supported mentioning the Abbots Ripton duty signalman as responsible. The Inquiry report instead considered it unfortunate that he had not retained his prresence of mind, but immediately went on to note that he had attempted to speak Huntingdon within a minute of the crash; the inference is that the inquiry did not think him blameworthy
- the failure to put platelayers at signals as soon as they were needed; to clear the signals of snow or to lay down detonators if the signals could not be got to work
- the running of fast through trains at full speed through such a storm..without the adoption of extra precautions, such as the detention of slower trains, the use of hand-lamps in the signal-cabins, and the employment of platelayers at the signals
- the absence of a speaking telegraph in the intermediate signal boxes
- the lack of continuous brakes on the Leeds express
Recommendations
The Board of TradeBoard of Trade
The Board of Trade is a committee of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom, originating as a committee of inquiry in the 17th century and evolving gradually into a government department with a diverse range of functions...
had no regulatory powers to enforce the recommendations of the inquiry report. The most important were:
- Improving signals so that they work properly in frost and snow, and that they provide an indication to the signalman if they are not operating properly
- Keeping the signals normally at danger, so that if they stick there is unlikely to be a false "clear"
- The use by signalmen of hand lamps in bad weather to confirm the indications of fixed signals
- The provision of telegraph apparatus in all signal boxes
- The improvement of braking systems on trains
- The suspension of less important trains, and the reduction in speed of other trains, in very severe weather conditions.
Consequences
- The GNR adopted a significantly different design of semaphore signal; the 'somersault' signal. In this, the pivot about which the arm moved was at the middle of the arm; other things being equal accumulation of snow should not significantly affect the balance of the arm
- The modern practice of the default position for signals being 'danger' was adopted
- Railway companies were required by law to make an annual return to the Board of Trade on what fraction of their passenger rolling stock was fitted with continuous brakes
Over a longer timescale, and after further accidents
- Continuous braking was fitted to passenger trains
- 'All clear' was indicated by a green light (so that a broken red lens - or one out of position- no longer gave false reassurance)