Frankfurt counterexamples
Encyclopedia
Frankfurt cases were presented by philosopher
Harry Frankfurt
in 1969 as counterexamples to the "principle of alternative possibilities" or PAP, which holds that an agent is morally responsible
for an action only if causal determinism is false.
, as detailed below:
(1) PAP: An agent is responsible for an action only if said agent could have done otherwise.
(2) An agent could have done otherwise only if causal determinism is false.
(3) Therefore, an agent is responsible for an action only if causal determinism is false.
Traditionally, compatibilists
(defenders of the compatibility of free will
and determinism, like Alfred Ayer
, Walter Terence Stace
and Daniel C. Dennett) reject premise two, arguing that, properly understood, free will is not incompatible with determinism. According to the traditional compatibilist analysis of free will, an agent is free to do otherwise when he would have done otherwise had he wanted to do otherwise (Ayer, 1954). Agents may possess free will, according to the conditional analysis, even if determinism is true.
Frankfurt's examples are significant because they suggest an alternative way to defend the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, in particular by rejecting the first premise of the argument. According to this view, responsibility is compatible with determinism because responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise.
Frankfurt's examples involve agents who are intuitively responsible for their behaviour even though they lack the freedom to act otherwise. Here is a typical case:
If Frankfurt is correct in suggesting both that Donald is morally responsible for voting Democratic and that he is not free to do otherwise, moral responsibility, in general, does not require that an agent have the freedom to do otherwise (that is, the principle of alternate possibilities is false). Thus, even if causal determinism is true, and even if determinism removes the freedom to do otherwise, there is no reason to doubt that people can still be morally responsible for their behaviour.
Having rebutted the principle of alternate possibilities, Frankfurt suggests that it be revised to take into account the fallacy of the notion that coercion precludes an agent from moral responsibility. It must be only because of coercion that the agent acts as he does. The best definition, by his reckoning, is this: "[A] person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise."
in his "Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame" (*Ethics* issue 108 in July 1998) provides a more specific answer to proposed problems with Frankfurt's counterexamples. In the article, Otsuka says,
"my strategy is to propose that the Principle of Alternate Possibilities be rejected in favor of a different incompatibilist principle," that is, different from Frankfurt's, "that I call the 'Principle of Avoidable Blame'."
Philosophy
Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems, such as those connected with existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language. Philosophy is distinguished from other ways of addressing such problems by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on rational...
Harry Frankfurt
Harry Frankfurt
Harry Gordon Frankfurt is an American philosopher. He is professor emeritus of philosophy at Princeton University and has previously taught at Yale University and Rockefeller University. He obtained his B.A. in 1949 and Ph.D. in 1954 from...
in 1969 as counterexamples to the "principle of alternative possibilities" or PAP, which holds that an agent is morally responsible
Moral responsibility
Moral responsibility usually refers to the idea that a person has moral obligations in certain situations. Disobeying moral obligations, then, becomes grounds for justified punishment. Deciding what justifies punishment, if anything, is a principle concern of ethics.People who have moral...
for an action only if causal determinism is false.
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities
The principle of alternative possibilities forms part of an influential argument for the incompatibility of responsibility and causal determinismDeterminism
Determinism is the general philosophical thesis that states that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen. There are many versions of this thesis. Each of them rests upon various alleged connections, and interdependencies of things and...
, as detailed below:
(1) PAP: An agent is responsible for an action only if said agent could have done otherwise.
(2) An agent could have done otherwise only if causal determinism is false.
(3) Therefore, an agent is responsible for an action only if causal determinism is false.
Traditionally, compatibilists
Compatibilism
Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent. It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define 'free will' in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism...
(defenders of the compatibility of free will
Free will
"To make my own decisions whether I am successful or not due to uncontrollable forces" -Troy MorrisonA pragmatic definition of free willFree will is the ability of agents to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints. The existence of free will and its exact nature and definition have long...
and determinism, like Alfred Ayer
Alfred Ayer
Sir Alfred Jules "Freddie" Ayer was a British philosopher known for his promotion of logical positivism, particularly in his books Language, Truth, and Logic and The Problem of Knowledge ....
, Walter Terence Stace
Walter Terence Stace
Walter Terence Stace was a British civil servant, educator, philosopher and epistemologist, who wrote on Hegel, Mysticism, and Moral relativism...
and Daniel C. Dennett) reject premise two, arguing that, properly understood, free will is not incompatible with determinism. According to the traditional compatibilist analysis of free will, an agent is free to do otherwise when he would have done otherwise had he wanted to do otherwise (Ayer, 1954). Agents may possess free will, according to the conditional analysis, even if determinism is true.
Frankfurt's objection
From the PAP definition "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise", Frankfurt infers that a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he could not have done otherwise – a point with which he takes issue: our theoretical ability to do otherwise, he says, does not necessarily make it possible for us to do otherwise.Frankfurt's examples are significant because they suggest an alternative way to defend the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, in particular by rejecting the first premise of the argument. According to this view, responsibility is compatible with determinism because responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise.
Frankfurt's examples involve agents who are intuitively responsible for their behaviour even though they lack the freedom to act otherwise. Here is a typical case:
- Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote for the DemocratsDemocratic Party (United States)The Democratic Party is one of two major contemporary political parties in the United States, along with the Republican Party. The party's socially liberal and progressive platform is largely considered center-left in the U.S. political spectrum. The party has the lengthiest record of continuous...
; in fact, only in one particular circumstance will he not: that is, if he thinks about the prospects of immediate American defeat in IraqIraqIraq ; officially the Republic of Iraq is a country in Western Asia spanning most of the northwestern end of the Zagros mountain range, the eastern part of the Syrian Desert and the northern part of the Arabian Desert....
just prior to voting. Ms White, a representative of the Democratic Party, wants to ensure that Donald votes Democratic, so she secretly plants a device in Donald's head that, if activated, will force him to vote Democratic. Not wishing to reveal her presence unnecessarily, Ms White plans to activate the device only if Donald thinks about the Iraq War prior to voting. As things happen, Donald does not think about Iraq prior to voting, so Ms White thus sees no reason to activate the device, and Donald votes Democratic of his own accord. Apparently, Donald is responsible for voting Democratic although, owing to Ms. White's device, he lacks freedom to do otherwise.
If Frankfurt is correct in suggesting both that Donald is morally responsible for voting Democratic and that he is not free to do otherwise, moral responsibility, in general, does not require that an agent have the freedom to do otherwise (that is, the principle of alternate possibilities is false). Thus, even if causal determinism is true, and even if determinism removes the freedom to do otherwise, there is no reason to doubt that people can still be morally responsible for their behaviour.
Having rebutted the principle of alternate possibilities, Frankfurt suggests that it be revised to take into account the fallacy of the notion that coercion precludes an agent from moral responsibility. It must be only because of coercion that the agent acts as he does. The best definition, by his reckoning, is this: "[A] person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise."
Legacy
Michael OtsukaMichael Otsuka
Michael Otsuka is Professor of Philosophy at University College London. He previously taught at UCLA and the University of Colorado. He has written extensively in political philosophy on topics such as equality and left-libertarianism...
in his "Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame" (*Ethics* issue 108 in July 1998) provides a more specific answer to proposed problems with Frankfurt's counterexamples. In the article, Otsuka says,
"my strategy is to propose that the Principle of Alternate Possibilities be rejected in favor of a different incompatibilist principle," that is, different from Frankfurt's, "that I call the 'Principle of Avoidable Blame'."