Armavia Flight 967
Encyclopedia
Armavia Flight 967 was a flight operated by Armavia
, the largest international airline of Armenia
on May 3, 2006, from Yerevan
in Armenia to Sochi
, a Black Sea
coastal resort city in Russia
. The aircraft crashed into the sea while attempting to conduct a go-around
following its first approach to Sochi airport, killing all 113 aboard.
The accident was the first major commercial airline crash in 2006 and the third highest death toll of any accident involving an Airbus A320 after Gulf Air Flight 072
and TAM Airlines Flight 3054
.
(EVN) with a scheduled departure time of 01:45 Armenian Daylight Time (20:45 UTC, May 2) and an arrival time at Adler-Sochi International Airport
(AER) of 02:00 Moscow Daylight Time (22:00 UTC, May 2).
In order to make their decision for departure, the crew obtained the observed weather data and the weather forecast for the takeoff, landing and alternate aerodromes all of which met the requirements for IFR flights. All the crew were correctly licensed and adequately rested to operate the flight.
The airplane took off from Zvartnots airport at 20:47. There were 113 occupants on board: 105 passengers (including 5 children and 1 baby), 2 pilots,1 aircraft engineer and 5 flight attendants. Takeoff, climb and cruise were uneventful.
The first communication between the Sochi approach controller and the crew took place at 21:10. At that moment the airplane was beyond the coverage area of the Sochi radar. Up until 21:17 the approach controller and the crew discussed the observed and forecast weather, and as a result the crew decided to return to Yerevan. At 21:26, after the decision had already been made, the crew asked the controller about the latest observed weather. At 21:30 the controller informed the crew that visibility was 3600 metres (2.2 mi) and the cloud ceiling 170 metre. At 21:31 the crew decided to continue the flight to Sochi airport.
The next communication with the approach controller was at 22:00. At that moment the aircraft was descending to an altitude of 3600 metres (11,811 ft) and was being tracked by the Sochi radar. The approach controller cleared the flight for a descent to 1800 metres (5,905.5 ft) and reported the observed weather at Sochi, as at 22:00, for runway 06, which was above the minimums.
The crew was then handed over to the holding and tower controllers, and was cleared for descent to 600 metres (1,968.5 ft), before entering the turn to the final approach. Whilst performing the turn, the runway extended centreline was overshot. After eliminating the deviation, the crew started descending the aircraft along the glide slope, following the approach pattern.
At 22:10 the crew reported that the gear was down and that they were ready for landing. In response they were advised that they were 10 kilometres (6 mi) from the airport and that the weather was now 4000 metres (2.5 mi) visibility x 190 metre cloud ceiling, and were cleared for landing. However, about 30 seconds later, the controller advised the crew of the observed cloud ceiling at 100 metre and instructed them to cease their descent, abandon the landing attempt, and carry out a right turn and climb to 600 metres (1,968.5 ft) and also to contact the holding controller, who gives instructions for entering the airport's holding pattern.
The last communication with the crew was at 22:12. After that the crew did not respond to any of the controller’s calls. At 22:13 the aircraft struck the water, it broke up on impact.
(CFIT), specifically water, while conducting a climbing manoeuvre after an aborted approach to Sochi airport at night with weather conditions below landing minimums for runway 06.
While performing the climb with the autopilot disengaged, the Captain, being in a psychoemotional stress condition, made nose down control inputs due to the loss of pitch and roll awareness. This started the abnormal situation. The Captain's insufficient pitch control inputs led to a failure to recover the aircraft and caused it to crash.
Along with the inadequate control inputs from the Captain, the contributing factors of the crash were also the lack of monitoring the aircraft's pitch attitude, altitude and vertical speed by the First Officer and no proper reaction by the crew to GPWS warnings
Armavia
Air Company "Armavia" is an airline with its head office on the grounds of Zvartnots International Airport in Zvartnots, Armenia, near Yerevan. It operates international passenger services from Yerevan to destinations in Europe and Asia...
, the largest international airline of Armenia
Armenia
Armenia , officially the Republic of Armenia , is a landlocked mountainous country in the Caucasus region of Eurasia...
on May 3, 2006, from Yerevan
Yerevan
Yerevan is the capital and largest city of Armenia and one of the world's oldest continuously-inhabited cities. Situated along the Hrazdan River, Yerevan is the administrative, cultural, and industrial center of the country...
in Armenia to Sochi
Sochi
Sochi is a city in Krasnodar Krai, Russia, situated just north of Russia's border with the de facto independent republic of Abkhazia, on the Black Sea coast. Greater Sochi sprawls for along the shores of the Black Sea near the Caucasus Mountains...
, a Black Sea
Black Sea
The Black Sea is bounded by Europe, Anatolia and the Caucasus and is ultimately connected to the Atlantic Ocean via the Mediterranean and the Aegean seas and various straits. The Bosphorus strait connects it to the Sea of Marmara, and the strait of the Dardanelles connects that sea to the Aegean...
coastal resort city in Russia
Russia
Russia or , officially known as both Russia and the Russian Federation , is a country in northern Eurasia. It is a federal semi-presidential republic, comprising 83 federal subjects...
. The aircraft crashed into the sea while attempting to conduct a go-around
Go-around
A go-around is an aborted landing of an aircraft that is on final approach.- Origin of the term :The term arises from the traditional use of traffic patterns at airfields. A landing aircraft will first join the circuit pattern and prepare for landing in an orderly fashion...
following its first approach to Sochi airport, killing all 113 aboard.
The accident was the first major commercial airline crash in 2006 and the third highest death toll of any accident involving an Airbus A320 after Gulf Air Flight 072
Gulf Air Flight 072
On 23 August 2000, Gulf Air Flight 072 crashed into the Persian Gulf on approach to Bahrain International Airport from Cairo.-Flight and investigation:...
and TAM Airlines Flight 3054
TAM Airlines Flight 3054
TAM Airlines Flight 3054 was an Airbus A320 airliner, registration PR-MBK, operating as a scheduled domestic passenger flight between Porto Alegre and São Paulo, Brazil, which crashed upon landing during rain in São Paulo on July 17, 2007...
.
History
The aircraft was operating a flight from Zvartnots International AirportZvartnots International Airport
Zvartnots International Airport is located near Zvartnots, west of Yerevan, the capital city of Armenia. The airport was built in 1961. It is now the busiest airport in Armenia and the Caucasus. The draftsmen of the airport included architects M. Khachikyan, A. Tarkhanyan, J. Sheqhlyan, L....
(EVN) with a scheduled departure time of 01:45 Armenian Daylight Time (20:45 UTC, May 2) and an arrival time at Adler-Sochi International Airport
Adler-Sochi International Airport
Sochi International Airport is an airport located in Adler District of the resort city of Sochi, on the coast of the Black Sea in the federal subject of Krasnodar Krai, Russia....
(AER) of 02:00 Moscow Daylight Time (22:00 UTC, May 2).
In order to make their decision for departure, the crew obtained the observed weather data and the weather forecast for the takeoff, landing and alternate aerodromes all of which met the requirements for IFR flights. All the crew were correctly licensed and adequately rested to operate the flight.
The airplane took off from Zvartnots airport at 20:47. There were 113 occupants on board: 105 passengers (including 5 children and 1 baby), 2 pilots,1 aircraft engineer and 5 flight attendants. Takeoff, climb and cruise were uneventful.
The first communication between the Sochi approach controller and the crew took place at 21:10. At that moment the airplane was beyond the coverage area of the Sochi radar. Up until 21:17 the approach controller and the crew discussed the observed and forecast weather, and as a result the crew decided to return to Yerevan. At 21:26, after the decision had already been made, the crew asked the controller about the latest observed weather. At 21:30 the controller informed the crew that visibility was 3600 metres (2.2 mi) and the cloud ceiling 170 metre. At 21:31 the crew decided to continue the flight to Sochi airport.
The next communication with the approach controller was at 22:00. At that moment the aircraft was descending to an altitude of 3600 metres (11,811 ft) and was being tracked by the Sochi radar. The approach controller cleared the flight for a descent to 1800 metres (5,905.5 ft) and reported the observed weather at Sochi, as at 22:00, for runway 06, which was above the minimums.
The crew was then handed over to the holding and tower controllers, and was cleared for descent to 600 metres (1,968.5 ft), before entering the turn to the final approach. Whilst performing the turn, the runway extended centreline was overshot. After eliminating the deviation, the crew started descending the aircraft along the glide slope, following the approach pattern.
At 22:10 the crew reported that the gear was down and that they were ready for landing. In response they were advised that they were 10 kilometres (6 mi) from the airport and that the weather was now 4000 metres (2.5 mi) visibility x 190 metre cloud ceiling, and were cleared for landing. However, about 30 seconds later, the controller advised the crew of the observed cloud ceiling at 100 metre and instructed them to cease their descent, abandon the landing attempt, and carry out a right turn and climb to 600 metres (1,968.5 ft) and also to contact the holding controller, who gives instructions for entering the airport's holding pattern.
The last communication with the crew was at 22:12. After that the crew did not respond to any of the controller’s calls. At 22:13 the aircraft struck the water, it broke up on impact.
Passengers
Most of the passengers were Armenians. According to reports, the flight had 85 Armenian citizens, 26 Russian citizens, one Georgian citizen, and one Ukrainian citizen.Primary Conclusions of the Final Accident Report
The crash of Armavia Flight 967 was a Controlled flight into terrainControlled flight into terrain
Controlled flight into terrain describes an accident in which an airworthy aircraft, under pilot control, is unintentionally flown into the ground, a mountain, water, or an obstacle. The term was coined by engineers at Boeing in the late 1970s...
(CFIT), specifically water, while conducting a climbing manoeuvre after an aborted approach to Sochi airport at night with weather conditions below landing minimums for runway 06.
While performing the climb with the autopilot disengaged, the Captain, being in a psychoemotional stress condition, made nose down control inputs due to the loss of pitch and roll awareness. This started the abnormal situation. The Captain's insufficient pitch control inputs led to a failure to recover the aircraft and caused it to crash.
Along with the inadequate control inputs from the Captain, the contributing factors of the crash were also the lack of monitoring the aircraft's pitch attitude, altitude and vertical speed by the First Officer and no proper reaction by the crew to GPWS warnings
Contributory Factors and Shortcomings
| Time | Factor or Shortcoming | Applicable Policy |
|---|---|---|
| During descent and approach the crew constantly held conversations having nothing to do with the operation of the aircraft. | ||
| The A320 Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM), which was approved by the Civil Aviation Administration of the Republic of Armenia and according to which the Captain passed his training before starting flights with the airline, does not contain the requirement for passing the Upgrade to Captain programme. The Captain did not pass this training. This training programme was made mandatory in the next revision of the FCTM. | A320 Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) | |
| The Flight Operations Department of Armavia does not comply with the requirement that airlines analyse flight operations with the use of the flight data recorder Flight data recorder A flight data recorder is an electronic device employed to record any instructions sent to any electronic systems on an aircraft. It is a device used to record specific aircraft performance parameters... and cockpit voice recorder Cockpit voice recorder A cockpit voice recorder , often referred to as a "black box", is a flight recorder used to record the audio environment in the flight deck of an aircraft for the purpose of investigation of accidents and incidents... recordings for aircraft with the certified maximum takeoff weight exceeding 27000 kilogram. As such it was impossible to completely evaluate the professional skill levels of the flight crew members. |
ROLRGA RA Section 11.2 and ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization The International Civil Aviation Organization , pronounced , , is a specialized agency of the United Nations. It codifies the principles and techniques of international air navigation and fosters the planning and development of international air transport to ensure safe and orderly growth... Annex 6 Part 1 Chapter 3 |
|
| Armavia does not keep records on the approaches and landings in complicated weather conditions performed by their Captains. | ROLRGA RA-2000 Sections 4.5.33 and 6.1.5 | |
| 21:16 | Sochi approach control advised the crew of the trend weather forecast for landing as 1500 metre (0.93205910497471 mi) visibility x 150 metre cloud ceiling and did not identify the trend as “AT TIMES”. This inaccuracy while reporting the weather to the crew was not directly connected with the cause of the aircraft accident, but it influenced the initial decision of the crew to return to Zvartnots. | |
| 22:01 | The approach controller advised the crew of the observed weather at Sochi and by mistake said the cloud ceiling was “considerable" at 1800 metre, instead of 180 metre, however this did not influence the Captain’s decision. | |
| 22:03 | The crew did not report (and the holding controller did not request them to report) the selected system and mode of instrument approach Instrument approach For aircraft operating under instrument flight rules , an instrument approach or instrument approach procedure is a series of predetermined maneuvers for the orderly transfer of an aircraft under instrument flight conditions from the beginning of the initial approach to a landing, or to a point... . |
Holding Controller’s Operation Manual, Section 4, item 4.2.1 |
| 22:11 | The final controller at Sochi was informed by the weather observer of the current observed weather: A cloud ceiling of 100 metre, below the established minimums (cloud ceiling 170 metre and visibility 2500 metres (1.6 mi)). Based on this information, the final controller instructed the crew: “Abort descent, clouds at 100 metre, right-hand turn, climb to 600 metre”, instructions not compliant with regulations. However, the controller had a right to order the go-around. | Civil Flight Operations Guidance 85 Section 6.5.16 and the Final Controller’s Operation Manual, items 4.3 and 4.3.1 |
| The controller had a right to order the go-around. | The AIP of Russia | |
| The weather forecast for Sochi for the period from 18:00 to 03:00 was not verified with regard to visibility in the “At times” group. | ||
| 22:11 | The weather observer did not complete the special weather report when the cloud ceiling descended to 100 metre, though to do so was required. | Guidance for Meteorological Support in Civil Aviation 95, Sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 d; Instruction for meteorological support at Sochi; Criteria for Issuance of a Special Weather Report, Annex 8 |
| The recommendation for ATIS broadcast was not entirely fulfilled. | Federal Air Transport Administration and Hydrometeorology and Environment Monitoring Service Joint Order No. 62/41 “On approval and implementation of Instruction for ATIS broadcast content in English and Russian” of 20 March 2000 | |
| In the course of reading out FDR data, a number of discrepancies were found in the documentation describing the logic of binary signal recordings. | ||
| While performing manoeuvres in the landing configuration with the autopilot and autothrust engaged, the LOW ENERGY WARNING may sound, which Airbus considers as an abnormal situation. |
Safety recommendations
To eliminate the shortcomings revealed during investigation of this accident, the final accident report made 22 safety recommendations as follows:| Number of Recommendations |
Target |
|---|---|
| 5 | Aviation administrations of the CIS countries |
| 1 | Aviation administrations of the CIS countries jointly with industrial and scientific and research organizations |
| 6 | Civil Aviation Administration of the Republic of Armenia and Armavia airline administration |
| 2 | Federal Air Navigation Service of the Russian Federation |
| 2 | Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring |
| 2 | Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Corporation for Air Traffic Management" |
| 4 | Airbus Industrie |
See also
- List of notable accidents and incidents on commercial aircraft
- Flash Airlines Flight 604Flash Airlines flight 604Flash Airlines Flight 604 was a charter flight operated by Egyptian charter company Flash Airlines. On 3 January 2004, the Boeing 737-300 crashed into the Red Sea shortly after takeoff from Sharm el-Sheikh International Airport, killing all 142 passengers, many of them French tourists, and all six...
- Airblue Flight 202Airblue Flight 202Airblue Flight 202 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight which crashed on 28 July 2010 near Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, killing all 146 passengers and six crew on board. It is the deadliest air accident to occur in Pakistan to date...
External links
- Final accident report - Interstate Aviation Committee - English translation done by and hosted by the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation CivileBureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'Aviation CivileThe Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile is an agency of the French government, responsible for investigating aviation accidents and making safety recommendations based on what is learned from those investigations. It is headquartered in Building 153 on the grounds...
(BEA) (Archive) - Investigation and Report (Archive) - Interstate Aviation Committee - The Russian version is the version of record
- Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation CivileBureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'Aviation CivileThe Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile is an agency of the French government, responsible for investigating aviation accidents and making safety recommendations based on what is learned from those investigations. It is headquartered in Building 153 on the grounds...
- " Accident near Sochi on 2 May 2006." (Archive)
- CNN Report on May 2 at night (EDT)
- Armeniapedia.org article on the crash
- BBC – Hunt for Armenia air crash bodies
- AirDisaster.com - Armenian A320 crashes into Black Sea
- ARMAVIA FLIGHT RNV 967 ACCIDENT IN SOCHI, RUSSIA - AirbusAirbusAirbus SAS is an aircraft manufacturing subsidiary of EADS, a European aerospace company. Based in Blagnac, France, surburb of Toulouse, and with significant activity across Europe, the company produces around half of the world's jet airliners....